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Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy 
Allison K. Hoffman
ABSTRACT
The last several decades of health law and policy have been built on a foundation of economic 
theory.  This theory supported the proliferation of market-based policies that promised maximum 
efficiency and minimal bureaucracy.  Neither of these promises has been realized.  A mounting 
body of empirical research discussed in this Article makes clear that leading market-based 
health care policies are not efficient—they fail to capture what people want.  People struggle 
when making choices, and they often choose poorly.  Even more, this Article describes how the 
failed struggle to bolster these policies—through constant regulatory, technocratic tinkering that 
aims to improve the market and the decisionmaking of consumers in it—has produced a massive 
market bureaucracy.
To illustrate the growth of the market bureaucracy, this Article traces the origin and development 
of several market-based theories that have been central to the modern era of health policy and law. 
The first, called managed competition, looks to consumerism in insurance markets and contends 
that people will choose wisely among health plan options, and their choices will drive higher value 
health care.  The second, sometimes called consumer-driven health care, relies on consumerism 
when using medical care.  The notion is that when people are subject to a share of the costs, they will 
more selectively choose when and where to use medical care and will avoid low-value products or 
services.  The final example considers the application of antitrust to health care mergers, ostensibly 
to create a competitive field on which consumerism can flourish.
This Article shows that, in application, these ideas have not, nor will ever, deliver as imagined 
in a world that deviates irreconcilably from theory.  Nonetheless, these ideas continue to spawn 
a vast web of health law and regulation in their support.  The cost of this market bureaucracy 
includes the scaffolding to hold up an ineffective market-based structure and, more importantly, 
the opportunity cost of foregone alternatives to solve important health care system challenges.
Health care’s market bureaucracy endures in light of repeated failure in part, as others have 
discussed, due to politics and political economy.  Yet, this Article suggests that it persists 
equally because of its role in the sanctification of values of individualism and choice.  Choice 
seems especially appealing when it comes to decisions about our health.  We want to believe 
we are in control.  Yet, choice as translated into market-based policies has proven empty. 
Understanding that markets do not actually enhance meaningful choice—and are as bureaucratic 
as any other approach—can clear the way to ask how to design better health law and policy.
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INTRODUCTION 
Health policy and law is in flux.  For most of its history, health law focused 
on the doctor and his patient, guided primarily by the goal of fostering the 
medical profession and protecting physician autonomy.1  The law gradually took 
equal interest in protecting patients’ autonomy.  One way this interest has 
manifested most recently is in patients’ role as consumers in a health care 
marketplace, as economic theory has emerged as the guiding light of health 
regulation.2 
Patients as consumers are now charged with using their purchasing power 
to solve what are considered health care’s most intractable problems: relatively 
high spending and poor outcomes in the United States.3  The United States 
spends nearly one-fifth of its gross domestic product on health care,4 more than 
all other peer nations and over 50 percent more than France, Germany, or 
Canada.5  Yet, we fall comparatively and embarrassingly short on key health 
outcomes, including life expectancy and infant mortality, as well as on subjective 
patient experience.6  
 
1. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE: THE RISE OF A 
SOVEREIGN PROFESSION AND THE MAKING OF A VAST INDUSTRY 27 (1982) (“Throughout the 
medical system, the profession was able by 1920—and for the next half century—to 
establish organizational structures that preserved a distinct sphere of professional 
dominance and autonomy.”). 
2. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN 
FOR HEALTH SECURITY 156 (1997) (“In the health policy community, the most influential 
ideas have been associated with economists.”). 
3. TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN 
MOVEMENT (2007); Carl E. Schneider & Mark A. Hall, The Patient Life: Can Consumers 
Direct Health Care?, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2009). 
4. National Health Expenditure Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html [https://perma.cc/SG66-P7MJ] (last 
updated Apr. 26, 2019). 
5. See ERIC C. SCHNEIDER ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MIRROR, MIRROR 2017: 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON REFLECTS FLAWS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BETTER U.S. HEALTH 
CARE 4 (2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/documents/ 
___media_files_publications_fund_report_2017_jul_schneider_mirror_mirror_2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FJ9F-KPJZ]. 
6. Id. at 8–9, 11–12 (describing higher rates of mortality amenable to health care than peer 
nations, lower life expectancy, and higher infant mortality rates, even despite relative strong 
performance on things like in-hospital mortality after health attack or stroke); for more on 
high rates of infant mortality, see Marian F. MacDorman et al., Recent Increases in the U.S. 
Maternal Mortality Rate: Disentangling Trends From Measurement Issues, 128 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 447, 453 (2016).  There is no neat explanation for this divergence.  Poor 
outcomes remain after adjusting for demographics.  And, higher spending is not easily 
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The United States is also unique in that it now relies on competition and 
consumer choice to attempt to fix the disparity between spending and outcomes.  
Market-based solutions enticingly promise patients control of their care, rather 
than relinquishing authority to doctors or insurers, as had been the practice in 
medicine in earlier eras.7  With the right incentives, theory predicts, consumers 
will select what they value most.8  In turn, health regulation has increasingly 
become a tool to define and lubricate markets, and a profession once exempt 
from competitive concerns is now consumed by them. 
Market-based approaches have dominated all U.S. regulatory fields since 
the Reagan revolution.  In this Article, I focus on the particular dysfunction that 
has resulted in health care regulation, where conditions are especially 
unconducive to consumerism and where getting regulation right is critically 
important for a massive industry that deals with life and death. 
The turn to markets in health law and policy has been widespread and 
apartisan,9 favored by the Reagan and Clinton Administrations alike.  When 
President Obama assembled his health reform team, he turned to economists and 
economic theories.10  These advisors brought market-based ideas, which formed 
the bedrock of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and of 
 
justified by investing in innovation.  Evidence in many areas suggests that we have reached 
the flat of the curve, where “innovation” does not improve outcomes.  See, e.g., Jonathan S. 
Skinner et al., Is Technological Change in Medicine Always Worth It?  The Case of Acute 
Myocardial Infarction, 25 HEALTH AFF. 34 (2006); see also discussion and sources infra 
note 321. 
7. STARR, supra note 1, at 27 (1982) (describing deference to the profession); see Schneider & 
Hall, supra note 3, at 10 (“Managed care has had successes in controlling costs, but it has been 
savaged by patients who felt they were losing control of their medical care and by doctors 
who felt they were losing control of their work.”); see also William M. Sage, Regulating 
Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 
(1999) (describing a shift from regulatory solutions to disclosure-based solutions that try to 
improve purchasing through more information on pricing and quality). 
8. As Deborah Stone, a skeptic, describes: “[M]arket reforms invite people to treat their health as 
a consumer good and to approach diagnostic, curative, preventive, and rehabilitative services 
as if they were part of the family market basket.”  Deborah Stone, The False Promise of 
Consumer Choice, 51 ST. LOUIS L.J. 475, 477 (2007). 
9. ROBERT I. FIELD, MOTHER OF INVENTION: HOW THE GOVERNMENT CREATED FREE-MARKET 
HEALTH CARE (2014); Stone, supra note 8, at 477 (“Indeed, the health sector has been 
more dramatically reconfigured according to market theory than any other sector of 
social policy.”). 
10. Glenn Kessler, Did Jonathan Gruber Earn ‘Almost $400,000’ from the Obama Administration, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/ 
11/14/did-jonathan-gruber-earn-almost-400000-from-the-obama-administration/?arc404=true 
(discussing role of Gruber’s work and Microsimulation Model in the design of the 2006 
Massachusetts reform and the ACA); Kevin Sack, Health Plan from Obama Spurs Debate, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/ 23/us/23health.html (citing 
economist David Cutler as an early influential advisor). 
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thousands of pages of rules and regulations to direct market dynamics.  Likewise, 
after the election of President Trump, the administration and Republican United 
States Congress sought to scale back comprehensive insurance coverage based on 
the economic theory that people will spend more judiciously with their own 
money at stake.11  Scholars and think tanks, in turn, have focused on regulating 
markets through constant technocratic tinkering, rarely pausing to reevaluate or 
challenge their prominence.12 
Market-based policies are hailed as offering two main advantages: being 
more efficient and less bureaucratic than alternatives.13  Efficiency is defined as 
 
11. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,813, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (Oct. 17, 1017) (encouraging increased 
uptake of Association Health Plans, short-term plans, and Health Reimbursement 
Accounts); American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. tit. II, subtit. A 
(2017) (promoting tax favored health savings accounts in House Bill that passed house on 
May 4, 2017). 
12. See K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 5–7 (2017) (describing the 
managerialist approach from the New Deal to the present and its reliance on expertise that 
coexists with the centrality of markets).  Even health law literature that recognizes the 
problems with consumerism often works within its paradigm.  See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Carl 
E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 
106 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2008) (describing doctrinal approaches that give patients the benefit 
of the doubt because of their compromised bargaining position for medical care); Russell 
Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law 
and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV 523, 526–27 (2014) 
(acknowledging problems people have making insurance decisions but proposing an 
alternative that requires they do so).  But see, e.g., Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social 
Justice, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 47, 51–52 (2014) (noting increased attention to 
collective needs and social determinants of health, rather than just individual preferences); 
Stone, supra note 8 (critiquing the rise of consumer choice and free markets in health care). 
13. There are softer and harder versions of pro-market arguments, which vary in level of 
commitment to an unregulated market.  Harder versions argue that government should be 
reduced to zero, or close to zero.  See e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY (1973); 
EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL LIFE (2015).  Softer versions concede government regulation for limited functions, 
such as to provide public goods that private providers might undersupply.  See, e.g., F.A. 
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 45 (1944) (rejecting the elimination of government); MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) (arguing that the government role includes 
enforcing law and order, diminishing “neighborhood effects” and controlling money); 
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) (arguing for a minimalist state, arising 
from anarchy).  In health care, pro-market arguments universally recognize some role for 
regulation, primarily to correct for market failures.  See generally CHARLES SILVER & DAVID A. 
HYMAN, OVERCHARGED: WHY AMERICANS PAY TOO MUCH FOR HEALTH CARE (2018) (arguing 
that consumer control over spending is the only way to control health care spending); CLARK 
C. HAVIGHURST, DEREGULATING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY: PLANNING FOR COMPETITION 
(1982) (arguing for deregulation to create a competitive market); MARK V. PAULY, MERCATUS 
CENTER, GIVING COMPETITION IN MEDICAL CARE AND HEALTH INSURANCE A CHANCE (2019), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/pauly-competition-medical-care-mercatus-research-
v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/8V4D-WJWL] (discussing empirical evidence on competition and 
where regulation is beneficial); James F. Blumstein & Michael Zubkoff, Perspectives on 
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producing what people want—maximizing their preferences, to put it in 
economic terms.  Markets are held up as the singular vehicle to achieve this goal, 
and thus to honor autonomy and choice.  Through such framing, individual 
choice has emerged as a sacred value in health care decisionmaking—where 
decisions are often scientifically imprecise, deeply personal, and potentially very 
expensive.14  Promises of market choice now pervade all corners of health care.  
You can choose your own insurance plan.  You can choose your own doctor.  
You can choose your hospital, imaging center, pharmacy, urgent care facility, lab, 
and outpatient surgical center.  You can choose your own procedures, drugs, and 
course of treatment.  You can get your care at CVS, or in India.  Market choice is 
sold as equivalent to freedom. 
Regulation, in ironic contrast, is critiqued as ill-suited to provide what 
people want.  In Richard Epstein and David Hyman’s words: “No administrative 
agency or committee of experts, no matter how well intentioned and highly 
credentialed, will be able to do a better job of meeting consumer demands than 
the private market.”15  In the private health care market, they posit that 
competition among businesses will in theory generate an array of options, 
allowing people to make individualized decisions. 
The second promise of market-based policy is limited government and, in 
turn, less opportunity for government failure.  Even though most experts concede 
markets need some regulatory structuring to exist,16 proponents claim 
government regulation can and should be more limited in a market-based 
 
Government Policy in the Health Sector, 51 MILBANK Q. 395, 401 (1973) (describing the public 
finance criteria for government intervention—externalities, public goods, monopoly, and 
market imperfections—and how they apply in health); Richard A. Epstein & David A. 
Hyman, Fixing Obamacare: The Virtues of Choice, Competition, and Deregulation, 68 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 493, 495, 517–536 (2013) (mapping out health care deregulation yet 
yielding the possible need for some price control).  For a version of a health care system closer 
to complete deregulation, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT 
TO HEALTH CARE? (1997). 
14. Cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and Taboo Cognitions, 7 
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320 (2003) (describing how commitment to some values becomes 
sacred, where tradeoffs with secular value of money or convenience is unthinkable, unless 
those tradeoffs are reframed rhetorically); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral 
Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2014) (describing choice 
bias as broadly driven by the rise of behavioral law and economics and its “presumption or 
precommitment in favor of choice-preserving regulatory options over others”). 
15. Epstein & Hyman, supra note 13, at 537. 
16. STEVEN K. VOGEL, MARKETCRAFT: HOW GOVERNMENTS MAKE MARKETS WORK (2018) 
(describing the many forms of public and private market governance); see also sources cited 
supra note 13. 
1934 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926 (2019) 
 
system, which will  lessen the influence of bureaucrats, who are criticized as both 
paternalistic and captured by powerful, vested interests.17 
This Article draws from a mountain of empirical evidence to document the 
irrefutable failure of health care’s most popular market-based policies to live up 
to both of these promises.  To the contrary, despite decades of efforts and 
refinement, these policies produce exactly the opposite: a myth of choice and a 
market bureaucracy.  Rather than helping people get what they want, market-
based policies produce a maze of obligations and decisions that confuse people 
and burden them when they are sick.  To illustrate, take just one example from 
the many described in more detail below.  When selecting an insurance plan, 
people struggle to choose, dread the shopping experience, and often do not 
choose well.  One study simulated plan choice in an ACA marketplace among a 
relatively informed group of participants, and they chose an objectively better 
plan only half of the time.18   
Furthermore, efforts to fix flailing competition-based policies have required 
armies of health regulators, reams of regulation, and seemingly endless 
evaluation and adjustment by technocratic experts—to no avail.  Behavioral 
economics-inspired attempts to educate and nudge participants to better results 
fall short,19 despite significant investments of time and money into these efforts.  
The result is a market-lubricating regulatory scaffold—a bureaucracy as 
vulnerable to capture and at least as large as what more direct regulatory 
approaches would likely produce.  
Health care’s market bureaucracy amasses equally within the walls of 
private industry.20  The United States relies heavily on private industry to achieve 
social welfare goals.  To the extent private industry forms the backbone of public 
programs, high private industry profits and salaries become part of the cost of 
 
17. VOGEL, supra note 16, at 10. 
18. See Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable?  The Value of 
Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE 1 (2013). 
19. Id. at 3 (describing that traditional tools like cost calculators and just-in-time education did 
not significantly improve outcomes). 
20. The United States has lower public social expenditures relative to other countries, but total 
social expenditures—public plus mandated private expenditures (those that serve 
redistributive purposes but are not directly government administered)—are higher in the 
United States than in all other countries except France.  Ryan McMaken, “Social 
Expenditures” in the US are Higher Than all Other OECD Countries, Except France, MISES 
INST. (Oct. 30, 2015), https://mises.org/wire/social-expenditures-us-are-higher-all-other-
oecd-countries-except-france [https://perma.cc/LK83-5VP8]. 
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bureaucracy21 and drive the administrative costs of the U.S. health care system 
well above those of its peers.22 
The popular narrative about the benefits of markets over other forms of 
regulation is empirically, and clearly, wrong in key areas of health care regulation.  
Market-based policies do not enable effective consumer choice.  
This Article argues that health policies that depend on consumerism, like 
those discussed below, have and will inevitably continue to fail.  To be clear, it 
does not suggest no role for economics in health policy.  Conversely, nor does it 
intend to imply, by elucidating that market-based policies have proven neither 
efficient nor nimble, that the aim of social policy should in fact be economic 
efficiency or minimalist government.  Others have offered compelling critiques 
of these aims,23 and have made explicit the hidden normative agenda of 
neoliberalism, obscured by the objective tone of the language of economics.24  
 
21. As just one example, in 2018, the compensation of the CEO of Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Michigan (just one insurer in one state) was $19.2 million.  Jay Greene, Blues CEO’s 
Compensation Rises 43 Percent to $19.2 Million, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Mar. 1, 2019, 2:25 
PM), https://www.crainsdetroit.com/health-care/blues-ceos-compensation-rises-43-
percent-192-million [https://perma.cc/58ZY-F84G]. 
22. See Austin Frakt, The Astonishingly High Administrative Costs of U.S. Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES: THE UPSHOT (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/upshot/costs-
health-care-us.html [https://perma.cc/R5VE-WTE3]. 
23. There are more examples than I could possibly cite here, but I list a few from different 
disciplines.  Robert Evans and Tom Rice describe market-based policies as a form of 
American exceptionalism that replicates inequitable access and unusually high system 
administrative costs and prices.  THOMAS RICE, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH RECONSIDERED 
(Ronald M. Andersen et al. eds., 1998); Robert G. Evans, Going for the Gold: The 
Redistributive Agenda behind Market-Based Health Care Reform, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & 
L. 427, 432 (1997) (“Distributional questions may be suppressed in economic analysis, but 
they remain at the forefront of public policy debates.”).  Tim Jost has aptly observed: “Even 
though the foundations and conclusions of neoclassical economics as a science are 
questionable and the ideological inclinations of the discipline render its normative 
prescriptions suspect, economics retains great influence on policy making in the United 
States, more so than any of the other social sciences.”  JOST, supra note 3, at 117.  Much of 
Deborah Stone’s work critiques the overinfluence of economics on policymaking.  See, e.g., 
Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 
11, 14 (1999).  Jacob Hacker critiques the rise of the idea of personal responsibility as part of 
the neoliberal project and how it has contributed to economic insecurity.  See JACOB S. 
HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, 
AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT BACK (2006).  For normative critiques of 
neoliberalism in other fields, see Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative 
Liberty and Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2014); 
Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014). 
24. See, e.g., David M. Frankford, Scientism and Economism in the Regulation of Health Care, 19 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 773 (1994); see also, e.g., Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the 
Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 
803, 804 (2010) (summarizing the notion Mettler has advanced of the “submerged state,” 
1936 66 UCLA L. REV. 1926 (2019) 
 
Rather, this Article shows that even when measured on their own terms, market-
based policies have fallen short in health care and will continue to do so. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  The first Part describes why health care 
is fundamentally inhospitable to market-based policies.  There is no one reason 
why health care consumerism does not work.  Rather, the failures arise from 
multiple levels of structural problems.  From the time Kenneth Arrow brought 
health care into mainstream modern economics, he warned that the most basic 
economic assumptions were belied in health care, including the most 
foundational principles that people have well-ordered preferences and the agency 
to make meaningful decisions.25  Yet Arrow’s caution did little to slow the eager 
adoption of microeconomic market-based approaches in health care.   
Health care also defies the recipes of behavioral economics, ascribing to all 
of the cognitive ills and responding to few of the prescriptions for cure.  
Proponents have been overly optimistic about the ability to correct failures both 
in the markets and in patient decisionmaking, the totality of which is inscrutable.  
This first Part attempts to preview and summarize health care’s exceptional 
characteristics as context for the pervasive failure of market-based approaches 
detailed in Part II.  
Part II then traces the arc of microeconomic influence, through three 
market-based ideas that have deeply shaped the regulation of health care 
financing (how we pay for health care) and delivery (how we use and provide 
health care) and that have, in the end, fallen short of expectations.  Market-based 
solutions to both financing and delivery problems fail for the same reasons: People 
lack the preferences, capacity, and desire to choose as these solutions demand. 
The first example looks at consumerism in health insurance, focusing on the 
theory of managed competition, made famous by Alain Enthoven.26  He argued 
that when people make good choices among health plans in a carefully regulated 
health insurance market, the choices will send signals to stimulate higher-value 
health care delivery.  This idea undergirds the ACA and its health insurance 
exchanges and was influential for decades prior, as part of President Clinton’s 
failed Health Security Act of 1993, Massachusetts’s health reform in 2006, 
Medicare Advantage (Medicare’s managed care marketplace), and the creation of 
Medicare’s prescription drug program in 2003.  The second example looks at 
patient decisions in health care delivery, about how and when to use medical care, 
 
where policies are enacted in ways that are “formidable and elusive,” such as through tax 
reform so that their inequitable results are opaque). 
25. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. 
REV. 941, 948 (1963). 
26. See supra Part II.A. 
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and the trend toward what is often called “consumer-driven” or “consumer-
directed” health care (CDHC), where higher out-of-pocket medical costs are 
supposed to incentivize patients to economize more wisely.27  This pervasive 
trend is often described, somewhat crassly, as consumers having “skin in the 
game.”  The final example focuses on antitrust law and oversight of mergers, 
which has seen a recent resurgence, and the hopes that healthy competition will 
benefit end consumers. 
Each of these ideas spawned a regulatory structure built on a simple 
blueprint—the idea that if health law and regulation support a functioning 
market, people can make meaningful choices that will, in turn, improve the value 
of health care spending.  These ideas transform the role of health regulation into 
fixing market failures and “flawed” decisionmakers.  Yet, despite intensive 
regulatory tinkering, markets are still not delivering as promised.   
The final Part of this Article examines why market-based approaches 
persist, even as evidence of their shortcomings amasses.  The persistence of 
market-based policies is in part a story of conflict avoidance and political 
economy.  Policymakers and regulators can avoid dealing with political pressure 
and hard normative tradeoffs over how much care we use, who uses it, and how 
much we pay for it.  The market-based bureaucracy is, in part, the price we pay to 
avoid wrestling collectively with hard moral or political challenges.28 
Yet, market-based solutions also endure because they have elevated 
choice—a narrow version of it defined by how people spend their dollars in a 
market—as the barometer of good social policy.  Market-based solutions are sold 
as the epitome of choice, even when the choice they produce proves empty. 
Thus, this Article concludes by arguing that to develop more productive 
future foundations for health care regulation, we must revisit the privileging and 
narrow definition of choice that has undergirded the last era of health policy and 
law.  In some cases, the value of choice has been overemphasized.  We would be 
better off if simply handed the best available health plan, or, more controversially, 
if denied treatments and therapies that are low in value or do not work.  
Yet, moving choice off its pedestal does not preordain paternalistic 
regulation; rather, it demands seeking proxies other than purchases in a market 
to understand what people most value.  This final Part ends by describing several 
recent examples that illustrate how democratic processes and collective 
 
27. See supra Part II.B. 
28. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 417 (1999) 
(“Citizens of diverse commitments converge on the deterrence idiom to satisfy social norms 
against contentious public moralizing; public officials likewise converge on it to minimize 
opposition to their preferred policy outcomes.”). 
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deliberation are surfacing shared values that can, in turn, inform regulation.  In 
many ways, what people value most in a health care system is not so complicated 
or varied, as these examples show.  People want to be able to see their doctor 
when they are sick.  They do not want to have to go broke, nor do they want 
others in their community to go broke, to stay healthy.  Most people expressly do 
not want to spend their time wading ineffectively through choices of health 
insurance plans, medical care prices, or treatment options.  For all of these 
reasons, we must avoid the temptation to continue to build reflexively on the 
market bureaucracy in the next era of health policy and regulation. 
I. PERFECT CONDITIONS FOR A MARKET BUREAUCRACY 
The gap between economic theory and successful application in health care 
is vast.  For this reason, economists did not see health care as an industry 
appropriate for economic analysis for many years.29  In fact, the early health 
economists who worked on policy saw economics as one tool among many and 
not especially helpful in making normative decisions.30  As an economist who 
served on the Council of Economic Advisers under President Kennedy wrote, “it 
is important that our political leaders listen to the wishes of society, not just the 
analyses of economists.”31 
Many viewed the early increasing attention to health care microeconomics 
with a healthy dose of skepticism.  At the nascence of modern health economics, 
Kenneth Arrow wrote that health care lacks many of the conditions necessary for 
a competitive market.32  In the late 1980s, even as market policies were gaining 
steam in the field, half of all economists agreed in one study that competition in 
health care does not work .33  Now, however, many scholars, policymakers, and 
commentators have lost this skepticism;34 others seem to know that getting health 
care markets to work is a Sisyphean task, but they keep at it, as examined below. 
 
29. Daniel M. Fox, From Reform to Relativism: A History of Economists and Health Care, 57 
MILBANK Q. 297 (1979). 
30. Id. at 307–14 (describing the early work by economists, which deferred to medical views on 
questions of need and distribution of medical care). 
31. Rashi Fein, Commentary, From Reform to Relativism: A History of Economists and Health 
Care, 57 MILBANK Q. 353, 357 (1979). 
32. Arrow, supra note 25, at 948. 
33. RICE, supra note 23, at 22. 
34. See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13; David Brooks, Do Markets Work in Health Care, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/13/opinion/do-markets-work-in-
health-care.html?emc=edit_tnt_20170113&nlid=19338766&tntemail0=y&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/8M56-ES7M]. 
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This Part provides the groundwork for understanding why economic 
theory—both neoclassical and behavioral—repeatedly falls short in health care as 
context for understanding the many reasons that the policies discussed in Part II 
fail.  Although market-based approaches can be, and have been, critiqued in 
many fields, this Part illustrates why health care is especially problematic.  Thus, 
even though the studies in Part II below do not always explicate or fully examine 
why market-based policies have failed in each instance, this Part should make the 
evidence of such failure unsurprising. 
The challenges are multilayered, and some are insurmountable.  The basic 
assumptions of neoclassic economics—like well-ordered preferences and the 
possession of (or ability to acquire) necessary information and skills—evade 
consumers when it comes to health care.  Even without such fundamental 
problems, health care consumers experience the full range of cognitive biases—
from information overload to anchoring to deference—that have proven tough 
to correct using traditional behavioral economics interventions.  In short, nearly 
every condition necessary for a well-functioning market is lacking.   
At the most fundamental level, basic assumptions underlying economic 
theory are absent in health care.35  First, neoclassical economics assumes that 
consumers have well-ordered preferences or “tastes” that are genuinely aligned 
with their interests.  For this to be true, people must be able to judge what is in 
their best interest, but they routinely fail to do so with respect to medical care or 
health insurance choices.36  As Arrow wrote: “The most obvious distinguishing 
characteristics of an individual’s demand for medical services is that it is not 
steady in origin as, for example, for food or clothing, but irregular and 
unpredictable.”37 
Instead of considering self-interest, people form preferences based on what 
they have experienced in the past, which economist Tom Rice describes as 
“wanting what they got rather than getting what they want.”38  He offers the 
example of Americans accustomed to high use of medical technology and 
wanting more of it, whether beneficial or not.39  Even if someone did have an 
 
35. Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & 
L. 383 (1997). 
36. The Rand Health Insurance Experiment showed that when people have less insurance, they 
reduce equal amounts of what experts consider to be the most effective treatment and what 
experts consider to be the least effective types of treatment.  Kathleen N. Lohr et al., Use of 
Medical Care in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment: Diagnosis- and Service-Specific 
Analyses in a Randomized Controlled Trial, 24 MED. CARE S1, S31 (Supp. 1986). 
37. Arrow, supra note 25, at 948. 
38. RICE, supra note 23, at 400. 
39. Id. 
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accurate sense of self-interest, the most basic economic concept of “willingness to 
pay” is hard to understand in the context of decisions that can be life or death. 
People must also understand the counterfactual, or what could have 
happened if they had made a different choice.40  As one expert explains:  
What a buyer wants to know is the difference between his state of 
well-being with and without the commodity being 
considered . . . .  Thus, a consumer of such services who gets better 
after the purchase does not know whether the improvement was 
because of, or even in spite of, the ‘care’ that was received.  Or if no 
health care services are purchased and the problem becomes 
worse, he is generally not in a strong position to determine 
whether the results would have been different, and better, if he had 
purchased certain health care.41   
In short, people cannot judge their decisions against foregone alternatives. 
Furthermore, interests must be exogenous and stable enough to inform 
meaningful decisions.  Preferences are at times not exogenous but rather shaped 
by social pressure or addiction, which might cause someone to smoke, use illegal 
drugs, forgo a helmet, or gamble, any of which are not in a person’s long-term 
best interest.42  And preferences on critical matters can change across short time 
frames.43  Women, for example, change their preferences about pain treatment 
throughout their pregnancy, during labor, and after labor.44  People’s views about 
whether they would want lifesaving treatment if it comes with a high risk of 
physical or cognitive disability change over relatively short periods of time.45  We 
 
40. RICE, supra note 23, at 73–74. 
41. Burton A. Weisbrod, Comment, in COMPETITION IN THE HEALTH CARE SECTOR: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE SPONSORED BY THE BUREAU OF 
ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 49, 52 (Warren Greenberg ed., 1978). 
42. RICE, supra note 23, at 22. 
43. See, e.g., Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Discount Functions and the Measurement of Patients’ 
Values: Women’s Decisions During Childbirth, 4 MED. DECISION MAKING 47, 47 (1984) 
(showing that women’s preferences about using pain treatment during labor varied based on 
when measured during and after pregnancy); Terri R. Fried et al., Inconsistency Over Time in 
the Preferences of Older Persons with Advanced Illness for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 55 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 1007, 1010 (2007) (reporting nearly half of study participants expressed 
inconsistent preferences over a short timeframe on willingness to risk disability in order to 
avoid death); Donald A. Redelmeier et al., Understanding Patients’ Decisions: Cognitive and 
Emotional Perspectives, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 72, 74 (1993) (describing reasons for 
inconsistent preferences).  For a more detailed discussion of the lack of stable preferences in 
health care decisionmaking, see Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 
WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1275–77 (2017). 
44. Christensen-Szalanski, supra note 43, at 47. 
45. Fried et al., supra note 43, at 1008 (when asked about willingness to risk physical or cognitive 
disability for survival, half of all participants responses were inconsistent over time). 
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simply do not have preferences about health care in the way that economic 
theory envisions. 
Another basic assumption of market-based policies is that consumers are in 
control of their choices.  Health care decisions, however, are replete with what 
economists call principal-agent problems; decisions are often strongly influenced 
by doctors or by employers, who choose a menu of health plans and design 
benefits.  There is ample evidence that people want their doctors to make 
decisions about their health care.46  Studies suggest that half of the time patients 
simply do—and in fact a majority prefer to do—what a physician recommends.47  
Sometimes, physicians’ recommendations align with a patient’s preferences, but 
physicians can also be influenced by factors like time constraints and conflicting 
profit motives.48  Finally, many people cannot afford good clinical decisions, even 
when the best option is clear—sometimes referred to as “financial toxicity.”49   
Health care markets also fail to meet another critical prerequisite for well-
functioning markets—that people possess and understand information 
regarding options.  The health care system is notoriously opaque.  Patients rarely 
know the price of medical care.50  Even if they did, patients do not understand 
 
46. See e.g., Peter Henry Huang, Happiness Studies and Legal Policy, 6 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 405, 
422 (2010) (“[P]eople often prefer not to make decisions by procrastinating, leaving decisions 
to others, making second-order decisions, or avoiding decisions . . . .”). 
47. Wendy Levinson et al., Not All Patients Want to Participate in Decision Making: A National 
Study of Public Preferences, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 531, 532 (2005) (“Fifty-two percent [of 
respondents] preferred to leave final decisions to their physicians and 44% preferred to rely 
on physicians for medical knowledge rather than seeking their own information.”); see also 
Neeraj K. Arora & Colleen A. McHorney, Patient Preferences for Medical Decision Making: 
Who Really Wants to Participate?, 38 MED. CARE 335, 338 (2000) (finding that 69 percent of 
patients prefer to leave medical decisions to their physicians, with rates increasing among 
older, less-educated, and sicker patients).  But see Betty Chewning et al., Patient Preferences 
for Shared Decisions: A Systematic Review, 86 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 9 (2012) 
(reviewing studies on shared decisionmaking from 1980–2007 and finding mixed results on 
patients’ preferences for an active role).  See generally CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF 
AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998). 
48. See John McKinlay et al., Non-Medical Influences on Medical Decision-Making, 42 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 769 (1996) (describing a range of nonmedical factors that influence physician 
decisionmaking); Amitabh Chandra et al., Who Ordered That?  The Economics of Treatment 
Choices in Medical Care, 2 HANDBOOK HEALTH ECON. 397, 412–18 (2012) (describing 
financial influences over physician decisionmaking). 
49. S. Yousuf Zafar & Amy P. Abernathy, Financial Toxicity, Part I: A New Name for a Growing 
Problem, 27 ONCOLOGY 149 (2013).  See also COMM. ON CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, 
INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE TOO LATE 27–28 (2002) (describing 
studies showing that the uninsured lack access to necessary care); Stone, supra note 8, at 478–
81 (describing the many ways that people make poor decisions for their own health when 
operating within budgetary constraints).  See also studies cited infra Part II. 
50. Hall & Schneider, supra note 3, at 47–62 (describing the opacity of pricing in health care and 
the reticence of doctors to discuss or patients to ask about prices). 
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basic aspects of the system, including that a doctor might recommend 
unnecessary surgery, that a doctor can only admit a patient to a hospital where 
she has privileges, or that doctors are not reexamined routinely prior to licensure 
renewal.51  Understanding these realities would make a rational person approach 
medical advice and decisions with some skepticism. 
More information is not the answer.  Many Americans, regardless of 
education level, lack the numeracy and literacy to make the kinds of complex 
decisions necessary to choose among health plans or medical care options.52  
Studies have shown that over half of American adults have only basic or below 
basic quantitative skills.53  This means, for example, that they are unable to 
determine whether their car has enough gas to get to the next gas station, 
knowing all of the relevant inputs (the distance to the next station, the reading on 
their gas gauge, and how many miles per gallon their car gets).54  Or even more 
pertinent, they cannot determine what time to take a prescription medicine, 
 
51. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., HOW SOPHISTICATED ARE CONSUMERS ABOUT THE MEDICAL CARE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM? 6–10 (1981). 
52. On numeracy, see, e.g., Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory and 
Practice, 35 ANNALS BEHAV. MED. 261 (2008) (providing an overview of research on health 
numeracy and the clinical implications for patients); Ellen Peters & Irwin P. Levin, Dissecting 
the Risky-Choice Framing Effect: Numeracy as an Individual-Difference Factor in Weighting 
Risky and Riskless Options, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 435 (2008) (showing that lower 
levels of numeracy led to higher loss aversion); Valerie F. Reyna et al., How Numeracy 
Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCH. BULL. 943, 945–46 
(2009) (reviewing studies showing links between innumeracy and poor health decisions); 
Stacey Wood et al., Numeracy and Medicare Part D: The Importance of Choice and Literacy 
for Numbers in Optimizing Decision Making for Medicare’s Prescription Drug Program, 26 
PSYCH. & AGING 295, 296 (2011) (summarizing studies showing that low numeracy impedes 
health-related decisionmaking).  On health literacy, see, e.g., ZSOFIA A. PARRAGH & DEANNA 
OKRENT, HEALTH LITERACY AND HEALTH INSURANCE LITERACY: DO CONSUMERS KNOW WHAT 
THEY ARE BUYING? (2015), http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/01/Health-Literacy-Toolkit_163.pdf [https://perma.cc/X732-GG4N] (describing health 
literacy and summarizing studies on health and health insurance literacy); Helen Levy & Alex 
Janke, Health Literacy and Access to Care, 21 J. HEALTH COMM. 43, 45–46 (2016) (reporting 
that individuals with low literacy are more likely to forgo needed care or to self-report 
difficulty in finding a health care provider); Tetine Sentell, Implications for Reform: Survey of 
California Adults Suggests Low Health Literacy Predicts Likelihood of Being Insured, 31 
HEALTH AFF. 1039, 1044–45 (2012) (finding that low health literacy is higher among the 
uninsured and that people with low health literacy are likely to be sicker).  On financial 
literacy, see generally Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed 
Consumer Choice? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w14084.pdf [https://perma.cc/VF4N-5YT7] (explaining that 
financial “[i]lliteracy is widespread among the general population and particularly acute 
among specific demographic groups, such as women, African Americans, Hispanics, and 
those with low educational attainment”). 
53. MARK KUTNER ET AL., AM. INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, LITERACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RESULTS FROM 
THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT LITERACY 13 fig.2-2 (2007). 
54. See id. at 7. 
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based on the drug label instructions for timing of doses to eating.55  Even college 
educated patients, doctors, and medical students show surprisingly high levels of 
error on numeracy assessments and simple arithmetic tests.56  Many patients do 
not understand straightforward and important information, such as when their 
next appointment is scheduled.57 
People especially lack health insurance literacy.  Repeatedly, studies affirm 
that people do not understand the technical terms that describe their health 
insurance policy, how much it costs, and what benefits are covered.58  Most 
people do not understand even the basic structure of their health insurance, 
including whether they are in a plan where they can see any doctor or in a 
managed care plan that restricts provider options.59  In a survey of insured adults, 
only 14 percent correctly answered four simple multiple-choice questions about 
cost-sharing features like a deductible.60  Yet, people overestimated the extent to 
which they understand insurance concepts, which suggests many would not seek 
more information even when needed and if offered.61   
 
55. Id. 
56. See Nelson et al., supra note 52, at 263. 
57. Id. at 262–63. 
58. See, e.g., eHealthInsurance, New Survey Shows Americans Lack Understanding of Their Health 
Coverage and Basic Health Insurance Terminology, EHEALTH (Jan. 3, 2008), 
https://news.ehealthinsurance.com/news/rel344367 [https://perma.cc/68LD-AZ58] 
(reporting that in a phone survey, “[l]ess than a quarter of respondents (23 percent) reported 
that they were very sure of what the terminology used in their health insurance  policy 
actually means” and only half knew how much they paid for monthly premiums or annual 
deductible); M. SUSAN MARQUIS, RAND CORP., CONSUMERS’ KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THEIR 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 12, 15–16 (1981) (showing in survey that many people do not 
understand what their insurance covers, many patients underreport coverage especially when 
their insurance covers outpatient care, and that with higher cost-sharing and more 
complicated insurance structures, more people incorrectly report that physician services and 
prescription drugs are not covered); Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans 
Understand Their Health Coverage?, 12 HEALTH AFF. 204, 206 (1993) (finding that even 
though consumers largely understood whether their plans covered hospitalization or doctors’ 
visits, they underreported that their plans covered services including mental health, alcohol 
and drug abuse treatment, or prescription drugs and overreported that their plans covered 
longterm care). 
59. Peter J. Cunningham et al., Do Consumers Know How Their Health Plan Works?, 20 HEALTH 
AFF. 159, 161–62 (2001) (finding overestimation of the need to sign up with a primary care 
provider and to get approval for specialty care); David E. Nelson et al., What People Really 
Know About Their Health Insurance: A Comparison of Information Obtained From 
Individuals and Their Insurers, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 924, 926 (2000) (reporting that 
84.2 percent of people in fee-for-service plans incorrectly believed they were in managed 
care plans). 
60. George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 850, 855 (2013). 
61. Id.; KATHRYN A. PAEZ & CORETTA J. MALLERY, AMERICAN INSTS. FOR RESEARCH, A LITTLE 
KNOWLEDGE IS A RISKY THING: WIDE GAP IN WHAT PEOPLE THINK THEY KNOW ABOUT 
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The vast gap between this reality of what health care consumers know and 
understand and an idealized informed consumer cannot be bridged, even if it 
could be somewhat narrowed.  Often, solutions to these problems focus on 
providing more information or real time education or coaching on options, 
which is like chipping away at the tip of an iceberg.62  One might imagine more 
literate and numerate decisionmaking if everyone in the United States received a 
better basic education, but that reality is unlikely to manifest in the name of 
producing better health care consumers.  Even with the best structured just-in-
time education, most consumers will never be able to navigate many choices in 
health care in the way models assume.  These gaps in capacity and understanding 
should be disqualifying, in and of themselves, of approaches that look to patients 
as consumers.   
Finally, even in the extraordinary situation where these basic neoclassical 
conditions were all met—well-ordered, exogenous preferences, good 
information and understanding of both choices and counterfactuals, agency to 
decide, and the financial resources to make the best decision—a patient must 
then act consistently and rationally in line with her preferences and understanding.  
The abundant work in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics has made 
clear that decisionmakers are far from the rational archetype.63 
The reasons people fail to make rational decisions are heightened in the 
medical care and health insurance contexts.64  Medical decisions are often 
scientifically and technically complex.65  People are overly optimistic about their 
own health, especially since the consequences of decisions are often delayed (for 
 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND WHAT THEY ACTUALLY KNOW (2014), https://www.air.org/sites/ 
default/files/Health%20Insurance%20Literacy%20brief_Oct%202014_amended.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4Y8Y-RRZZ]. 
62. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 18, at 3 (showing that most interventions, including 
educational interventions, only made a small change in the number of people choosing a 
dominated health plan). 
63. See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 (1955).  For a 
sampling of this work in law, see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); Christine Jolls et al., 
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476–79 (1998) 
(describing the research on bounded rationality—the reasons why actual behavior differs 
from rational behavior); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 
(2000) (outlining empirical evidence inconsistent with the rationality assumption). 
64. See Redelmeier et al., supra note 43 (describing reasons, based on studies in cognitive 
psychology, why patients are flawed decisionmakers); Korobkin, supra note 12, at 532–38 
(summarizing some of the key factors that contribute to bounded rationality in health 
care decisionmaking, such as complexity, novelty of the decision, evaluability problems, 
and emotion). 
65. See Schneider & Hall, supra note 3, at 54. 
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example, skin cancer develops years after the pleasure of warm sun on your 
face).66  People tend to focus too much on possibilities that are unlikely but 
frightening (for example, a spot that a doctor says has a very small probability of 
being cancerous) when making a decision.67  Emotional responses, such as 
disgust, are overly influential.68  People struggle deeply to comprehend and factor 
risk into decisions69—an element central, of course, to choices of health insurance 
and medical care (for example, what does it mean for something to increase or 
decrease your risk of heart attack by 10 percent?).  When people are making 
decisions about major medical care, they are often dealing with questions of first 
impression.  Even when not, people do not accurately remember past medical 
experiences.  Duration of past pain, for example, is less memorable than intensity 
of pain.70  Framing can significantly affect decisions, as when people make 
different decisions when told survival rates versus mortality rates.71 
Medical care decisions often must be made when ill and vulnerable or, in 
the case of emergency care, unconscious.72  For most big-ticket items, health care 
spending does not feel discretionary.  Consider the case of a patient with 
advanced cancer, who must decide between expensive, intense treatments with 
no chance of cure yet some probability of prolonging life for months or years, on 
one hand, and less expensive, less invasive treatment (or no treatment) that will 
mean a better quality of life in the remaining time but less likelihood of prolonged 
 
66. See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCH. 806 (1980). 
67. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 63, at 1100–02 (describing “anchoring” errors); Amos 
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 
1124 (1974); Redelmeier et al., supra note 43, at 75 (“[S]udden problems with short deadlines 
tend to be most compelling, whereas intermittent problems of insidious onset are often 
overlooked.”). 
68. Redelmeier et al., supra note 43, at 75 (describing a study showing that people are averse to 
wearing clothing of people with disease, disfigurement, or moral faults after that clothing has 
been sterilized). 
69. Id. at 71–72 (describing how people tend to categorize something as safe or dangerous, 
without regard for the level of risk, and overvalue reducing risk to zero).  For an overview of 
cognitive biases with respect to risk and uncertainty, see Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and 
the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing 
Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 203–24 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 264 (1979) 
(showing that people tend to make choices inconsistent with their own expected utility when 
dealing with risky options). 
70. See Redelmeier et al., supra note 43, at 75. 
71. See id. at 73. 
72. See Farzon A. Nahvi, Don’t Leave Health Care to a Free Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/opinion/health-insurance-free-market.html 
[https://perma.cc/86JG-2S8B] (“describing the circumstances under which patients make 
decisions in an emergency room.”).  
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survival, on the other.  The patient is sick and scared, perhaps under pressure 
from family to make certain choices, and she knows that no choice will save her 
life.  These are impossible conditions for decisionmaking, and yet are routinely 
present in medical care decisions.73 
It should be unsurprising that with so many major barriers separating 
theory from reality, a mounting body of empirical evidence, discussed in detail in 
Part II below, has shown that consumerism does not work in health care.  As an 
illustration, among expectant mothers who felt they had a choice in prenatal care 
providers, only 24 percent seriously considered another provider and only 14 
percent had contact with one.74  These low rates belied the authors’ expectations 
because of the importance of the decision and the relative ease of searching for a 
prenatal care provider.75 
The widespread academic response to evidence of consumerist failure, 
motivated by the rise and deep influence of behavioral law and economics, has 
been to try to nudge imperfect consumers to better answers through choice 
architecture.76  Yet, the studies below illustrate that nudges are falling short.77  
Addressing all of these aforementioned barriers would demand Herculean effort, 
and some barriers cannot be dismantled, even with such efforts.  
Economic theory and competition can be productive in some 
circumstances in health care.  For example, there is evidence that in more 
competitive provider markets, hospitals compete on price, and when price is 
fixed, on quality.78  The threat of disruption by retail clinics or medical tourism 
can prompt doctors and hospitals to lower their prices, even if patients have not 
yet begun to flee.79  These supplier-level dynamics seem to have the potential to 
 
73. See Hall & Schneider, supra note 3, at 650–51 (describing how illness affects patient, pulling 
quote from literature describing people’s experience as ill patients and consumers). 
74. See Thomas J. Hoerger & Leslie Z. Howard, Search Behavior and Choice of Physician in the 
Market for Prenatal Care, 33 MED. CARE 332, 341 (1995). 
75. See id. at 348. 
76. See generally NUDGING HEALTH: HEALTH LAW AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (I. Glenn Cohen 
et al. eds., 2016). 
77. Infra Part II. 
78. See Martin Gaynor et al., Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Patient 
Outcomes in the National Health Service, 5 AM. ECON. J. 134, 150–51 (2013) (finding market 
concentration has a positive effect on mortality); Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Is 
Hospital Competition Socially Wasteful?, 115 Q.J. ECON. 577, 601 (2000) (finding that 
Medicare patients receiving care for heart attacks in less competitive areas experienced higher 
rates of mortality); Marah Noel Short & Vivian Ho, Weighing the Effects of Vertical 
Integration Versus Market Concentration on Hospital Quality, 2019 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 
(finding that increased market concentration is strongly associated with reduced quality, 
based on patient satisfaction). 
79. See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 331–32, 352–53. 
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produce some benefit, even without effective patient consumerism.80  In some 
very limited and unique situations, consumer-focused competition may move 
the needle.  An oft-cited example, which may be due to consumerism or other 
factors, is laser eye surgery, or Lasik, which costs one-tenth today what it did 
twenty years ago, in nominal terms.81  Similar results have been shown with 
plastic surgery, fertility services, and, most recently, hearing aids.82  But it is 
fallacious to extrapolate from these examples of mostly simple, elective care to the 
more common, complicated decisions that today’s policies are asking patients to 
make.83  The patient earning just over minimum wage with a $500 deductible and 
a chronic disease is in a wholly different decisionmaking situation than a cash-
pay patient seeking out elective breast augmentation. 
The following Part illustrates what should be an unsurprising result of 
policymaking on this shaky foundation: Decades of market-reliant policies are 
not producing as promised. 
II. THE PRODUCTION OF HEALTH CARE’S MARKET BUREAUCRACY 
Economic concepts may not translate well into law and policy for various 
reasons.  Some theories are wrong conceptually, even if applied perfectly.  
Alternately, the assumptions underlying the theory may not prove true in 
application, or in application in a particular field, for reasons such as those 
outlined above in Part I.  Policymakers, lawyers, and judges might extend a 
theory beyond its usefulness84 or undermine benefits that can be derived from the 
theory.  This Part illustrates how all of these types of shortcomings have occurred 
 
80. Some people, like Silver & Hyman, draw a logical fallacy about the success of cash-pay health 
care from trends like CVS minute clinics and medical tourism.  In these very situations, 
services in new settings are often reimbursed by insurers (not cash pay) , who encourage 
insureds to use care in new settings.  Cheryl-Ann N. Williams et al., Marketing Retail Health 
Clinics: Challenges and Controversies Arising from a Health Care Innovation, 28 HEALTH 
MARKETING Q. 270, 276 (2011) (“By 2007, only 15.9% of retail clinic visits were paid cash out 
of pocket. . . .  Some insurers, for example Aetna and Blue Cross Blue Shield, give their 
members incentives which could include low or zero co-pays for using a retail health clinic 
for nonurgent health issues instead of an emergency room or urgent care facility.”). 
81. Brooks, supra note 34; see also SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 318–19. 
82. See SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 318–22, 324–25. 
83. Evans, supra note 23, at 450.  Even though these examples are cited as successes because 
prices have decreased over time in real terms, it does not mean that patients navigate these 
markets especially well.  Anyone who has been to Los Angeles knows there is a glut of bad 
cosmetic surgery, even if competitively priced. 
84. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or 
Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829 (2003) (describing the disconnect between doctrines of contract 
law and predictions of economic theory). 
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as economic theory has permeated health law and policy in the form of 
microeconomic market-based solutions. 
As these market-based ideas have been increasingly adopted as the favored 
policy approach, health law has shaped to accommodate them, using regulation 
as scaffolding.  Examining several of the most vital areas of modern health care 
regulation reveals that market ideology has become increasingly 
institutionalized—and bureaucratized—as the intellectual core of the field. 
Each of the following Subparts look to a different economic theory and 
market tool employed to reduce health care spending or improve quality.  Part 
II.A examines the theory that consumers will choose well among insurance plans, 
eventually reshaping health care delivery.  Part II.B examines the idea that higher 
cost-sharing can incentivize patients to ration medical care and price compare 
and, in turn, reduce low-value health care spending.  The final Part II.C describes 
using antitrust regulation to improve dynamics in larger market competition to 
drive value for end consumers.  By considering these ideas in parallel, this Part 
highlights that they share two main themes.  First, each relies on the theory that 
markets and consumerism will achieve the best solution if we can just get the 
regulation (or deregulation) right.  Second, they have all failed, despite 
tremendous investment of regulatory effort and intellectual capital.  Although the 
studies cited below do not prove definitively that the ideas never work, concerted 
efforts over decades have repeatedly fallen short.  At the very least, these failed 
efforts are proof that these ideas rarely work.   
A. Managed Competition and the Market for Health Insurance 
Managed competition has been one of the most influential ideas of the past 
half century in the development of health insurance design and regulation, yet its 
predictions of what consumer choices among health plans will produce have not 
materialized.  This Part documents this irrefutable failure, as well as the 
Herculean efforts and massive regulatory infrastructure built in unsuccessful 
attempts to produce better results.  Subpart II.A.1 describes the theory, Subpart 
II.A.2 describes why it has failed in implementation and why efforts at refinement 
have likewise fallen short, and Subpart II.A.3 describes the bureaucracy built up 
to support this faltering idea.   
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1. The Theory of Managed Competition and Its Promise 
The ACA’s health insurance exchanges were built loosely on a concept that 
has come to be called managed competition, most often associated with Stanford 
economist Alain Enthoven.85  Republicans, even as they called for a dismantling 
of the ACA, proposed policies that build on this same idea,86 and private 
exchanges have begun to develop in parallel to serve the employer-based health 
insurance market.87 
The oversimplified idea is that when consumers choose among health plans 
in a regulated marketplace that is carefully controlled by “sponsors,” they will 
make choices based on their preferences.88  Since they will presumably choose 
plans where they get better care at lower costs, their choices will ultimately drive 
health plans to compete for their business by offering higher-value options.89  
Enthoven initially called the idea “Consumer-Choice Health Plan” (CCHP), 
emphasizing the element of choice involved.90   
Enthoven proposed implementing this idea with a system of vouchers for 
buying health insurance, where each person would receive a credit to buy a health 
plan in a regulated, competitive market.91  The value of these vouchers would vary 
based on an individual’s age, and low-income people would receive additional 
subsidies.92  The ground rules he proposed included mandating that insurers 
accept any applicant during an open enrollment period (guaranteed issue), 
requiring “community-rated” premiums that do not vary based on health status, 
and placing limits on out-of-pocket spending93—all rules that the ACA enacted 
 
85. Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Choice Health Plan (First of Two Parts): Inflation and Inequity 
in Health Care Today: Alternatives for Cost Control and an Analysis of Proposals for National 
Health Insurance, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 650 (1978) [hereinafter Enthoven, First Part]; Alain 
C. Enthoven, Consumer Choice Health Plan (Second of Two Parts): A National-Health 
Insurance Proposal Based on Regulated Competition in the Private Sector, 298 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 709 (1978) [hereinafter Enthoven, Second Part]; Alain C. Enthoven, The History and 
Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF. 24 (Supp. 1993). 
86. American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1626, 115th Cong. (2017); Pete Sessions et al., How 
We Can Repeal the ACA and Still Insure the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170118.058364/full/#one 
[https://perma.cc/CL4G-HMK2]. 
87. Alain C. Enthoven, Managed Competition 2014: Rescued by the Private Sector?, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (May 12, 2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20140512.038969/full 
[https://perma.cc/4ACT-JP2D]. 
88. Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 709. 
89. Id. at 716–17. 
90. Enthoven, First Part, supra note 85, at 650, 652. 
91. Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 710. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 713–14. 
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for exchange plans to make those plans both accessible and more affordable to 
people regardless of their health status. 
In his vision, an individual consumer would assess the different offerings 
and structure among plans and buy the one most consistent with her preferences.  
As Enthoven put it: “What distinguishes [this plan] from the others is that it seeks 
to give the consumer a choice from among alternative systems for organizing and 
financing care, and to allow him to benefit from his economizing choices.”94  For 
example, Enthoven posited that if someone wanted a plan that prioritized better 
access to home health care or ambulatory care over, for example, hospitalization, 
she should choose it.95 
Enthoven’s assumption when he introduced this idea at the nascence of 
managed care was that tightly-managed health maintenance organizations 
(HMOs) would prevail.96  In particular, he was motivated by HMOs that adopted 
a payment model that pays doctors based on the number of patients they care for 
and not based on individual patient visits.97  These plans relied on primary care 
providers as gatekeepers to ration more expensive specialty and inpatient care, 
enabling them to benefit financially if they kept down use of this expensive care 
among their patients.98 
This gatekeeping function, in turn, unlocks the rest of Enthoven’s 
masterplan.  The reduction of wasteful care would prompt a rationalization of the 
health care workforce and reduce the number of specialists.  Enthoven writes: 
“Primary care physicians would assume more of the responsibility for the total 
costs of care of their patients, and specialists whose costs were judged by such 
primary care physicians to be excessive would find themselves obliged to 
negotiate lower fees to retain their referrals.”99  Enthoven thought mobilizing 
consumer choice could correct the overreliance on expensive, specialty doctors in 
the United States—a politically thorny problem resistant to direct regulation. 
This theory, now referred to as managed competition, has so deeply 
permeated the health policy zeitgeist that it has influenced nearly every major 
health financing reform effort of the past decades.  It graduated to the main stage 
of the policy scene in the early 1990s, when it was incorporated into the blueprint 
for President Clinton’s attempt at health reform in 1993, the Health Security 
Act.100  Although that reform failed, the idea persisted.  It undergirds the design of 
 
94. Id. at 718 (emphasis omitted). 
95. Enthoven, First Part, supra note 85, at 652. 
96. Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 718. 
97. Id. at 717. 
98. Id. 
99. Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 715. 
100. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993–1994). 
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the Medicare Part D prescription drug coverage and Medicare Advantage, where 
Medicare beneficiaries can choose among plans administered by private health 
insurance companies.  Most recently, the idea is reflected in the creation of the 
ACA’s health insurance exchanges, or marketplaces, based on the 2006 
Massachusetts reform.  Managed competition ideals have informed proposals 
floated by Republicans to replace the ACA and to privatize Medicare.101  And 
managed competition emerged again in the 2020 Democratic primaries, usually 
in the form of the idea of a public option to compete with private plans.  Even 
though none of these efforts followed Enthoven’s blueprint exactly, they all 
internalized the concept he preached: Consumers with buying power will drive 
value in a managed, competitive insurance marketplace. 
2. The Shortcomings of Managed Competition 
Enthoven aimed to solve politically sticky problems in the health care system: 
overuse of overpriced specialty care and fee-for-service payment, where providers 
are paid per unit of care.  The theory, as applied, however, has neither enabled 
people to choose better what they want, nor has it generated the hoped-for system 
transformation.  The first Subpart describes why the idea is conceptually flawed.  
The second Subpart offers empirical evidence of the failure of managed 
competition in various health care programs.  The final Subpart describes how 
these shortcomings persist in the ACA’s exchanges, despite various attempts to 
use decision aids and nudges to improve consumer decisionmaking.  
a. Conceptual Shortcomings 
Enthoven’s vision is built on false assumptions about people’s ability to 
select well among health plans.  Choosing a health insurance plan implicates all of 
the challenges described in Part I.  To Enthoven’s credit, the best empirical 
evidence on this point emerged later, but the outcomes were largely predictable. 
Enthoven expected people to consider tradeoffs between, for example, 
possible future use of home health care versus hospital care,102 possibly having no 
experience with or exposure to either.  Thus, it would be hard to imagine how 
to order preferences between the two or know how much to be willing to pay 
for each one. 
Furthermore, insurance choices require at least moderate mathematic skills 
to determine total possible spending, taking into consideration benefits, 
 
101. See supra note 11. 
102. Enthoven, First Part, supra note 85, at 652. 
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networks, premiums, and cost-sharing.103  Most importantly, the choice of health 
plan is all about risk and uncertainty, conditions that thwart decisionmaking for 
even a perfectly informed and well-educated buyer. 
Finally, even if Enthoven’s idealized customer did exist, managed 
competition would be unlikely to transform health care delivery as it exists in the 
United States.  He imagined insurers would internalize consumers’ preferences 
and negotiate with providers accordingly to improve health care delivery 
structures.104  Yet, insurers lack the requisite market power vis-à-vis providers.  
Although less true when Enthoven first wrote, providers have accreted 
substantial market power through consolidation, undermining insurers’ relative 
bargaining position.105  When providers flex their muscles in negotiations, they 
usually win.106 
Even more, the very structure of Enthoven’s model undermines insurers’ 
ability to gain leverage over providers.  Managed competition relies on having 
multiple insurers competing for customers, but the more insurers there are, the 
harder it is for any single insurer to enroll enough people to gain bargaining 
power over providers.  The ACA’s piecemeal design exacerbates this problem by 
rolling out the policy to a small slice of the population.  In initial best-case 
scenario estimates, about twenty-three million people (a mere 7 percent of the 
population) would buy an ACA exchange policy by 2016;107 the actual enrollment 
numbers have been less than half this number.108  This number of enrollees 
spread across fifty states does not give insurers much added leverage against 
behemoth hospital systems.  The theory of managed competition becomes 
untenable in real markets and, especially, with real consumers. 
 
103. See supra note 53. 
104. Enthoven, Second Part, supra note 85, at 717. 
105. See infra note 339 and accompanying text. 
106. Id. 
107. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF 
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION 13 (2012), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/112th-congress-2011-2012/reports/43472-07-24-
2012-coverageestimates.pdf [https://perma.cc/69YC-FLEB] (“According to the current 
estimates, from 2016 on, between 23 million and 25 million people will receive coverage 
through the exchanges . . . .”). 
108. EMILY P. ZAMMITTI ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 
EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NHIS, JANUARY–JUNE 2016 1 (2016), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201611.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RLB-
WNDW]. 
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b. Empirical Evidence on Managed Competition’s  
 Shortcomings as Applied 
Mountains of empirical evidence confirm that people do not choose as 
Enthoven predicted.  Studies have tried to pinpoint what exactly impedes good 
decisionmaking—from complexity of choices to insufficient information.  
Increasingly, experts have recognized a fundamental inability among consumers 
to evaluate and rank options even in the best-case scenario, with simple choices 
and transparent information.109 
Much of the empirical research on health plan choices examines situations 
with a dominant—or clearly superior—choice among options.110  This means 
that there is no scenario in which Plan A is better than Plan B, for any buyer.  For 
example, imagine two health plans with the same benefits and price but the 
second has a smaller network; no one should choose the latter.  Or imagine Plan 
A has high monthly premiums and low cost-sharing and Plan B has low monthly 
premiums and high cost-sharing, such as a high deductible.  They cover identical 
benefits and offer the same provider network, but someone who chooses Plan A 
will face higher total annual spending at any level of medical care use.  No one 
should choose Plan A.  Studies of private insurance, the Medicare market, and 
ACA plans all reveal the pervasiveness of people choosing such dominated plans.  
Since there is no one who would rationally choose a dominated plan, doing so is 
objectively a poor choice and ripe for study. 
Based on a simulated insurance purchase, one study by Eric Johnson and 
colleagues reported that people have less than even odds of making the right 
insurance choice when given a small number of options and information about a 
family’s medical needs.111  This study excluded respondents who failed to 
 
109. Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Choosing a Health Insurance Plan: Complexity and 
Consequences, 314 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2505, 2506 (2015) (“[T]he main barrier to financially 
efficient choice was not the number of options confronting employees, nor the transparency 
of their presentation, but rather the . . . lack of basic understanding on health insurance . . . .”); 
Saurabh Bhargava, George Loewenstein, & Justin Snyder, Choose to Lose: Health Plan Choices 
from a Menu With Dominated Options, 132 Q. J. ECON. 1319, 1325 (2017) (“Taken 
collectively, results from the experiments suggest that the demand for dominated plans does 
not predominantly reflect the informed preferences of consumers or the consequences of 
menu complexity, but instead involves a failure of consumers to accurately evaluate and 
compare plans.”).  
110. Compare Ian Ayres & Quinn Curtis, Beyond Diversification: The Pervasive Problem of 
Excessive Fees and “Dominated Funds” in 401(k) Plans, 124 Yale L.J. 1476 (2015) for a 
discussion of the problem of choice of dominated options occurring in other financial realms.  
111. Johnson et al., supra note 18, at 3.  The study concludes: “Consumers left to their own devices 
seem to make large errors when choosing health insurance . . . and they seem to be unaware 
of that failure.”  Id. at 5. 
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demonstrate that they understood basic insurance terms (premiums, deductibles, 
or copayments) after a brief lesson.112  This means that the under 50 percent rate 
of success was among a pool of people with relatively more knowledge or 
capacity.  Even the Wharton business school participants in this study got it 
wrong over one-quarter of the time.113 
Studies reveal similar results when employees choose among options for 
their employer-sponsored health insurance.  Among enrollees in the University 
of Michigan employee plan, over one-third of all workers enrolled in a 
dominated plan, which was identical to another option in every way, except that 
it had a more restricted provider network.114  Again, there is no scenario in which 
a worker would be better off enrolled in this plan that a large number of the 
University’s employees selected.115  Another study of a large U.S. firm similarly 
found that a majority of employees chose a dominated option, which was more 
expensive than a higher-deductible option at every level of possible health care 
use but otherwise identical (in terms of benefits, provider network, 
administrator, etc.), and which resulted in 24 percent excess spending on 
premiums.116  Lower-income employees were more likely to select dominated 
plans.117 These studies also refute the idea that employers serve as skilled 
intermediaries, acting as more informed agents to select good plan option for 
their employees.  
In the Medicare market, a well-known study of Part D, where beneficiaries 
choose among private prescription drug plans, showed that over 73 percent of 
enrollees could have chosen a less expensive plan without increasing future 
spending variance, and the average enrollee could have spent nearly one-quarter 
 
112. Id. at 4. 
113. Id. 
114. Anna D. Sinaiko & Richard A. Hirth, Consumers, Health Insurance, and Dominated Choices, 
30 J. HEALTH ECON. 450, 453 (2011). 
115. One may rightfully ask why the University of Michigan is even offering such a plan—a point 
discussed further below. 
116. Bhargava, Loewenstein, & Sydnor, supra note 109, at 1321–22 (studying an employer where 
employees can “build” their own plans by choosing four cost-sharing elements—deductible, 
copayment, coinsurance, and out-of-pocket maximum—for plans that otherwise are 
identical in terms of, for example, covered benefits, provider network, and  plan 
administrator).  To illustrate a dominated plan, for employees to lower their deductible from 
$1000 to $750, they had to pay $528 more in premiums per year, spending $278 more than 
they would in any scenario under the $1000 deductible plan.  But cf. Benjamin R. Handel, 
Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts, 103 AM. 
ECON. REV. 2643 (2013) (showing that in one employer setting, correcting inertia that 
leaves people in dominated plans exacerbates adverse selection and leads to an overall 
welfare reduction). 
117. Bhargava, Loewenstein, & Sydnor, supra note 109, at 1322. 
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less.118  Another revealed that fewer than 10 percent of Part D enrollees choose 
plans that end up being optimal for them in terms of total cost.119  Even though 
people might chose a more expensive plan for rational reasons other than price, 
including formulary or favorite provider, this study tested and ruled out such 
possibilities.120  One-quarter of individuals could have done better by picking at 
random, and nearly three-quarters would have done better simply by picking the 
plan with the lowest premium.121 
Despite some early evidence suggesting that people might get better at 
making decisions in the Medicare Part D program over time,122 these poor 
choices have persisted in the decade since the program began and have in fact 
grown worse, suggesting that people are not becoming better consumers.123 
The same results emerge in the Medicare supplemental insurance market, 
where people buy private policies to pay for costs not covered by traditional 
Medicare, which only pays for 60 percent of costs for the average retiree.124  There 
 
118. Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Heterogeneity in Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: 
Evidence from Prescription Drug Plan Choice, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 377, 379 (2011).  They find 
that individuals consider premiums, instead of total out-of-pocket costs, in making decisions.  
Id.  See also Florian Heiss et al., Mind the Gap! Consumer Perceptions and Choices of Medicare 
Part D Prescription Drug Plans 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13627, 
2007) (finding that Medicare Part D consumers selected inexpensive plans when more 
expensive plans with more comprehensive coverage were actuarially better); Chao Zhou & 
Yuting Zhang, The Vast Majority of Medicare Part D Beneficiaries Still Don’t Choose the 
Cheapest Plans that Meet Their Medication Needs, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2259, 2261 (2012) (finding 
that only 5.2 percent of beneficiaries choose the cheapest plan and that, by doing so, they 
spent on average $368 more annually). 
119. Florian Heiss et al., Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence From Administrative Data 
20–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18166, 2012) (reporting that only 
5.8 percent of individuals chose an ex post optimal plan in 2007 and 7.4 percent in 2008, with 
average losses of $399 in 2007 and $435 in 2008). 
120. Id. at 24. 
121. Id. at 21. 
122. Jonathan D. Ketcham, Sinking, Swimming, or Learning to Swim in Medicare Part D, 102 AM. 
ECON. REV. 2639, 2653 (2012) (studying enrollment in Caremark Part D plans in the initial 
and second year (2006–2007) and finding that people switched to plans that notably 
decreased their overspending).  Later studies, such as Abaluck and Gruber, supra note 118, 
were not able to replicate such results while looking at a longer time period and a broader 
range of plan options. 
123. See Jason Abaluck & Jonathan Gruber, Evolving Choice Inconsistencies in Choice of 
Prescription Drug Insurance 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19163, 
2013).  People err both by over- and under-insuring.  Id. at 29. 
124. PAUL FRONSTIN & JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., SAVINGS MEDICARE 
BENEFICIARIES NEED FOR HEALTH EXPENSES: SOME COUPLES COULD NEED AS MUCH AS 
$400,000, UP FROM $370,000 IN 2017 4 (2018), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-
source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_460_medicare-8oct18.pdf?sfvrsn=5c1b3e2f_2 
[https://perma.cc/L97A-PN9R]. 
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are two main types of supplemental private plans that fill in the rest.125  Medicare 
Advantage is a managed care plan that replaces original Medicare with a private 
plan that has a narrower network of providers.126  These plans cover all Medicare 
benefits, fill in gaps in cost-sharing, and sometimes cover additional services such 
as dental, vision, and hearing.127  The second option, called Medigap plans, layer 
on top of original Medicare, filling in cost-sharing gaps but not narrowing the 
network or covering additional services.128  Once someone chooses between 
Medicare Advantage or Medigap, few make an active choice again between them 
in subsequent years, which leaves some people in a dominated plan.129  One study 
documented that when a policy change made Medicare Advantage clearly 
superior, 75 percent of enrollees remained in the dominated Medigap plans.130  
The authors hypothesized any number of reasons might have influenced them, 
from inertia to limited cognitive capacity to the complexity of these decisions and 
the difficulty of comparing the many options.131  Not surprisingly, insurers in 
this market take advantage of this stickiness by increasing premiums after the 
first year.132 
 
125. Patricia Neumann and Gretchen A. Jacobson, Medicare Advantage Checkup, 379 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 2163, 2163–4 (2018). 
126. Id. at 2164. 
127. Id.; see also Medicare Advantage Plans Cover All Medicare Services, MEDICARE, 
https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/what-medicare-health-plans-
cover/medicare-advantage-plans-cover-all-medicare-services [https://perma.cc/V437-3TB6] 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2019) (“Most Medicare Advantage Plans offer coverage for things that 
aren’t covered by Original Medicare, like vision, hearing, dental, and wellness programs (like 
gym memberships).”). 
128. Neumann & Jacobson, supra note 125, at 2164. 
129. Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Enrollment in Medicare Advantage Plans in Miami-Dade County: 
Evidence of Status Quo Bias?, 50 INQUIRY 202, 211 (2013).  This stickiness may be from a 
genuine aversion to revisiting options or over-loyalty to a past choice, what psychologists call 
“status quo bias.”  For the study that first revealed status quo bias in the selection of health 
plans, observing health plan choices among Harvard University employees, see William 
Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7, 26–31 (1988). 
130. Christopher C. Afendulis et al., Dominated Choices and Medicare Advantage Enrollment, 119 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 72, 73 (2015) (finding that a majority of beneficiaries did not switch 
out of traditional Medicare plans dominated by private fee-for-service plans, which became 
available in the mid-2000s). 
131. Id. at 75; see also J. Michael McWilliams et al., Complex Medicare Advantage Choices May 
Overwhelm Seniors—Especially Those with Impaired Decision Making, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1786, 
1791–92 (2011) (describing the cognitive limitations of Medicare beneficiaries, especially as 
they age, and how it affects plan choice). 
132. Joseph P. Newhouse & Thomas G. McGuire, How Successful is Medicare Advantage?, 92 
MILBANK Q. 351, 359 (2014) (“For example, in 2006, the first year of Part D, the insurer 
Humana priced its Part D policies much lower than its competitors and, as a result, obtained 
a relatively large market share.  It subsequently raised its premiums to near the level of its 
competitors but largely maintained its market share, very likely because of status quo bias.”). 
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Other studies document how the overwhelming number of options in the 
Medicare supplemental market can also impede consumers.  If there are too 
many Medicare Advantage options, for example, people opt instead for original 
Medicare and Medigap.133  Likewise, for Medigap, consumers can choose among 
ten different benefits designs, but a majority choose the most comprehensive plan 
design with the highest premiums.134  It is possible, but unlikely, that most retirees 
have the same preference for this plan design.135  More likely, people are opting 
for what seems simplest and least risky, as a result of what is called “choice 
overload,” where too many choices cause people to attempt to simplify,136 
disproving the basic economic assumption that more choices are better.137 
Even when there is not a plan that is objectively a better option, people may 
still not choose the plan most aligned with their own stated preferences because 
of a variety of misunderstandings.  A study of a large firm by economists 
Benjamin Handel and Jonathan Kolstad showed that basic misunderstanding of 
plan options could influence decisions significantly.138  The employees had a 
choice between two health plans: a high deductible health plan (HDHP) or a 
preferred provider option (PPO), the latter with higher premiums and lower 
cost-sharing.139  Both offered access to the same benefits and medical network, 
which is a critically important feature for choosing a plan but which over half of 
the employees did not understand, despite this fact being emphasized in 
 
133. McWilliams et al., supra note 131, at 1791.  See also Yaniv Hanoch et al., How Much Choice Is 
Too Much?  The Case of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 44 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1157, 
1163–64 (2009) (finding that increasing the number of drug plan options decreased accuracy 
of identifying plans with specific attributes, including lowest cost). 
134. CTR. FOR POL’Y AND RESEARCH, AMERICA’S HEALTH INS. PLANS, TRENDS IN MEDIGAP 
ENROLLMENT AND COVERAGE OPTIONS, 2014 10 (2015), https://ahip.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/MedigapEnrollmentReport_Linked.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AN5-
ELX5]. 
135. Mark J. Brown & Helen Doerpinghaus, Asymmetric Information and the Demand for 
Medigap Insurance, 31 INQUIRY 445, 448 (1994) (“There is no statistically significant 
difference in the policy provisions chosen or the premiums paid by self-reported high- and 
low-risk insured individuals.”). 
136. Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset 
Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 538 (2010) (“Our results establish that the size of the choice 
sets also impacts what types of options are selected by the market participants.  We find that a 
larger choice set increases the appeal of simple, easy-to-understand, options.”). 
137. For a comprehensive, easily digestible version of this idea, see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE 
PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2016). 
138. Benjamin R. Handel & Jonathan T. Kolstad, Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information 
Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2449, 2485 (2015) 
(“Consumers who believe that the PPO plan has a larger network of medical providers 
value the HDHP by $2,326 less than someone who correctly knows that these plans 
grants the same access.”). 
139. Id. 
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information given to them.140  A large majority of people also incorrectly 
estimated their spending from the prior year, yet a majority were confident in 
their estimates—more evidence that people do not understand their 
shortcomings enough to seek to remedy them.141 
This study estimated that someone who believed incorrectly that one option 
with a lower deductible had a larger network than the second option with the 
higher deductible valued the latter at $2,326 less than someone who understood 
they both had the same network structure.142  Misunderstanding the options, 
rather than a genuine preference for more comprehensive coverage, likely shapes 
some decisions. 
The bottom line of this body of studies is that regardless of age, plan type 
and options, and capacity, people fail to choose well among health plans for a 
variety of reasons.  Early evidence on the ACA exchanges, discussed in the next 
subpart, only affirms this fact.  A common response has been to attempt to nudge 
people toward better decisions.  That strategy has not worked either, as the 
following discussion illustrates. 
c. The ACA, More Flawed Decisionmaking, and Failed Nudges 
Emerging studies of the ACA exchanges show that, even with “nudges” 
toward better decisions, people are not choosing well.  Consistent with the 
evidence above, many people are selecting almost exclusively based on lowest 
premium sticker price, often resulting in the choice of a dominated plan once 
subsidies are factored in.143 
Others choose health plans that are not aligned with their own stated 
medical needs and preferences.144  In a study simulating the purchase experience 
 
140. Id. at 2465. 
141. Id. at 2466. 
142. Handel & Kolstad, supra note 138, at 2485. 
143. Reed Abelson, Cost, Not Choice, is Top Concern of Health Insurance Customers, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/business/cost-not-choice-is-top-
concern-of-health-insurance-customers.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7HFV-3WKX]; DEP’T. 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH PLAN CHOICE AND PREMIUMS IN THE 2016 HEALTH 
INSURANCE MARKETPLACE 7 (2015), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/ 
135461/2016%20Marketplace%20Premium%20Landscape%20Issue%20Brief%2010-30-
15%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPQ6-U3F2] (noting that in 2014, the majority (64 
percent) of enrollees selected the lowest (43 percent) or second lowest (21 percent) priced 
plan in their metal tier.  In 2015, 47 percent selected the lowest or second lowest price plans 
(31 percent and 17 percent, respectively)). 
144. Andrew J. Barnes et al., Determinants of Coverage Decisions in Health Insurance 
Marketplaces: Consumers’ Decision-Making Abilities and the Amount of Information in Their 
Choice Environment, 50 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 58, 67 (2015) (finding in a simulation based on 
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on ACA exchanges, only one-third of respondents chose the cost-minimizing 
plan, based on their own anticipated medical care need.145  In contrast, 43 percent 
of respondents chose a plan that would leave them over insured (resulting in, on 
average, overspending by 24 percent, or $1,324 on premiums), and nearly a 
quarter selected a plan that would leave them underinsured.146  The authors 
estimated that if all people buying plans on the ACA exchanges had similar error 
rates as the study population, “the result would be roughly $7.1 billion of excess 
spending each year, borne by a population with low to moderate incomes.”147 
The study hypothesized that the labeling of plans in the ACA exchanges, 
which was an attempt to steer people to better choices, may instead have created 
confusion.148  The ACA plans are organized and sold by “metal” level, such as 
Gold, Silver, and Bronze.149  Higher metal levels indicate that a plan will on 
average pay for a higher share of spending on essential health benefits—known as 
higher actuarial value—generally in return for higher premiums.150  The authors 
found more generic labels improved choices, but only a little.151 
Other studies show how low-income consumers are leaving money on the 
table.  For people with especially low incomes (defined as 100–250 percent of the 
federal poverty level, or $25,750–$64,375 for a family of four in 2019152), the law 
requires insurers to provide a second subsidy called cost-sharing reductions 
(CSRs), which decrease out-of-pocket spending when someone uses medical 
 
purchasing actual ACA exchange plans that 40 percent of respondents choose a plan that 
would cost them at least $500 more than another option, based on their self-reported 
health needs). 
145. Saurabh Bhargava et al., The Costs of Poor Health (Plan Choices) & Prescriptions for Reform, 3 
BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2017).  This study varied plans only by cost.  It told respondents that 
benefits were equal among plans and did not mention network differences.  Id. 
146. Id. at 7–8. 
147. Id. at 10. 
148. See id. at 1. 
149. The ‘Metal’ Categories: Bronze, Silver, Gold & Platinum, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plans-categories [https://perma.cc/B4PZ-8BDB] 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
150. This is not universally true after the 2018 open enrollment, where plans in many states priced 
up Silver Plans to increase federal premium subsidies to make up for the cost-sharing 
reductions the Trump Administration will not pay.  See Margot Sanger-Katz & Kevin Quealy, 
When Silver Costs More Than Gold: How Trump’s Actions Have Scrambled Insurance Prices, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/upshot/when-silver-costs-
more-than-gold-how-trumps-actions-have-scrambled-insurance-prices.html 
[https://perma.cc/FBC7-JWEN]. 
151. See Bhargava et al., supra note 145, at 10–11. 
152. Poverty Guidelines, OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLAN. & EVALUATION (Jan. 11, 
2019), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/7BRW-JD9V]. 
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care.153  To get CSR assistance, someone must buy at least a Silver-level plan.154  If 
she buys the plan with the cheapest premiums she can find, likely a Bronze plan, 
she disqualifies herself from these subsidies, and her total spending on premiums 
and cost-sharing will almost certainly be higher than if she bought the Silver-level 
plan.  Millions of low-income enrollees have fallen into this trap.155 
The overwhelming response by scholars and policymakers to all of this 
evidence has been to try to correct pervasive decisionmaking errors, using the 
insights of behavioral law and economics.156  Several exchanges, for example, try 
to nudge consumers eligible for cost-sharing reductions to Silver plans by 
displaying them first on websites, instead of showing the cheapest Bronze plans 
first as they do for other buyers who are not eligible for CSRs.157  More assertively, 
the federal exchange healthcare.gov issues a warning if someone eligible for CSRs 
tries to buy a Bronze plan.158  Even with such efforts, only about 80 percent of 
people eligible for CSRs were buying Silver plans.159  It is possible that some 
people could not stomach higher spending on premiums at the point of purchase, 
but many will ultimately spend more in a year due to defaulting on the CSRs. 
Marketplaces have acknowledged the challenges of designing useful 
decision-support tools to help people choose their best option, balancing the 
need for enrollment simplicity against predictive accuracy.  One state reported, 
 
153. Louise Norris, The ACA’s Cost-Sharing Subsidies, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Sept. 23, 2019), 
https://www.healthinsurance.org/obamacare/the-acas-cost-sharing-subsidies 
[https://perma.cc/P3LL-E53P]. 
154. Id. 
155. See Vicki Fung et al., Nearly One-Third of Enrollees in California’s Individual Market Missed 
Opportunities to Receive Financial Assistance, 36 HEALTH AFF. 21 (2017); More Than 2 Million 
Exchange Enrollees Forgo Cost-Sharing Assistance, AVALERE HEALTH (Aug. 19, 2015), 
http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/insights/more-than-2-million-exchange-
enrollees-forgo-cost-sharing-assistance [https://perma.cc/22M2-6C23]. 
156. See, e.g., TOM BAKER ET. AL, PENN LEONARD DAVIS INST. HEALTH ECON., WINDOW 
SHOPPING ON HEALTHCARE.GOV AND THE STATE-BASED MARKETPLACES: MORE CONSUMER 
SUPPORT IS NEEDED (2014), https://ldi.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/ 
pdf/window%20shopping%20on%20healthcare%20gov.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNP9-P6EB]; 
JUSTIN GIOVANNELLI & EMILY CURRAN, COMMONWEALTH FUND, EFFORTS TO SUPPORT 
CONSUMER ENROLLMENT DECISIONS USING TOTAL COST ESTIMATORS: LESSONS FROM THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S MARKETPLACES (2017), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_issue_brief_2017_feb_1929_giov
annelli_total_cost_estimators_rb.pdf [https://perma.cc/2E3B-UNPD]. 
157. BAKER ET AL., supra note 156, at 4.  See also In Washington State, Too Many Low-Income 
Bronze Plan Buyers, XPOSTFACTOID (Mar. 29, 2015, 10:41 AM), 
http://xpostfactoid.blogspot.com/2015/03/in-washington-state-too-many-low-income.html 
[https://perma.cc/RF9W-W5LP]. 
158. Id.  (“While the site does provide a pop-up warning to CSR-eligible buyers who make a 
preliminary selection of a metal level other than silver, it’s not a very clear warning . . . .”). 
159. Id. 
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tellingly, that it avoided asking too many input questions because it “might give 
consumers a false sense of accuracy.”160  The outputs from any website supports 
are inevitably complicated, breaking down total annual estimated costs into 
monthly premiums, deductible spending, and basic plan information.161  One 
study aptly noted: “Delivering on this vision [of a consumer-friendly shopping 
experience] is difficult because health insurance is complicated.”162  More, or 
different, information does not necessarily help. 
The Johnson simulation, discussed above, tested various decision-support 
tools and concluded that most had little positive effect.  A cost calculator, for 
example, which displayed total annual cost among options, resulted in only small 
decisionmaking improvements.163  The only approach that substantially reduced 
errors was a combination of just-in-time education, cost calculator, and, most 
importantly, a smart default with an opt out.164  Yet, consumers with these tools 
did not demonstrate a large increase in their confidence in their decisions, even 
though their final decisions were considerably better.165  The study authors 
conclude: “Consumers left to their own devices seem to make large errors when 
choosing health insurance, suggesting that they will select options that are not 
cost-efficient and they seem to be unaware of their failure.”166 
Another favorite approach among researchers is to simplify the choices or 
to package them differently.  One set of health economics researchers homed in on 
and tested the hypothesis that people would do better if they had fewer, simpler 
options, only to find out that it made little difference when tested empirically.167 
Others propose repackaging medical care into different bundles to fix 
decisionmaking errors caused by bounded rationality.  For example, law 
professor Russell Korobkin has proposed a redesign of health insurance policies, 
which he calls “relative value health insurance.”168  Insurance policies would 
bundle services based on evidence of their comparative cost effectiveness, or 
technically-calculated value.169  Putting aside the lack of data to calculate in this 
way (which is a large concession), the idea is that a Level 1 policy would cover 
only the most cost-effective treatments and a Level 10 would cover the universe, 
 
160. GIOVANNELLI & CURRAN, supra note 156, at 5. 
161. See id. at 6. 
162. Id. at 7. 
163. Johnson et al., supra note 18, at 4. 
164. Id. at 5 (defaulting consumers into the best options and allowing them the ability to opt out 
into a different option). 
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167. See Bhargava & Loewenstein, supra note 109. 
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from high to low value.170  He explains that: “[t]he simple numerical rating scale 
would provide boundedly rational consumers with a useful tool for allocating 
resources between their medical care and other goods and services.”171  He 
imagines that “[a]t the time of insurance enrollment, consumers could consult 
the current list of relative value ratings for all treatments, organized by condition, 
which would provide concrete examples of what interventions would need to be 
covered by policies set at different rating levels.”172 
The proposal may offer a reasonable way to root out some low-value care if 
most people do not buy the top-level plans.  It may also eliminate some bias 
toward overuse that happens when rationing occurs at the point of care, but 
other biases will be stronger with ex ante decisionmaking, including over-
optimism, anchoring on certain treatments on (or not on) a particular level 
list, or risk aversion. 
More detrimentally, even if options are designed more rationally, people 
still will not understand the implications of particular bundle levels.  People will 
no more understand what they get with a Level 8 policy than with the Gold-level 
Blue Shield PPO option.  More fundamental problems, such as the lack of well-
ordered preferences, the failure to understand risk and probability, and literacy 
and numeracy deficits remain.  What will undoubtedly occur is that people with 
more disposable income will pick more comprehensive coverage, while people 
without as much disposable income will buy as much as they can afford.  Few 
people will make the kinds of rational tradeoffs Korobkin envisions; his proposal 
merely becomes an even more forceful rationing of medical care by economic 
means and does little to enhance meaningful choice. 
Worse even, it perpetuates the false notion that people are getting what they 
want.  Most people will have a hard time deciphering what the effects of different 
bundles would be on their lives and livelihoods, and how to trade off a level 
upgrade against spending on other goods and services.  Furthermore, to the 
extent people have preferences about deeper or shallower coverage, they might 
not align any better to bundles of services organized by some measured value 
than to today’s insurance plan bundles.  Yet, an insurer, hospital, or policymaker 
can claim that someone chose her own fate if she selected a Level 5 plan when 
later denied Level 6 medical care. 
This type of technocratic tinkering is celebrated as innovation within a 
market structure.  It might reduce the use of low-value care overall, if fewer plans 
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cover it than do now (although that same end could be achieved without an 
overhaul of health plan design).  Yet, it unquestionably grows market bureaucracy, 
requiring huge investment in comparative effectiveness research, sorting 
treatments into levels, and redesigning health insurance policies accordingly. 
At the end of the day, and in light of the reality of how people choose among 
health plans, creating choices, even among simplified or differently-organized 
options, neither produces the ability for people to choose what they want, nor 
does it drive health care value based on those choices.  The ACA exchanges have 
successfully increased the number of people with insurance.  Yet, it is a stretch to 
say that they have enabled people to choose health plans most aligned with their 
preferences or that competition among plans has resulted in better health care. 
Enthoven’s vision of managed competition—with its many iterations over 
the years—is hard to square with reality.  The research shows that people do not 
navigate options with the sophistication Enthoven imagined.  More so, it is 
difficult to improve their decisions with anything short of a strong default, a 
decision-support shove, so to speak.173  If people are defaulted into their best 
option, choice becomes an empty concept. 
3. The Bureaucracy and Costs of Managed Competition 
Managed competition has not produced efficient results, nor has it avoided 
extreme government oversight.  Just the ACA version of managed competition 
has generated a massive regulatory infrastructure that was established and 
continues to grow in a futile attempt to support better consumer choice among 
barely distinguishable health plans.   
Federal and state governments have spent billions of dollars to establish and 
run these ACA exchanges, though the structure sets people up for failure and 
creates anxiety.  The federal government spent nearly $5 billion on state grants to 
establish exchanges and continues to spend $1–2 billion a year on an ongoing 
basis for the operation of healthcare.gov, the federally-funded exchange.174  It 
spent $2.5 billion to support temporary health insurance cooperatives, many of 
which failed.175  When the initial rollout of the healthcare.gov website, which over 
 
173. Cf. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 14, at 1621, 1625 (describing default contributions rates as 
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half of the states rely on, failed, enrolling only six people on its first day, the effort 
to overhaul it cost $1.7 billion, compared to an initial budget of $93.7 million.176  
It also wrought reputational harm on the ACA and the Obama Administration. 
States with their own exchanges must fund a large part of their ongoing 
operations.  California estimates annual costs of over $350 million, funded out of 
plan assessments.177  Even a smaller state like Vermont will spend about $50 
million a year to run its state exchange on an ongoing basis.178 
Innumerable hours of labor have been spent launching and refining this 
market.  The Department of Health and Human Services proposed, revised, and 
issued hundreds of pages of federal regulations to implement the exchanges—all 
of which face the same risk of regulatory capture as nonmarket based regulation 
and perhaps more because of the critical role that private industry plays.179  From 
the passage of the ACA through the end of the Obama Administration, CMS 
promulgated twenty-four new rules and generated sixty-four guidance 
documents with respect to the exchanges alone.180  An entirely new office, the 
Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, was established 
within CMS in part to implement them.181 
In parallel, the state regulators have been doing the same, first to set up the 
exchanges and then later to adapt to the many regulatory changes that have rolled 
out over the past ten years of ever-shifting implementation.  Implementing an 
ACA model based on the ideas of managed competition has required a 
tremendous investment of money and regulatory effort.  All of this expensive, 
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https://rctom.hbs.org/submission/the-failed-launch-of-www-healthcare-gov 
[https://perma.cc/VJ3Q-8PTK] (last modified Nov. 18, 2016). 
177. COVERED CALIFORNIA, FISCAL YEAR 2018–2019 BUDGET: PROPOSED 23 (2018), 
https://board.coveredca.com/meetings/2018/05-17/CoveredCA_2018-
19_Proposed_Budget-5-17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/9S3L-4823]. 
178. VT. AGENCY OF HUM. SERVS., BUDGET DOCUMENT: STATE FISCAL YEAR 2016 88, 92 (2016), 
https://dvha.vermont.gov/budget-legislative/sfy201602042015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MNH5-ZSXL]. 
179. As one example, the 2019 annual ACA exchange market rule received over 400 comments, 
about one-third of which came from industry participants, including Anthem, PhRMA, and 
DaVita. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2019, 82 Fed. Reg. 51052 (Nov. 
2, 2017); cf. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 14, at 1605 (“Soft paternalist measures run the risk of 
being less visible than more traditional regulations and mandates, which could make the 
political dynamics more prone to capture rather than less . . . .”). 
180. See The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight: Regulations and 
Guidance, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-and-
Guidance/index.html#HealthInsuranceMarketplaces [https://perma.cc/537U-AKRN] 
(counting listings under “Health Insurance Marketplaces” through calendar year 2016). 
181. The Center for Consumer Information & Insurance Oversight, CMS.GOV, 
https://www.cms.gov/cciio [https://perma.cc/WBC6-J782]. 
Health Care’s Market Bureaucracy  1965 
 
time-intensive tinkering and scrutiny serves to bolster a market structure that 
provides insurance for a mere 3 percent of the population.182 
This type of effort is replicated in various degrees for the Medicare 
supplemental market, including both Medicare Advantage and Medigap, as well 
as the Medicare Part D market.  Add to these costs the private bureaucracy, 
including the operating costs and profits of the insurers who sell policies in these 
various managed marketplaces.   
There are also opportunity costs.  The cost of this bureaucracy arguably 
includes price inflation that might have been avoided with a more effective policy 
strategy.  The efforts needed to bolster the exchanges have consumed health 
insurance regulators at both the state and the federal level.  They have 
commanded oversized technocratic analysis of exchanges and their successes and 
shortcomings, with some of the most talented researchers and think tanks 
consumed by this task.183  
From 2010 until mid-2017, a constant stream of research studies and news 
articles obsessed over the functioning of the exchanges.  The New England 
Journal of Medicine published thirty-five articles focused on the exchanges, 
Health Affairs published 280 articles that mention and 140 that focus on the 
exchanges, and over 800 law review articles discussed the exchanges, 250 of which 
focused on them in depth.184  The New York Times alone published over 300 
articles discussing the exchanges from 2010–2016,185 many of which focus almost 
obsessively on the state of competition, as measured by the number of 
competitors or premiums.186  Scores of researchers track premium prices, 
declaring them higher or lower than anticipated and setting off celebration or 
dismay.187  Stories of increasing prices or a major insurer, such as United 
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Healthcare, dropping out of the exchanges incite panic.188  Microscopic attention 
to increases in premium prices grabs attention, while revealing little about 
whether this model is working or will eventually work.189 
Finally, the exchanges have fueled several high-profile, high-stakes legal 
challenges, including King v. Burwell,190 over the availability of premium 
subsidies in the federal exchange, and House v. Hargan,191  (née House v. Burwell 
and briefly House v. Price) over the legitimacy of the Obama Administration’s 
payment of cost-sharing reductions without Congressional appropriation.  
Dozens of lawsuits have been filed against the federal government for the 
nonpayment of money owed to exchange insurers under the ACA.192  Such 
litigation arises largely due to the of the complexity of the market-based 
infrastructure,193 and likely consumes a lion’s share of the resources in the 
Solicitor General’s office. 
In sum, managed competition, embodied in the ACA health insurance 
exchanges has created a massive regulatory scaffolding—bureaucracy—without 
the payoff that the theory predicts.  Billions of dollars per year go to the mere 
administration of various marketplaces.  Countless hours of time are spent 
scrutinizing them and making technocratic adjustments to try to get them to 
work a little better at the margins, and they have fueled an endless stream of 
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Wrong Things?, 375 NEW ENG. J. MED 303 (2016). 
189. See David Blumenthal & Sara R. Collins, Turmoil in Individual Private Health Insurance 
Markets: Welcome to Real Competition, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2016/turmoil-individual-private-health-
insurance-markets-welcome-real-competition [https://perma.cc/CFF2-7LMZ] (“As reports 
of turmoil among private insurers in ACA marketplaces arise, we should keep in mind these 
characteristics of private health insurance markets, and competitive markets generally.”). 
190. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (holding that premium subsidies are available on the 
federally run exchange, as well as on state exchanges, in favor of the Obama Administration). 
191. U.S. House of Representatives v. Price, No. 16-5202, 2017 WL 3271445 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017). 
192. See How the ACA ‘Risk Corridor’ Fallout Is Hurting Health Care, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON 
(Mar. 29, 2018), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/significance-risk-corridors-
lawsuits [https://perma.cc/H226-PCGP]. 
193. See Allison K. Hoffman, What Health Reform Reveals About Health Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, & William M. Sage 
eds., 2017). 
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litigation and related costs.  This is all in addition to the operational costs of 
private insurers who are the machinery behind the exchanges.  In all likelihood, 
this market-based policy creates as much, perhaps more, bureaucracy than a 
more direct approach to expanding access would have, and consumers are 
arguably worse off than they would have been under a simpler approach. 
B. Moral Hazard, Consumer-Driven Health Care, and the Market  
for Medical Care 
Perhaps the most influential of economic theories on the development of 
health law and policy over the past decades has been moral hazard.194  Moral 
hazard has come to mean, most simply, that insurance increases losses.  The 
greater protection against losses someone has, the less incentive she has to avoid 
them.195  Perhaps more than any other idea, it has impeded productive health care 
regulation by perpetuating the flawed idea that health care consumers can, and 
should, themselves rationalize health care spending.  Reflecting on the American 
obsession with moral hazard, Malcolm Gladwell wrote in 2005: “Health 
economists in other Western nations do not share this obsession . . . .  But [in the 
U.S.] moral hazard has profoundly shaped the way think tanks formulate policy 
and the way experts argue and the way health insurers structure their plans and 
the way legislation and regulations have been written.”196  He goes on to credit the 
U.S. health care “mess” to the particular way moral hazard has shaped how 
American policymakers think about insurance.197 
Among other influences, moral hazard prompted a phenomenon of 
consumer-driven health care (CDHC).  Like managed competition does for 
health plans, CDHC relies on individual decisions regarding medical care—at the 
point of service—to spark price competition among providers and to reduce 
spending on low-value items or services.  As economists Jamie Robinson and 
Paul Ginsburg put it: “In the consumer-driven world view, patients should 
manage their own care, with the advice of their physicians and with information 
on prices and performance derived from Internet sites, patient groups, and 
 
194. See Arrow, supra note 25, at 961–62 (introducing the idea of “the moral hazard” for patients 
and physicians); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. 
REV. 531 (1968) (arguing that moral hazard is more serious of a problem than Arrow 
hypothesized and that it may make some expenses uninsurable). 
195. See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238 (1996). 
196. Malcolm Gladwell, The Moral-Hazard Myth, NEW YORKER (Aug. 21, 2005), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/08/29/the-moral-hazard-myth 
[https://perma.cc/3VT9-W26D]. 
197. Id. 
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personal advisers.”198  In theory, if patients must pay for more out-of-pocket, 
rather than with insurance, they would price compare and spend less on low-
value health care, which would enable them to spend more on things they value 
more, such as housing, food, or leisure.199  In turn, a regulatory morass has 
developed to try to realize this vision—with a web of laws promoting the 
transparency of price information and policing the amount of skin in the game—
even as mounting evidence show this concept does not work in application as 
theory predicts.200  As in Part II.A above, this Part proceeds in three Subparts that 
outline first the theory, second how and why CDHC has failed to produce wise 
rationing as predicted, and finally the bureaucratic scaffolding that has risen up to 
support this faltering idea. 
1. The Theory of Moral Hazard and Consumer-Driven Health Care 
The concept of moral hazard originated in early fire insurance 
underwriting, where it operated in a different way, to describe individuals as 
“moral hazards,” or not trustworthy enough to deserve the benefits that 
insurance confers.201 
Economists, including Kenneth Arrow in 1963202 and Mark Pauly, writing 
in response to Arrow in 1968,203 brought the idea of moral hazard into broader 
economic theory, where Pauly made it a phenomenon about rationality, more 
than morality.204  Instead of a character flaw, moral hazard came to represent the 
idea that any rational person who does not have to internalize the full extent of a 
 
198. James C. Robinson & Paul B. Ginsburg, Consumer-Driven Health Care: Promise and 
Performance, 28 HEALTH AFF. 272, 274 (Supp. 2009), https://www.healthaffairs.org/ 
doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.28.2.w272 [https://perma.cc/2CBD-RACD]. 
199. John C. Goodman, What is Consumer-Directed Health Care?, 25 HEALTH AFF. w540, w540 
(2006), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.25.w540 [https://perma.cc/ 
6LPS-YP6L] (describing the tradeoff between health care and other goods and services and 
why patient power is the right approach to such tradeoffs). 
200. Several reviews synthesize research prior to the ACA.  See, e.g., KATHERINE SWARTZ, ROBERT 
WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., COST-SHARING: EFFECTS ON SPENDING AND OUTCOMES (2010), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/786b/cb85cdd5bba0f4b5939d0f428707b6e9bbe2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7355-S7CL]; Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing 
and Healthcare Spending Growth, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 47 (2011); JONATHAN GRUBER, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND., THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE 
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND (2006). 
201. Baker, supra note 195, at 263–64. 
202. Arrow, supra note 25, at 961–62. 
203. See Pauly, supra note 194. 
204. See Baker, supra note 195, at 271 (describing that economists described what insurers thought 
as temptation instead as rational responses to “incentives” based on cost-benefit calculations). 
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cost has less incentive to avoid or limit it.205  Pauly argued that “need” for health 
care does not exist independently, and that demand for health care is elastic and 
follows the same rules as any other consumer product.206  In turn, insurance 
should be limited so people do not overconsume health care because the price 
feels artificially low.207 
Moral hazard can arise in two ways when people have insurance against 
losses.208  First, insurance reduces incentives to avoid harms, which is sometimes 
called “ex ante” moral hazard.209  Second, insurance creates a risk of malingering 
after a loss, or “ex post” moral hazard.210  For example, once sick, people will 
overuse care if it is fully paid for by insurance, in turn driving up health 
insurance premiums.211 
From its initial adoption, leading economists challenged the accuracy of 
Pauly’s conception of moral hazard on technical and normative grounds.  Arrow, 
both in his original writing and in response to Pauly, suggested that other 
countervailing factors limit overuse, including the physician acting as a 
“controlling agent” by attesting to necessity of a treatment,212 as well as the 
insurance company’s review and prevailing social norms.213  John Nyman 
challenged the notion that moral hazard was a problem, by showing that much of 
what Pauly’s initial models deemed inefficient was in fact efficient spending 
because insurance caused a positive income effect once people were ill.214 
 
205. Pauly, supra note 194, at 535.  Arrow and others extended the idea beyond insurance, to any 
situation where one party’s actions create a loss borne by another.  See Kenneth J. Arrow, The 
Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1968).  Joseph 
Stiglitz later modeled this insight.  See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The 
Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4 (1983). 
206. Pauly, supra note 194, at 532. 
207. Id. at 536. 
208. See Baker, supra note 195, at 270 (explaining the distinction between the two); George L. 
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547 (1987) 
(describing the former as the “reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the 
loss” and the latter as an “increase in claims against the insurance policy beyond the services 
the claimant would purchase if not insured”). 
209. See Priest, supra note 208, at 1547. 
210. Id. 
211. Pauly, supra note 194, at 533–34. 
212. Arrow, supra note 25, at 961. 
213. Arrow, supra note 205, at 538 (“Nonmarket controls, whether internalized as moral 
principles or externally imposed, are to some extent essential for efficiency.”). 
214. JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE (2003). Nyman also 
challenged the accuracy of the findings in the RAND study that suggested that cost-sharing 
did not produce negative health effects, illuminating that a significant number of people in 
the high cost-sharing experimental population dropped out of the study.  John A. Nyman, 
Moral and Other Hazards of Economic Analysis of Health Insurance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE LAW (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., 2015). 
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Yet, at the end of the day, Pauly’s arguments and overly-simplified 
conception prevailed in the marketplace of ideas, and moral hazard became a 
central tenet of law and economics scholarship that is applied widely across 
fields—from torts to contracts to bankruptcy—usually to justify limiting liability 
and compensation regimes.215  In health care, it motivated a cottage industry of 
policy design and scholarship attempting to solve the problem that “over-
insurance” causes people to use medical services inefficiently.  The solution is to 
scale back insurance coverage so that people experience a greater share of costs,216 
sometimes referred to as having more “skin in the game.”  In turn, people with 
more money at stake, in theory, will stop choosing low-value medical care.  Once 
patients reduce their demand for certain lower-value goods and services, basic 
economic theory predicts their prices will drop.  
Mark Pauly and Regina Herzlinger, who have written volumes on the topic, 
were early academic proponents of CDHC.217  Timothy Jost and others were wary 
of the idea from its nascence, cautioning that it likely would not work and would 
disproportionately harm lower-income and sicker patients.218  Jost’s cautions 
were prescient, as the studies discussed below increasingly illuminate.  
These ideas drove an increase in high deductible health plans, beginning in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, where the insured have to pay the first share of 
 
215. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 21, 26 (1987) (discussing 
the need to make sure that liability rules induce people to take the right amount of care to 
reach an equilibrium between risk and utility created by their actions); Richard A. Epstein, 
Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 666 (1985) (arguing against 
the foreseeable misuse doctrine that holds manufacturers liable in products cases because 
shifting liability to manufactures creates moral hazard of misuse); George L. Priest, A Theory 
of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1313–14 (1981) (discussing how to 
limit moral hazard through ex-ante definition of warranties in products contracts). 
216. See WILLARD G. MANNING & M. SUSAN MARQUIS, HEALTH INSURANCE: THE TRADE-OFF 
BETWEEN RISK POOLING AND MORAL HAZARD 31 (1989) (contending that 55 percent 
coinsurance is optimal); JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT POWER: 
SOLVING AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE CRISIS (1992); Martin Feldstein & Jonathan Gruber, A 
Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform 25 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 4852, 1994) (arguing for 50 percent coinsurance and 10 percent of income limits 
on out-of-pocket spending). 
217. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND 
POLICYMAKERS (Regina E. Herzlinger ed., 2004); REGINA HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN 
HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST 
SERVICE INDUSTRY (1996); REGINA HERZLINGER, WHO KILLED HEALTH CARE?  AMERICA’S $2 
TRILLION MEDICAL PROBLEM—AND THE CONSUMER-DRIVEN CURE 157 (2007); MARK V. 
PAULY, AN ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: DO TWO WRONGS MAKE A RIGHT? 
(1994). 
218. See JOST, supra note 3, at x; M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the 
Disadvantaged, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1315 (2007); Colleen L. Barry et al., Who Chooses a 
Consumer-Directed Health Plan?, 27 HEALTH AFF. 1671 (2008). 
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medical care costs before insurance reimburses spending.219  Proposals usually 
pair these plans with private savings accounts that patients can use to save and 
pay for their increased out-of-pocket share.220   
CDHC is in strong resurgence.  Policymakers have recently advocated for 
an expansion of tax credits for health savings accounts and regulations that allow 
higher cost-sharing in ACA health plans.221  Moral hazard is used to justify the 
current trend toward increased cost-sharing and other “personal responsibility” 
policies in state Medicaid programs.222  A new wave of Medicaid waiver proposals 
includes, for example, higher cost-sharing and penalties for using the emergency 
room for nonemergency care.223  
Employers increasingly offer high deductible plans and make plan design 
changes that reduce their responsibility for their employees’ medical care 
spending; 58 percent of workers with an employer plan had a deductible of 
$1,000 or higher for individual coverage in 2018, compared to 22 percent in 
2009224 and 10 percent in 2006.225 
Moral hazard also motived the rise of tax-advantage savings accounts that 
individuals can use to pay for their medical care, when their insurance no longer 
does.  These accounts were first created as a demonstration project as part of 
HIPAA in 1996.226  Even though the demonstration results were disappointing 
with very low uptake, a next generation product of health savings accounts 
(HSAs) emerged in response to lobbying efforts as part of the 2003 Medicare 
Modernization Act and the Bush Administration’s “ownership society 
 
219. JOST, supra note 3, at x. 
220. For a comprehensive history of and critique of consumer-driven health care, see JOST, supra 
note 3; HEALTH CARE AT RISK: AMERICA’S AILING HEALTH SYSTEM—AND HOW TO HEAL IT 
(Jacob S. Hacker ed., 2008). 
221. Stephanie Armour, Trump Targets Medicare for All in Re-Election Campaign, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-to-target-medicare-for-all-proposals-in-
re-election-campaign-11570104191 [https://perma.cc/KPU4-JRYS]. 
222. KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, PREMIUMS AND COST-SHARING IN 
MEDICAID: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH FINDINGS (2013), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files. 
wordpress.com/2013/02/8416.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RDX-QA7D]. 
223. Robin Rudowitz & MaryBeth Musmeci, The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report-section/the-aca-and-medicaid-
expansion-waivers-issue-brief [https://perma.cc/7L8G-R7NV]. 
224. KAISER FAM. FOUND., EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 2018 112 (2018), 
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey 
[https://perma.cc/6JYE-M8L3]. 
225. KAISER FAM. FOUND., 2016 EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS SURVEY 4 (2016), 
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2016-employer-health-benefits-survey 
[https://perma.cc/BLS8-S4XX]. 
226. JOST, supra note 3, at 81–83. 
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agenda.”227  In parallel, the IRS created rules that require a person to have a plan 
with a high deductible to qualify for a tax-advantaged HSA.228  This combination 
of high deductible plans with tax-favored savings accounts made them 
disproportionately beneficial to people with high incomes who could gain more 
from tax-sheltered savings.  In 2017, in the wake of the 2016 elections, countless 
policies supporting high deductible plans and HSAs came in quick sequence 
from Congress and the Trump Administration.229 
All of these types of proposals rely on the same theory, that with the right 
financial incentives, people will use less low-value health care.  
2. The Shortcomings of Law and Policy to Combat Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard relies on assumptions about how people react to incentives 
that, even if compelling in theory, have not proven true in practice.  The 
conceptual shortcomings and the mounting body of evidence described in the 
following Subpart make clear that patients will no sooner choose high-value 
medical care than they will select wisely among health insurance plans, regardless 
of how the incentives are structured.  The three Subparts describe first the 
theory’s conceptual shortcomings, second empirical evidence of its shortcomings 
as applied in policies, and third why efforts to correct failings through choice 
architecture and other technocratic tinkering are unlikely to lead to 
improvements. 
a. Conceptual Shortcomings 
Like with managed competition, even before applied in the real world, the 
assumptions that the theory of moral hazard relies on struggle under scrutiny, as 
Arrow’s and Nyman’s work argued and as Tom Baker has artfully detailed.230  In 
theory, moral hazard assumes money can compensate for losses, so that someone 
who is fully insured can be made whole and lacks incentive to avoid losses.231  For 
instance, if a fully-insured house burns down and the fire insurance company 
pays the owner the full value of the house, the owner is made whole.  
 
227. M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1756, 1756 (2006). 
228. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. NO. 969, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND OTHER TAX-
FAVORED HEALTH PLANS 3–4 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N3MV-BMD4] (requiring at least $1,350 for individual coverage and 
$2,700 for family coverage). 
229. See supra note 10. 
230. See Baker, supra note 195, at 276–83. 
231. Id. at 276. 
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Theoretically, if insured for more than the full value of the house, the owner 
would not prevent a fire or, even worse, might encourage one.  This example 
illustrates clear practical limits to moral hazard.  Although money can replace 
some losses, there are many that it cannot, such as the emotional value of home 
and possessions. 
In the context of health insurance, where losses usually follow from bodily 
harm, money is an even worse substitute, which tempers moral hazard’s effects.  
An individual has independent reasons to avoid bodily harm, even if the costs of 
medical care are fully reimbursed.  Many people exercise and eat vegetables to 
stay healthy, regardless of whether they have comprehensive health insurance.  
And much of illness is random. 
It is more plausible that well-insured people will use more medical care after 
they are sick or injured.  The first empirical support for this idea came when the 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (RAND HIE) showed that, indeed, people 
scale back on care when they have to pay for more of it themselves.232 
Yet, even this ex-post moral hazard has its conceptual limits.  People have 
reasons independent from cost to use, or not use, care.  Many people would 
rather spend their time in places other than a waiting room, and some avoid 
medical care altogether.233  Using more care, especially diagnostic care, increases 
the risk of false positives that will require more testing, time, and possibly invasive 
procedures.234  On the other end of the spectrum, some types of expensive care, 
including emergency care, are insensitive to price, meaning that people will use 
roughly the same amount regardless of whether they are well insured.235  And as 
 
232. JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE ET AL., FREE FOR ALL?: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE 
EXPERIMENT 40, 162 (1993) (showing that people with less insurance coverage used less care).  
This study examined nearly 3000 nonelderly families in plans with several levels of cost-
sharing, ranging from none to 95 percent, and several levels of maximum dollar 
expenditures, and found that people with higher coinsurance used less care, reporting 
spending 45 percent lower in the 95 percent coinsurance plan than in the free plan.  Id. 
at 8, 40. 
233. Jennifer M. Taber et al., Why do People Avoid Medical Care?  A Qualitative Study Using 
National Data, 30 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 290 (2014) (“People often avoid seeking medical 
care even when they suspect it may be necessary; nearly one-third of respondents in a recent 
national United States (U.S.) survey reported avoiding the doctor.”) (footnotes omitted). 
234. See, e.g., Joann G. Elmore et al., Ten-Year Risk of False Positive Screening Mammograms and 
Clinical Breast Examinations, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089, 1089 (1998) (finding a 49 percent 
risk of false positive result in a retrospective cohort study of 2400 women, resulting in 870 
outpatient appointments, 539 diagnostic mammograms, 186 ultrasound examinations, 188 
biopsies, and 1 hospitalization). 
235. See Newhouse et al., supra note 232, at 47 (showing that demand for some categories of care, 
including inpatient medical care for children, was inelastic). 
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Arrow noted, doctors as “controlling agents” will resist overuse of care, at least to 
some extent.236 
A second assumption of moral hazard is that people control their spending 
so that they could, in theory, avoid spending on low-value care if sick or injured.  
This assumption maps especially poorly in the health care context: The RAND 
HIE showed that most of the difference in care utilization by less-insured subjects 
occurred when they decided to forgo care altogether.237  Once someone went to a 
doctor or hospital, the amount of care used or what they spent on it did not differ 
by level of insurance coverage.238  This is because people routinely follow their 
doctors’ advice.239  Doctors are especially influential when care is most expensive, 
or for serious illness or injury.240  While moral hazard has some blunt, predictive 
value on spending, countervailing forces mute its impact. 
A final, critical assumption is that with more skin in the game people will cut 
out low-value care.  Yet, as discussed above in Part I and proven by the empirical 
evidence below, layers of impediments thwart sound medical care choices.  
So, health care consumers will indeed ration, but not in ways that are 
especially efficient. 
b. Problems in Practice 
A deep body of empirical evidence has grown to show that the moral hazard 
theory has strong practical limits in health care.241  CDHC-based policies are for 
the most part not encouraging better tradeoffs between medical care and other 
goods, nor is this market-based approach quelling bureaucracy or regulatory 
intervention.  In fact, it demands the opposite. 
 
236. Arrow, supra note 25, at 961. 
237. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232, at 98–100. 
238. Id. at 95. 
239. Cf.  Levinson et al., supra note 47 (finding that many people prefer to rely on a 
physicians’ advice). 
240. See Arora & McHorney, supra note 47, at 338; Lesley F. Degner & Jeffery A. Sloan, Decision 
Making During Serious Illness: What Role do Patients Really Want to Play?, 45 J. CLINICAL 
EPIDEMIOLOGY 941, 945–46, 948 (1992) (finding that 59 percent of newly diagnosed cancer 
patients preferred physicians to make treatment decisions on their behalf; only 12 percent 
wanted an active role). 
241. Studies of social insurance programs fail to show the increased utilization that moral hazard 
predicts would occur with the introduction of indemnity programs.  Baker, supra note 195, at 
284–89 (citing empirical studies that provide no strong evidence that insurance reduces the 
level of care and little evidence of significant “ex-post” moral hazard).  As one example, 
switching from third-party to no-fault insurance, which under classic theory would increase 
accidents considerably, shows only small increases.  See J. David Cummings & Mary. A 
Weiss, The Stochastic Dominance of No-Fault Automobile Insurance, 60 J. RISK & INS. 230, 233 
(1993). 
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i. Evidence on Reductions of Care and Outcomes 
To review, proponents claim that CDHC increases efficiency because 
people will spend less on lower-value medical care and shift resources to things 
they value more.  One way they might do so is by reducing the use of low-value 
types of care.  Another way is to compare prices and choose less-expensive 
providers.  Yet, the evidence suggests that in practice people are not following this 
theoretical playbook. 
Studies beginning with the classic RAND HIE confirmed the basic claim 
that increased cost-sharing will lower health care spending.242  Yet, what RAND 
HIE also showed, and has been affirmed now by a quarter-century of empirical 
research, is that reductions do not result from better consumerism, such as 
shopping for lower-priced services, or from elimination of wasteful care.  With 
higher cost-sharing, people reduce beneficial care as much as wasteful care.243  
Consumers reduce spending across most health services, including cutting out 
beneficial pharmaceuticals and preventive care,244 as well as lower-value care, 
 
242. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232 at 40; Amelia M. Haviland et al., Do “Consumer Directed” 
Health Plans Bend the Cost Curve Over Time?, 46 J. HEALTH ECON. 33, 42 (2016) (“We find 
that health care cost growth among firms offering a CDHP is significantly lower in each of the 
first three years after offer.”); see also M. KATE BUNDORF, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., 
CONSUMER-DIRECTED HEALTH PLANS: DO THEY DELIVER? 12 (2012) (reporting, based on 
survey of studies, between 5 percent and 14 percent reductions on health care spending on 
average from CDHPs). 
243. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232 at 162, 166.  See, e.g., Zarek C. Brot-Goldberg et al., What 
Does a Deductible Do?  The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Health Care Prices, Quantities, and 
Spending Dynamics, 132 Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1266 (2017); (“[C]onsumers meaningfully reduce 
both types of care, calling into question whether quantity reductions overall are net welfare 
increasing or decreasing.”); Judith H. Hibbard et al., Does Enrollment in a CDHP Stimulate 
Cost-Effective Utilization?, 65 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 437, 443 (2008) (showing reduction in 
both low-priority, or less cost-effective, and high-priority acute and chronic visits among 
people who switched into a CDHP); Mitchell D. Wong et al., Effects of Cost Sharing on Care 
Seeking and Health Status: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1889 (2001) (finding that cost-sharing reduced the use of care for both minor and serious 
symptoms in a chronically ill population who faced high copayments). 
244. See, e.g., Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1293 (“Despite the fact that preventive 
services are free both before and after the switch to high-deductible care, we find that 
consumers meaningfully reduce consumption of these services.”).  Consumers also reduce 
services like mental health care and prescription drugs for diabetes management, cholesterol 
management, depression, and hypertension.  Id. at 1295–96; Michael T. Eaddy et al., How 
Patient Cost-Sharing Trends Affect Adherence and Outcomes: A Literature Review, 37 
PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 45, 47, 49 (2012) (reporting that 85 percent of relevant studies 
reviewed showed that increasing patient share of medication costs led to lower adherence 
and, among studies on adherence and outcomes, 86 percent showed statistically significantly 
improved outcomes with increased adherence); Leonard Fromer, Prevention of Anaphylaxis: 
The Role of the Epinephrine Auto-Injector, 129 AM. J. MED. 1244, 1247 fig.1 (2016) (showing 
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such as nonemergent use of emergency departments.245  Economist Katherine 
Baicker and colleagues characterize the underuse of high value care as a type of 
“behavioral hazard,” which can result even from small cost-sharing.246 
There has been a more extensive debate over whether such reductions 
ultimately lead to negative health outcomes, although increasingly studies 
suggest they can.  There have been only two controlled experiments—RAND 
HIE and the Oregon Experiment—to examine the ultimate link between 
insurance coverage and health outcomes, and neither found a strong connection 
in the overall study population.247  If these studies were definitive and people with 
higher cost-sharing were randomly to reduce both high- and low-value care 
and end up no worse off, that might be an acceptable result, even if different 
than anticipated. 
Other recent studies, however, have shown evidence of harm when people 
face high cost-sharing and reduce care.  Even RAND HIE found negative health 
outcomes for low-income populations.248  Numerous observational and quasi-
experimental studies since found negative outcomes both among low-income 
populations and more broadly, among older adults, a population that was 
excluded from RAND HIE design.249 
 
increased abandonment of prescriptions for lifesaving EpiPens as cost increases, with more 
than 50 percent of prescriptions abandoned when patient cost exceeds $300). 
245. J. Frank Wharam et al., Emergency Department Use and Subsequent Hospitalizations Among 
Members of a High-Deductible Health Plan, 297 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1093 (2007). 
246. Katherine Baicker et al., Behavioral Hazard in Health Insurance, 130 Q. J. ECON. 1623, 1623 
(2015). 
247. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232; Amy Finkelstein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment: Evidence from the First Year, 127 Q. J. ECON. 1057 (2012). 
248. NEWHOUSE ET AL., supra note 232, at 208–11. 
249. See, e.g., Amitabh Chandra et al., Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the 
Elderly, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 193, 194 (2010); John Hsu et al., Unintended Consequences of 
Caps on Medicare Drug Benefits, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2349, 2354–55 (2006); Robyn 
Tamblyn et al., Adverse Events Associated With Prescription Drug Cost-Sharing Among Poor 
and Elderly Persons, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 421, 426–27 (2001).  Other studies show that 
higher cost-sharing reduces behaviors that are known to improve health outcomes, such as 
medication adherence.  Michael Chernew et al., Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on 
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1131, 1134–35 (2008) 
(studying data from 6 million employees in large firms and finding that increased cost-
sharing resulted in relatively lower medication adherence among individuals in low-income 
areas); Amelia M. Haviland et al., How do Consumer-Directed Health Plans Affect Vulnerable 
Populations?, 14 F. HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2011) (showing that higher cost-sharing 
reduces beneficial preventive and chronic care).  For reviews of these and other studies, see 
Thomas Rice & Karen Y. Matsuoka, The Impact of Cost-Sharing on Appropriate Utilization 
and Health Status: A Review of the Literature on Seniors, 61 MED. CARE RES. & REV. 415 (2004) 
(reviewing Medicare studies up until 2004); Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient 
Cost-Sharing and Healthcare Spending Growth, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 56–60 (2011) 
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For example, Medicare recipients whose drug benefits were capped showed 
lower rates of drug adherence than did those without caps, even for chronic 
diseases like high blood pressure and diabetes.250  Those with capped benefits 
were, in turn, more likely to have higher blood pressure and LDL cholesterol and 
higher rates of visits to the emergency department, nonelective hospitalizations, 
and death.251  Likewise, when a new Canadian law imposed a 25 percent 
coinsurance rate and a deductible on prescription drugs, a study showed that 
rates of serious adverse events, including hospitalization, nursing home 
admission or death roughly doubled among elderly persons and welfare 
recipients.252  Another study of significant increases in cost-sharing in the 
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) supplemental 
coverage for retirees showed decreased use of prescription drugs and physician 
office visits.253  Savings from this decrease were offset by increased 
hospitalization, which contradicts the findings of the RAND HIE that reductions 
in spending were not offset.254 
Studies also show that people with less insurance act in ways that might 
cause more significant future medical problems, and short-term spending 
reductions may not mean less spending in the long run—a finding that neither 
the RAND nor Oregon studies were able to measure.255  Inversely, studies show a 
link between increased insurance and participation in activities that are proven to 
make people healthier, such as better medication adherence and using certain 
preventive services.256 
 
(describing studies on insurance and health outcomes, especially on pharmaceuticals); JOST, 
supra note 3, at 130–31 (summarizing various studies pre-2007); SWARTZ, supra note 200. 
250. See Hsu et al., supra note 249, at 2354–55. 
251. Id. at 2355–56. 
252. Tamblyn et al., supra note 249, at 426–27 (reporting incidence of adverse events associated 
with reductions increasing from 5.8 to 12.6 per 10,000 person-months in the elderly 
population and from 14.7 to 27.6 among welfare recipients in the study).  People reduced use 
of both nonessential and essential drugs—the latter including, for example, antibiotics and 
gastroprotective medications.  Id. 
253. Chandra et al., supra note 249, at 194. 
254. Id. at 211 (conflicting with the RAND HIE bottom line and suggesting that it may have 
missed implications by focusing on a nonelderly population). 
255. Research shows that uninsured people who forgo beneficial care in their pre-Medicare years 
catch up and spend relatively more when they age into Medicare.  See, e.g., J. Michael 
McWilliams et al., Impact of Medicare Coverage on Basic Clinical Services for Previously 
Uninsured Adults, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 757 (2003); J. Michael McWilliams et al., Use of 
Health Services by Previously Uninsured Beneficiaries, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 143 (2007). 
256. Benjamin D. Sommers et al., Health Insurance Coverage and Health—What the Recent 
Evidence Tells Us, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 586 (2017) (surveying research on the impact of 
health insurance on financial security and health); Finkelstein et al., supra note 247 (reporting 
higher use of preventive care, access to care, and perceived quality of care, as well as self-
reported health improvements, following Medicaid expansion to previously uninsured). 
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ii. Exploring Consumerist Shortcomings in CDHC 
Empirical studies reveal a range of explanations for why skin-in-the-game 
incentives are not working as predicted; these studies suggest that even with 
endless regulatory tinkering, they are unlikely to improve.  One problem is that 
people do not seem to understand the incentives created by these health plans 
and, if they do, fail to respond as a rational person would to them.  For example, 
when high-value care is excluded from a plan’s deductible, the goal is to create 
incentives for people to maintain use of this care by making it free.  Yet, patients 
do not understand this dynamic.257  Similarly, people reduce care throughout a 
plan year, even if it is fairly certain they will exceed the deductible and other cost-
sharing obligations over the course of the year.258  In doing so, they eliminate care 
that is in effect free to them. 
More detrimentally, people do not seem willing to price compare to get a 
better deal, even under ideal conditions for price shopping, with their own dollars 
on the line, for relatively fungible services, and when price data is right at their 
fingertips.259  A recent study, based on a natural experiment that occurred when a 
large employer changed its employee plan from coverage that paid for all medical 
care to a high deductible health plan with high cost-sharing, showed decreased 
overall utilization, as in earlier studies.260  Yet, there was no evidence that 
 
257. Mary E. Reed et al., In Consumer-Directed Health Plans, A Majority of Patients were Unaware 
of Free or Low-Cost Preventive Care, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2641 (2012) (finding that a majority of 
enrollees were unaware that the deductible did not apply to certain high-value care, such as 
preventive office visits, medical tests, and screenings). 
258. See e.g., Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1306–07 (describing that 25 percent of total 
spending reductions over the year in population studied occur from the consumer (i) while 
under the deductible and (ii) who is predictably sick and will almost certainly outspend the 
deductible).  This pattern holds in future years, suggesting people do not learn to estimate 
their true shadow prices in future years.  Id. at 1308. 
259. Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1286–88 (finding that among employees with access 
to leading technology for price comparison, there appeared to be no price shopping at all and 
that only a minority of employees reported that they knew of (33 percent), used (22 percent) 
or benefitted from (4 percent) the tool); Judith H. Hibbard & Edward C. Weeks, Does the 
Dissemination of Comparative Data on Physician Fees Affect Consumer Use of Services?, 27 
MED. CARE 1167, 1172–73 (1989) (finding that providing hundreds of government 
employees and Medicare Part B enrollees a directory listing and the fees charged by local 
physicians for common procedures had little effect on their behavior and use of services); 
Sunita Desai et al., Association Between Availability of a Price Transparency Tool and 
Outpatient Spending, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1874, 1879–80 (2016) (testing a price 
transparency tool among employees at two large companies and finding it was not associated 
with lower spending or choosing lower-priced ambulatory settings and, in fact, resulted in 
modestly higher spending).  This study found that only 10 percent of employees even logged 
into the tool in the first year of use.  Id. at 1879. 
260. Brot-Goldberg et al., supra note 243, at 1263. 
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employees price compared among services, even though the price comparisons 
were made easy and employees paid a significant share of the costs out-of-
pocket.261  A coauthor of this study, leading economist Amitabh Chandra, told 
the New York Times: “I was all for high-deductible plans before I wrote my 
paper,” which he said disabused him of the belief that deductibles and data would 
prompt good consumerism.262 
Other studies testing price transparency laws or decision aids show similar 
results.263  Despite a tool offered in the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System (CalPERS) that displayed prices for lab tests, office visits, and imaging 
services, only 12 percent of people used the tool in the first fifteen months after it 
was introduced and, for the most part, they did not choose a lower-priced service 
after using the tool.264  The study authors concluded that “simply increasing 
deductibles and introducing price transparency tools will not induce consumers 
to price-shop.”265  Even the study with the strongest positive results showed very 
limited consumerism.266 
 
261. Id. at 1265. 
262. Margot Sanger-Katz, The Big Problem With High Health Care Deductibles, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/upshot/the-big-problem-with-high-health-
care-deductibles.html [https://perma.cc/ZL25-C2E6]. 
263. See Sunita Desai et al., Offering a Price Transparency Tool Did Not Reduce Overall Spending 
Among California Public Employees and Retirees, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1401, 1405–06 (2017) 
(finding that only a small percent of purchases followed a price search and access to a price 
transparency tool did not lower spending).  This study did find that people used lower-priced 
imaging services but only 1 percent of people using imaging services conducted a price 
search.  Id.  See also Ateev Mehrotra et al., Americans Support Price Shopping for Health Care, 
But Few Actually Seek Out Price Information, 36 HEALTH AFF. 1392, 1398–99 (2017) (finding 
that an unwillingness to switch providers or insurance networks constraints contribute to 
extremely low levels of price shopping).  Two studies do show modest reduction in prices for 
imaging services among people who used a price-transparency tool, but also show that only a 
small number of people used it.  Christopher Whaley et al., Association Between Availability 
of Health Service Prices and Payments for These Services, 312 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1670 (2014) 
(5.9 percent of laboratory claims, 6.9 percent of advanced imaging claims, and 26.8 percent of 
clinician office visits matched a search with respective savings of 13.93 percent, 13.15 percent, 
and 1.02 percent); Anna D. Sinaiko et al., Association Between Viewing Health Care Price 
Information and Choice of Health Care Facility, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1868, 1869 (2016) 
(reporting that 3.5 percent of users used Aetna’s web-based price transparency tool and, of 
those, users chose lower-price services for sleep studies, but the difference was not significant 
for the other six services studied). 
264. Desai et al., supra note 263, at 1401. 
265. Id. at 1406. 
266. Whaley et al., supra note 263, at 1672–73 (finding that about 6–7 percent of employees 
searched prior within fourteen days of using a service and among those who did, spending 
was 13.93 percent lower for laboratory tests, 13.15 percent lower for advanced imaging, 1.02 
percent lower for office visits, and 2.4 percent lower for new patient office visits).  There is 
some limited evidence that people may respond more to a well-designed system of reference 
pricing—where price is set at the level of a designated provider and patients must pay extra if 
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A sweeping study among people with high deductible plans and easy access 
to price data on lower-leg MRIs, which are shoppable, expensive, and “among the 
least differentiated health care services” found that “on average, patients travel 
past six lower-priced providers in route to where they received care.”267  This 
study found that only 14 percent of people went to the lowest-cost MRI provider 
within thirty minutes of her home and that patients could have reduced out-of-
pocket costs by over $80 and insurer spending by over $220 (over 27 percent and 
40 percent excess spending).268  The referring physician was the strongest 
determinant of where people went for an MRI and the median referring 
orthopedic doctor sent no patients to the lowest-cost provider.269  While many of 
the above studies document the failures of consumerism without pinpointing the 
exact situs of the failure, this one suggests that at least one factor is agency, namely 
that patients rely on their doctors to make decisions. 
In sharp contrast to these scenarios where prices were made transparent, the 
price of health care is usually indecipherable.270  Often, neither insurers nor 
providers can or will disclose the price of a service beforehand.  This is in part due 
to a belief that prices are proprietary—a problem regulation could address.  Yet, it 
is also due to the unpredictable way medicine is reimbursed, by units of care, so 
that prices may genuinely be unknowable in advance.  If a surgery proves more 
complicated than anticipated, surgical or hospital bills will be higher.  Prices may 
differ by insured, by insurer, and by provider, so that even the doctor providing 
the services is unlikely to know how much her services will cost for the patient.271 
It is also noteworthy that typically even if users have good information on 
price, they lack that on quality, which is just as important for making wise 
 
they choose nondesignated providers with higher prices.  The California Personnel 
Retirement System (CalPERS), for example, has had success in reducing spending with 
reference pricing combined with preauthorization to explain pricing to patients.  David 
Frankford & Sara Rosenbaum, Go Slow on Reference Pricing: Not Ready for Prime Time, 
HEALTH AFF. (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20150309.045147/full [https://perma.cc/G9Y9-YSQT].  Although this experiment 
showed the ability to steer people toward lower-cost services, it saved 0.26 percent of total 
expenditure and increased plan administrative costs.  Id. 
267. Chernew et al., supra note 249, at 10. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 3. 
270. See generally STEVEN BRILL, AMERICA’S BITTER PILL: MONEY, POLITICS, BACKROOM DEALS, AND 
THE FIGHT TO FIX OUR BROKEN HEALTHCARE SYSTEM (2015); Steven Brill, Bitter Pill: Why 
Medical Bills Are Killing Us, TIME, Feb. 20, 2013 (exposing the high and indecipherable prices 
of medical care and the reasons why). 
271. See e.g., G. Michael Allan et al., Physician Awareness of Drug Cost: A Systemic Review, 4 PLOS 
MED. 1486, 1486 (2007) (reviewing studies showing doctors’ ignorance of prescription 
drug prices). 
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decisions.  Although ratings systems have attempted to judge high and low 
hospital performance, they are underdeveloped and inconclusive, and studies 
show that the four existing national rating systems have produced inconsistent 
assessments.272  Even if consumers had good data on both price and quality and 
wanted to use it, they would be faced with impossibly complex decisions about 
cost/quality tradeoffs and might lack the proficiency to navigate this complexity.  
CDHC advocates argue consumers can overcome such shortcomings 
because they successfully navigate markets for other complex goods.  Yet, the 
complexity of health care has proven greater than choosing between a Mac and 
PC.  More importantly, it is becoming evident that patients do not view their 
medical care as just another consumer good, and resist invitation to price 
compare.  They will follow a doctor’s specific advice, even if the doctor 
recommends, knowingly or not, avoidably higher-priced options. 
Some scholars herald international examples as consumerism success 
stories, such as Switzerland, Singapore, Germany, and even China.  Even though 
these countries have systems that build in some degree of choice of services or 
health plan, none relies on consumerism to save money; rather, they (and other 
peer nations) all use supply-side incentives and regulatory price controls or 
rationing to get results.273  What choice-based features in these systems do is to 
allow people to opt for higher level service or amenities, such as a private room, 
for the most past.  The theory that consumer choice will drive better health 
care quality and prices is becoming increasingly hard to defend, as CDHC is 
tested in practice. 
 
272. J. Matthew Austin et al., National Hospital Ratings Systems Share Few Common Scores and 
May Generate Confusion Instead of Clarity, 34 HEALTH AFF. 423 (2015). 
273. In the Swiss system, for example, the government mandates benefits, sets national fees 
schedules for physicians and maximum pricing for hospitals and pharmaceuticals, and 
approves community-rated premiums.  Nikola Biller-Andorno & Thomas Zeltner, 
Individual Responsibility and Community Solidarity—The Swiss Health Care System, 373 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2193, 2195 (2015).  In Singapore, government control of prices and 
rationing of health services, not the presence of medical savings accounts, drive cost control 
efforts.  Michael D. Barr, Medical Savings Accounts in Singapore: A Critical Inquiry, 26 J. 
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 709, 716–18 (2001).  See also Winnie C. Yip & William C. Hsaio, 
Medical Savings Accounts: Lessons From China, 16 HEALTH AFF. 244, 250 (1997) (describing 
that neither China nor Singapore are demand-side success stories and that the Singaporean 
system, which is often cited by CDHC advocates as an example of success, led to redundant 
proliferation of technology and overprescribing); Olga Khazan, What American Healthcare 
Can Learn From Germany, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/ 
archive/2014/04/what-american-healthcare-can-learn-from-germany/360133 
[https://perma.cc/PDW7-JPG7] (describing the uniform fee schedule and other German 
cost-cutting regulatory measures). 
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c. More Technocratic Tinkering to Improve CDHC’s 
Like in insurance plan choice, rather than see these deep failures as a sign 
that consumers may not be the right agents to drive down prices or root out low-
value services, these shortcomings have impelled attempts to design more 
nuanced systems to nudge consumers toward better decisions.  Scholars propose 
rebates and incentives to steer choices by making low-value goods relatively more 
expensive.274  The classic model in this mold is value-based insurance design (V-
BID), proposed by A. Mark Fendrick and Michael Chernew and others, which 
proposes charging a patient higher copayments for lower-value therapies and less 
for therapies that are more likely to be effective.275  Unlike later iterations, 
Fendrick and Chernew wisely suggest not paying for wasteful care at all, which 
would reduce or eliminate zero-value care without consumerism.  A related idea 
is reference pricing, usually applied to pharmaceuticals, where insurance covers 
the price for a low-cost benchmark drug, and if the patient chooses another 
higher-priced drug that is deemed a close substitute, she must pay the 
difference.276  These efforts show some, albeit limited, success in carefully 
designed pilots and populations.277 
Other proposals, like Korobkin’s discussed above, also attempt to vary 
coverage by value to shape how people use care.278  People precommit to plans 
that cover only higher value care, and have to pay out of pocket altogether for 
uncovered services, creating a blunt and strong deterrent against using such 
services and, as a side effect, a maze of coverage and decisions for consumers 
to navigate. 
Another similar proposal uses cash payments in a complex system to 
discourage people from lower-value care.279  Christopher Robertson proposes 
that when a doctor recommends expensive treatments that are arguably not cost 
effective, the insurer could offer the choice between a portion of the cost of the 
 
274. This idea began with value-based insurance design (VBID) research by A. Mark Fendrick, 
Michael Chernew, and others and was initially called benefit-based copay.  Michael E. 
Chernew et al., Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF. w195 (2007), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.26.2.w195 [https://perma.cc/KPF4-
LYVH].  Iterations on the idea by legal scholars include Korobkin, supra note 12; Christopher 
Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the Health Care Game, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 921 (2013). 
275. Chernew et al., supra note 274. 
276. See Panos Kanavos & Uwe Reinhardt, Reference Pricing for Drugs: Is It Compatible With U.S. 
Health Care?, 22 HEALTH AFF. 16 (2003) (describing international models of reference pricing 
and early results). 
277. See Frankford & Rosenbaum, supra note 266. 
278. See Korobkin, supra note 12. 
279. Robertson, supra note 274. 
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treatment in cash or the full treatment in kind.  He gives the example of a drug 
that costs $70,000, where the insurer will either provide the drug or pay the 
patient $10,000 in cash.280   
He sells this approach as the “painless” way to have skin in the game.  It 
seems potentially quite painful, however, especially for lower-income people.  
The proposal enhances incentives to forgo care, but much more strongly for poor 
people, who are more sensitive to the potential for a cash payoff.  Such choices are 
morally problematic are unproductive in the long run.  A policy that suggests 
people have a “choice” to use care or get cash reduces social obligations to ensure 
care for one another, while prompting poor people disproportionately to tradeoff 
among what they may perceive as basic needs. 
More importantly, this proposal only adds complexity to decisions that 
people already struggle to make.  Imagine that a patient is deciding between an 
expensive drug with a low probability of saving her life, versus paying the rent, or 
helping her child afford higher education.  Dangling the potential for this 
treatment that her doctor has recommended or offered and that she will struggle 
to evaluate independently, and then making her choose between it and 
desperately needed cash is far from painless. 
These proposals all offer clever, technocratic solutions that reinforce 
scaffolding around market based CDHC approaches.  Yet, to the extent certain 
drugs or treatment have no value or are “not worth their cost,”281 the goal should 
be for insurers simply not to pay for them and for doctors not to prescribe them.  
Scholars and policymakers should redouble efforts on resisting FDA approval for 
such drugs,282 rather than contorting the shape of insurance policies in hopes 
that patients will refuse them, to preserve some imagined and unattractive 
version of choice. 
Nudge solutions result in an unsatisfactory middle ground.  The stronger 
the push, the less the approach honors individual decisionmaking.  Choice and 
autonomy become illusory.  The weaker the incentive, the less an individual will 
decide based on it, as the evidence above shows.  When it comes to health 
insurance or health care decisions, the level of default needed to prompt 
successful consumerism may be a determinative default, not a suggestive nudge 
like framing effects.283 
 
280. Id. at 945. 
281. Id. at 927. 
282. See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Barak D. Richman, A Preferable Path for Thwarting Pharmaceutical 
Product Hopping, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 22, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/ 
10.1377/hblog20180522.408497/full [https://perma.cc/L876-3MY8]. 
283. See Johnson et al., supra note 18. 
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Finally, to the extent higher cost-sharing plus informed nudges did prompt 
better consumerism, system effects would be marginal.  A relatively small 
number of very sick people are responsible for the majority of health care 
spending annually,284 and most high spenders are not using discretionary services 
(or those that a consumer would perceive as discretionary).  One study estimates 
that, at most, only 7 percent of consumer out-of-pocket spending is on 
“shoppable” services, defined as scheduled in advance and with a choice of 
providers and price data.285  Conversely, many clearly discretionary services, 
including elective procedures such as cosmetic surgery, laser eye surgery, or 
bariatric surgery, are generally not covered by insurance.286  So even if these skin-
in-the-game policies incentivized consumers to decline low-value, discretionary 
spending or to shop for lower-priced services, the potential dollars saved would 
be small in comparison to the investment needed to get these policies to work. 
An extreme response to the failures described is that the incentives are not 
blunt enough and the right answer is to maximize one’s skin in the game to drive 
down prices to what people are willing to pay.287  A no-insurance approach would 
undoubtedly have a downward effect on overall spending, but that would be the 
only good result.  The early twentieth century taught that medical markets 
without insurance produce unsatisfying results.288  People failed to get critical 
care.289  Others faced insolvency due to medical spending.290  And eventually, this 
cash pay system receded and insurance grew up because medical professionals 
who had a hard time getting bills paid had to select patients they believed 
could pay the bills.291  It is no surprise that no developed country takes a no-
insurance approach. 
The body of evidence discussed above undermines the very foundation of 
CDHC and skin-in-the-game thinking.  People with financial incentives and 
good data do not reduce low-value care or make decisions based on price 
 
284. STEVEN B. COHEN, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, THE CONCENTRATION OF 
HEALTH CARE EXPENDITURES AND RELATED EXPENSES FOR COSTLY MEDICAL CONDITIONS, 2012 
1 (2014) (reporting that the top 5 percent of the population accounted for 50 percent of total 
health care spending). 
285. Amanda Frost et al., Health Care Consumerism: Can the Tail Wag the Dog?, HEALTH AFF. 
BLOG (Mar. 2, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160302.053566/full 
[https://perma.cc/3VZM-YBPC].  An estimated 40 percent of total health care expenditures 
are on shoppable services.  Id. 
286. See DIANA FARRELL ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF US 
HEALTH CARE: A NEW LOOK AT WHY AMERICANS SPEND MORE 28 (2008). 
287. SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13. 
288. See JOST, supra note 3, at 43–46. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 46. 
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comparisons.  It seems the best possible result of these policies is a reduction in 
use of care overall—good and bad—which will be harmful in at least some cases. 
What these policies have accomplished is to shift responsibility for paying 
for health care from insurance pools and employers to individuals.  This may be 
the result that CDHC advocates ultimately and honestly seek—less on-budget 
health care spending, rather than a genuine rationalization of medical care use or 
prices.  But it is fallacious to claim that such a result improves welfare by enabling 
people to better use their resources to get what they want. 
3. The Bureaucracy and Costs of Consumer-Driven Health Care  
As with managed competition, the efforts to limit moral hazard through 
market-based policy have produced tremendous regulatory and intellectual 
scaffolding.  This infrastructure has high direct and opportunity costs, which are 
hard to justify in light of the ethical concerns with and technical failings of such 
policies in practice. 
The CDHC bureaucracy is perhaps best illustrated by the proliferation of 
transparency laws and private investment into transparency tools that support 
this particular market-based bureaucracy.  Transparency might have benefits if 
the mere public sharing of data shames providers to lower prices, but the 
evidence above suggests that policies that aim to increase transparency to support 
consumer decisionmaking will offer little benefit. 
Transparency has generated business for private companies like Castlight or 
Truven Health Analytics, who build cost-estimator and other tools that major 
health plans are now offering.  Venture capital firms, according to one source, 
“have poured money into healthcare transparency tool companies,” including 
$184 million into Castlight before its 2014 initial public offering, $86.3 million 
into a provider-search website competitor, Vitals, $26.5 million for MDsave, 
which lists prices for competitors, and $45 million for Amino, part of a “new 
wave of transparency companies with its consumer-friendly interface and real-
time data.”292 
Proposals—academic and legislative—to increase price transparency have 
become nothing short of a health policy obsession.293  Half of the states have 
 
292. Maria Castellucci & Shelby Livingston, Achieving Transparency in Healthcare, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, https://www.modernhealthcare.com/reports/achieving-transparency-in-
healthcare/#! [https://perma.cc/3MPT-A95R]. 
293. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES (Holly 
Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2019); David Cutler & Leemore Dafny, Designing Transparency 
Systems for Medical Care Prices, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 894 (2011) (challenging total 
transparency but offering more nuanced versions); Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: 
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passed laws to make prices more transparent to consumers.294  Many states are 
working to create, either through regulation or through voluntary efforts, 
databases that aggregate commercial claims data in part to publish price 
comparisons for consumers.295  Organizations encourage proliferation of these 
laws by rating each state based on them, scoring the scope of information, type of 
information, and quality of website for consumers.296 
The federal government has also joined in.  As CMS Administrator, Seema 
Verma, touted in a press release on the various transparency rules the current 
Administration has issued: “You Have the Right to Know the Price.”297  To help 
vindicate this right, CMS finalized a 2019 rule requiring that all hospitals publish 
a list of their standard charges online in a machine-readable format.298  CMS also 
requested input on what it would take for hospitals to better inform patients of 
out-of-pocket obligations, including those for out-of-network physicians 
working at an in-network hospital, resulting in high surprise bills.299  CMS 
required drug manufactures to include list prices in television ads and launched 
new dashboards for Medicare and Medicaid drug spending—presumably to 
shame the companies, as much as to inform consumers.300  And CMS is releasing 
 
Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce Healthcare Spending?, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 
319 (2013) (explaining price transparency and examining existing initiatives and their 
shortcomings); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Health Care Price Transparency and Economic Theory, 312 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1642 (2014) (arguing for greater price transparency based on the Whaley 
study, supra note 266). 
294. DENISE LOVE ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ALL-PAYER CLAIMS DATABASES: STATE 
INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE TRANSPARENCY (2010) (describing the use of state all-
payer claims databases to improve price transparency). 
295. Id. at 3.  These states must navigate carefully, after Vermont’s law requiring all employers and 
insurers to disclose claims and utilization data was found preempted by the federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).  See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 
S. Ct. 936 (2016). 
296. See, e.g., FRANÇOIS DE BRANTES & SUZANNE DELBANCO, REPORT CARD ON STATE PRICE 
TRANSPARENCY LAWS—JULY 2016 (2016), https://dev-catalyst-for-payment-
reform.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/uploads/woocommerce_uploads/2017/04/2016-Report-
Card-on-State-Price-Transparency-Laws.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TME-Q36U] (reporting on 
the states’ relative development of transparency rules on a “report card” suggesting that more 
development is beneficial). 
297. Seema Verma, You Have the Right to Know the Price, CMS.GOV (Nov. 17, 2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/blog/you-have-right-know-price [https://perma.cc/Z4P6-T54G]. 
298. Medicare Program, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, at 41,686 (August 17, 2018) (to be codified at 42 
C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 424, and 495), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/ 
2018/08/17/2018-16766/medicare-program-hospital-inpatient-prospective-payment-
systems-for-acute-care-hospitals-and-the [https://perma.cc/3ZX8-TMAT].  
299. Jeff Byers & David Lim, CMS Pushes Hospitals to Post Prices Online, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Apr. 
25, 2018), https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/cms-IPPS-2019-proposed-rule/522089 
[https://perma.cc/C56W-WXRR]. 
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a web-based Medicare price lookup to compare prices and copayments for 
procedures that are offered in both hospital and outpatient settings.301 
This regulatory fixation imagines that if prices were transparent and 
comprehensible, it would pave the way for better consumerism, despite the rich 
body of evidence to the contrary, discussed above.  CMS’s intended regulated 
disclosure of surprise bills from out-of-network anesthesiologists or radiologists 
is especially ironic because most patients have little or no ability to navigate 
around these bills, and there is little evidence that disclosure alone will shame 
these out-of-network providers into lower prices.  
The governmental infrastructure in support of CDHC takes other forms as 
well, including consumer protection regulations and constant revision of tax 
laws.  Before the passage of the ACA, states had enacted consumer protection 
laws to limit the amount of financial exposure that people, especially those in 
vulnerable populations, could have to health care spending.302  The rise of high 
deductible plans and HSAs demanded that states reconsider these laws.303  Many 
states, for example, prohibited cost-sharing for certain services or populations, 
such as for home health visits or for victims of violent crimes.304  Yet, because 
health plans had to be considered “high deductible” (defined in 2019 as having 
deductibles of $1350 per individual and $2700 per family) to be eligible to be 
paired with HSAs under federal law, states revisited and often repealed these 
protections.305  In addition, states had to decide whether to reconcile state tax law 
exemption of HSAs with the federal exemption.  In 2005–2006, fifteen states 
amended their laws to enable favorable treatment for HSAs under state tax law.306  
In total—from 2004 to early 2011—states passed over eighty laws to 
accommodate and promote HSAs,307 losing tax revenue in the process. 
Federal law regarding HSAs and high deductible plans is also in constant 
flux.  The ACA mandated coverage for preventative health care without 
copayments, even in high deductible plans.308  It also reduced the breadth of 
 
301. Id. 
302. JOST, supra note 3, at 160–65. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
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306. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATES LEGISLATORS, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND THE 
STATES (2017), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/hsas-health-savings-accounts.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/A44Y-42WK]. 
307. Id. at tbls.1, 1A, 2 & 3 (summarizing HSA bills signed into law from 2004 through 
March 2011). 
308. ACA § 1001 (2010), amending Public Health Service Act § 2713 (exempting routine 
examination and well-childcare, immunizations, tobacco cessation programs, and certain 
preventive health screenings from cost-sharing, so that they are paid fully by insurance plans). 
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services that could be funded from HSAs, eliminating, for example, the use of 
HSA funds on over-the-counter drugs.309  This type of regulatory tinkering 
requires a constant revisiting of how much skin in the game is appropriate 
and for what services, with much greater precision than consumers could 
possibly understand. 
Even before actively encouraged to do so in early 2018 by the Trump 
Administration,310 state Medicaid programs experimented with policy designs 
that incorporated cost-sharing, despite the unambiguous evidence that even 
small amounts of cost-sharing can cause poor health outcomes in low-income 
populations.311  These demonstration experiments consume regulatory resources 
and deflect attention away from testing other ways to achieve more efficient 
Medicaid spending without risking negative health outcomes.312  To try to create 
some boundary for experimentation with such strategies in Medicaid, DHHS 
developed detailed federal rules outlining how much cost-sharing is allowable 
and in what forms.  These rules are rehashed and rewritten by each 
administration, playing in the weeds of health policy.313 
More detrimentally, building this kind of regulatory scaffolding around 
CDHC perpetuates the idea that we should turn to individuals to solve what are 
complex and systemic problems, like high prices and low-value care.  CDHC 
feeds a culture of individual responsibility.314  It also perpetuates a false idea that 
consumer overconsumption of health care drives high health care spending in 
the United States, even though research regularly affirms that price and mix of 
services, not quantity, make the United States an outlier.315  Americans rely more 
on specialists and high-end technology that do not necessarily improve 
outcomes.316  This American story of overuse will not be solved by the blunt 
instruments of deductibles, copayments, or transparency laws, especially if the 
 
309. See id. § 9003. 
310. Letter from Brian Neale, Dir., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Ctrs. for Medicare & 
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313. Id. 
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REV. (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/01/16/hoffman-unhealthy-return-
individual-responsibility-health-policy [https://perma.cc/3N5L-H8FU]. 
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providers who guide patient decisionmaking recommend such care.  Consumers 
lack the power, knowledge, and will to rewrite this story. 
C. Health Care Marketplace Competition and Antitrust Law 
The two above Subparts focus on how economic theory influenced the rise 
of policies that rely on individual-level consumerism.  This Subpart examines 
antitrust law, focusing on merger analysis, which is one step removed from 
consumer decisionmaking.  Nevertheless, what is interesting is that modern 
antitrust analysis is still deeply reliant on assumptions of effective consumerism.  
This Subpart offers a brief sketch of how reflexive and pervasive reference to 
consumer preferences pervades health law, even when less explicit. 
What antitrust law shares with the two ideas above is the desire to use 
market dynamics to produce higher-value health care.  As one set of experts 
wrote, “[e]nsuring that markets function efficiently is central to an effective 
health system that provides high quality, accessible, and affordable care.”317  Also 
like the above ideas, antitrust regulation and enforcement has fallen short in 
practice, despite tremendous efforts spent on scrutinizing and refining it.  
Ironically, in light of the failings of regulated market dynamics to contain prices, 
some experts now suggest consumerist techniques to disrupt the current, 
consolidated state of the market and, in theory, reinvigorate competition.  
Looking at antitrust law is important both as a discreet example of a 
struggling market-based regulatory approach, and because the application of 
antitrust law to health care has lubricated the accelerated roll out of market-based 
policies, like managed competition and CDHC, by offering principled 
boundaries for government intervention and regulation.  Instead of arguing for 
total deregulation, proponents of market-based solutions make the more 
moderate case that if the government enforces antitrust law well, competitive 
markets can create efficient results and, in turn, government regulation of prices 
or production will be unnecessary.318  As antitrust expert Tim Greaney described: 
“Properly applied, antitrust law should promote decentralized decision-making 
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318. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health 
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by market participants while encouraging efficient combinations that serve 
consumer welfare.”319  In other words, markets can find sweet spots in pricing 
and production in a way that government regulators cannot.  These promises 
turn attention to antitrust regulation so that the market can produce 
better quality and lower cost care without having to rely on direct 
substantive regulation. 
Finally, proponents argue that even if antitrust law produces imperfect 
results, it is better than direct regulation of market participants or prices, which 
would risk harm to innovation.320  These claims are a stretch.  Even though there 
has been important health care innovation in the United States, it is not clear that 
it was the result of, or maximized by, market-based regulation.  Further, evidence 
shows that, in recent years, so-called health care innovation is largely on the flat of 
the curve, doing more work to drive up prices than to improve health.321  
This Part describes, first, very briefly antitrust theory with respect to health 
care mergers, second, how this theory falls short, and third, the costs of this 
approach, in terms of market bureaucracy and, more importantly, forgone 
opportunities to deal with the high prices in U.S. health care.  Finally, it considers 
how experts respond to these problems, including, for some, by proposing an 
ironic return to consumerism.  
1. The Theory of Antitrust Law and Competitive Markets 
The U.S. Department of Justice’s website states that the goal of antitrust law 
is to promote competition to protect the people from harms that could result 
from an anticompetitive environment.322  Since the Progressive Era, antitrust law 
has shifted its analytical center from trust busting and preventing concentrations 
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of private power to consumer welfare.323  As the DOJ website promises: 
“Competition in a free market benefits American consumers through lower 
prices, better quality and greater choice.”324  This shift has brought with it an 
analytical lens focused on the end consumer. 
Antitrust law became relevant in health care starting only in the mid-1970s.  
Before then, the health care marketplace was largely sheltered from antitrust 
liability by the “learned profession exemption,” which placed professionals 
outside the scope of normal commerce.325  The basic idea was that since doctors, 
and other professionals, acted to serve patients, they should be exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny, which could have the adverse effect of introducing 
considerations of profitmaking into their consciousness.326 
In the mid-1970s, as medicine looked and acted more and more like a 
business, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the learned profession exemption,327 
and, in parallel, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice 
(DOJ) bolstered their health care antitrust enforcement programs and efforts.328  
Under modern law, the FTC and DOJ may review329 and block a transaction 
when the “effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or 
to tend to create a monopoly.”330  Legal inquiry weighs harm to consumers 
against potential benefits of a merger to competition, and usually focuses on 
price effects. 
Especially as regulatory attempts to stem growing health care costs failed or 
were rejected, such as health planning in the 1970s and managed care in the 
1980s, attention turned to fostering competition in the industry to use the market 
to mediate price inflation and value.  In recent years, the potential 
anticompetitive effect of health care mergers has gained particular attention once 
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again.331  Regulators scrutinize mergers to try to preserve a competitive market to 
keep prices in check and quality high, but, in practice, efforts fall short of this 
ideal. 
2. Shortcomings of Antitrust Theory as Applied  
to Health Care Mergers 
a. Conceptual Problems 
Conceptually, the unusual structure of health care purchasing through 
insurance complicates health care antitrust analysis from the start.  Even defining 
the consumer is challenging.  Insurers or employers usually act as an 
intermediary between the patient and health care providers (doctors, hospitals, 
and other suppliers), by designing plans and networks and negotiating for prices 
for services.332 
Antitrust analysis sometimes considers an employer or an insurer as a proxy 
for the hypothetical end consumer, which is problematic.333  The analysis 
assumes these intermediary buyers will negotiate on this end consumer’s behalf 
for the best plans, networks, and prices possible.334  Yet, neither employer nor 
insurer interests are necessarily aligned with the end users.335  Insurers, for 
example, can and do pass higher prices off to employers.  Employers who face 
higher health care spending, in turn, pass costs off to their employees in the form 
of stagnant wages.336  These dynamics reduce the motivation for insurers to find 
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the hard edge of negotiation.  When they do, they often retain excess profits for 
themselves, rather than passing them down the chain. 
Likewise, employer and employee interests might diverge in broad ways 
when employers design health plans.  Because of the transient nature of 
employment, employers may underinvest in types of care that produce long-term 
benefits.  Employees might care most about the flexibility to go to a doctor they 
know and trust, but employers increasingly choose narrow network options as 
the mechanism to keep plan costs down.  So, conceptually, even in the best-case 
scenario, competition may not prioritize the things end consumers most value. 
Although the end consumer is often obscured by health care antitrust 
analysis, the value of a competitive marketplace for health care services can often 
only be fully realized if patient consumers can navigate options well, or if proxies 
do so on their behalf.  Merger law, for example, often scrutinizes interactions 
between providers (hospitals, doctors, medical device or pharmaceutical 
companies), on the one hand, and the aggregators (usually insurers and 
employers), on the others.  Yet, an imaginary patient consumer is ever present.  
Courts factor in idealized models of how patients navigate health plan options or 
medical care options within a health plan, or how they might do so in a changed 
landscape, which is problematic for all of the reasons discussed above.337  In the 
end, the consumer’s imagined behavior—for example, whether she will buy a 
health plan that fails to include a particular hospital in network or how far she 
might travel for good care or to save money—deeply influences legal analysis.338  
Reliance on the idea of how a hypothetical patient will respond to choices and 
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338. See, e.g., FTC. v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 343 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Patients, of 
course, are relevant.  For instance, an antitrust defendant may be able to demonstrate that 
enough patients would buy a health plan marketed to them with no in-network hospital in 
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incentives has embedded into antitrust analysis all of the problems discussed 
above.  
b. The Strained Application of Antitrust Law to Health Care 
Application of the law in an imperfect judicial and regulatory environment 
only draws further from the cramped theoretical ideal.  After four decades of 
antitrust enforcement in the health care industry, the provider market is more 
consolidated than ever, sending prices on a steep upward trajectory without 
notable increases in quality.339 
Scholars have advanced a host of explanations for consolidation, from 
regulatory failure to misguided judicial decisions, all of which are likely true to 
some degree.340  Some scholars suggest that health care regulations, especially 
state regulations, prevent potentially useful cooperation, integration, and entry.341 
Another common explanation is that courts and regulators misapplied 
antitrust law.342  Tim Greaney describes that with respect to litigation, the 
“principal shortcoming was the courts’ tendency to oversimplify antitrust 
analysis by adopting simplistic, Chicago-school assumptions about markets 
while failing to incorporate the effects of market imperfections in their analyses of 
health markets.”343 
Courts, like consumers, have found health care products harder to define 
than cars or computers, for all of the reasons outlined in Part I.  Reasonable 
substitutes are often not obvious.  For example, any one condition might be 
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treated in a range of ways, from taking a pill to surgery to waiting and seeing, all 
which might be reasonable treatments depending on the age of the patient, health 
history, or genetics, among other factors.  Furthermore, health care is sold in 
disaggregated process parts and inputs (for example, appointment with surgeon, 
hospital bed, anesthesia), rather than as “assembled products” (for example, knee 
surgery), which makes it more difficult for courts and customers, alike, to 
scrutinize the product being sold.344  In response, courts have defined markets 
coarsely, in clusters, such as by level of inpatient care (primary, secondary, or 
tertiary care), rather than service-by-service (cardiac care vs. orthopedic care), 
which can mask anticompetitive effects at the service level.345  Courts also struggle 
with how and whether to consider quality in their analysis.346 
Others blame a pro-professionals bias that survived the formal rejection of 
the learned professions exemption, causing regulators and judges to balk at strict 
application of antitrust doctrine to hospitals, especially nonprofit hospitals, and 
doctors.347  Regulators devised various exceptions to per se illegality and are more 
willing to consider surrounding facts and circumstances when it comes to the 
health care industry,348 especially if in the service of protecting hospitals or 
doctors from the forces of managed care.349  Judges’ inclination to protect 
hospitals threatened by managed care companies sometimes led courts to permit 
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the ways in which courts have disfavored health care regulation). 
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providers to consolidate to bolster their relative bargaining power.350  This 
judicial gerrymandering proved to be playing with fire, as evinced by the current 
disproportionate level of market concentration among providers.351 
For all of these reasons and more, it is clear that antitrust regulation has 
failed to achieve the above-quoted DOJ ideal for consumers and faces a steep 
climb to ever do so, even if there is room for improvement.  To the contrary, it has 
not stopped harmful consolidation among hospitals and providers, and health 
care costs continue to grow faster than the rest of the economy.352   
Faith that competition will magically generate high-value options for 
consumers is getting hard to defend.  Policy is necessarily implemented in an 
imperfect judicial and regulatory environment, and inconsistent courts and 
stifling state regulations predated the take up of antitrust enforcement in health 
law in the 1970s.  The problem may be as much the results we expect from 
regulating competition as the imperfect environment itself. 
3. The Implications: Antitrust’s Market Bureaucracy 
It is difficult to know exactly the size of the apparatus created to evaluate and 
litigate anticompetitive activity in the health care sector, but it is sizeable.  
Between 2009 and 2013, over one-third of all Federal Trade Commission 
investigations involved hospitals.353  From 1996 to 2017, the FTC initiated 211 
cases or proceedings to enforce health care antitrust matters—ninety-two of 
those after 2010.354  Between 1976 and 1996, the FTC and DOJ settled by consent 
decree an estimated sixty-five enforcement actions against price fixing.355  The 
federal health care division of the FTC alone employs several dozen attorneys.  In 
2015, the FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez reiterated that health care was a 
major area of focus: “the FTC devotes significant resources to preventing mergers 
that threaten to raise prices or undermine cost-containment efforts in a variety of 
health care markets.”356  And most states have their own regulatory agencies, 
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working in parallel.  Calls by experts for better enforcement would require a 
doubling down. 
Antitrust cases are expensive to investigate and litigate, relying deeply on 
the opinions of high-priced experts in economics and law.  Leemore Dafny 
describes pre-merger analysis: 
[E]nforcers must devote substantial time and resources to evaluating 
these individual transactions and—if appropriate—to satisfying the 
legal standards for challenging them.  Economics experts must comb 
through reams of claims data, using complex statistical methods to 
assess the extent to which the merging hospitals compete and, where 
possible, to predict the magnitude of likely price increases.  On the 
other side of the scale, enforcers must weigh the potential benefits that 
would accrue from the merger (and that cannot otherwise be realized), 
which may arise from cost reductions, improvements in quality or 
access to care, or all of the above.357 
These direct costs may be relatively small compared to overall health 
spending, but they represent a significant investment for the lukewarm results 
they have produced to date. 
The larger cost is opportunity costs and distraction from alternatives.  As 
experts focus on markets to regulate prices, prices have skyrocketed on 
everything from medical devices to pharmaceuticals to outpatient care. 
Furthermore, as with managed competition and CDHC, experts and the 
media pour over health care mergers.  Antitrust law and the potential of 
competitive markets has captured the attention of academics and the 
imagination of news sources.  From 2001 to 2015, over 1600 law review articles 
included in depth discussion of health care antitrust enforcement.358  In that same 
period, the Wall Street Journal published 1500 articles that mention the topic, 
with the New York Times and Washington Post contributing over 500 each.359  
The New England Journal of Medicine had over fifty articles on the topic.360  This 
level of attention to a technocratic endeavor is striking. 
4. Redux: Proposals to Bolster Competition and the Consumerist Turn 
In light of the shortcoming of antitrust merger enforcement, experts now 
pour energy into legal reforms to spur competition and to disrupt 
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consolidation.361  Some advocate for better antitrust enforcement, including 
increased oversight and improved legal analysis.362  Such suggestions are often 
paired with Medicare payment policies that could support more competition.363  
Others propose deregulation or federal preemption or repeal of state laws that 
lessen competition.364   
Some experts, including Leemore Dafny and Tim Greaney, remain 
circumspect about getting the legal analysis right and acknowledge the intensive 
investment that would be needed to do so.365  Furthermore, they acknowledge 
that even if better enforcement were to reduce future consolidation, it can do little 
to address current levels of provider concentration.  Thus, increasingly, some 
experts are beginning to ask whether price regulation may be the singular 
response to current levels of consolidation.366   
Yet, finally and ironically, other experts take a strong turn back to 
consumerism as the solution to reignite competition. Ideas range from new 
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products—medical tourism, mobile health, or telemedicine—to new incentive 
structures to attempt to shift the playing field.367   
Bill Sage has critiqued, for example, how the product is defined in hospital 
merger enforcement.368  He suggests that a major flaw is that we treat health care 
products as process steps, rather than as assembled end products like other 
consumer goods.369  In other words, when someone goes in for surgery, she gets 
one bill from her surgeon, another from her anesthesiologist, and another (or 
several) from the hospital.  Sage argues that the end good must be something that 
a patient values and understands, rather than disaggregated lines on a bill.  He 
offers examples of an assembled end good including a hip surgery with a 
warranty, medical tourism, or end-of-life care370 and outlines the many ways 
antitrust law and other regulations would need to change to accommodate such 
assembled products.371  Although he does not promote this idea as a consumer 
panacea, the implication is that if the regulation were better and the products 
were clearer, consumers and their proxies would reject options with high prices 
or low quality.372 
In a similar consumerist turn, Clark Havighurst and Barak Richman 
advocate for requiring hospitals to negotiate prices individually for each service, 
rather than in a bundle of all services they offer (a common practice known as 
tying).373  Havighurst and Richman imagine that once insurers focus on the price 
of an individual service at one hospital versus another, they could institute more 
favorable coverage terms, such as lower copayments, to encourage patients to 
travel to providers farther from home or in a new facility.374 
 
367. See, e.g., Sage, supra note 344 (seeking to define products in “assembled” way that make sense 
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These solutions simply come back to the idea that the right decisionmaking 
architecture can solve structural problems—here anticompetitive prices wrought 
by provider consolidation.375  But, the reality of how people really make medical 
care choices and how they fail to respond to insurance policy incentives strongly 
suggests otherwise.376  Even if process steps were assembled into end products, 
legal barriers were lifted to allow new entrants, and consumers could save money 
under the terms of their insurance policies by traveling farther for care, this 
reshaped market would still face an imperfect consumer who has shown an 
inability and unwillingness to navigate such options. 
Imagine that a patient—or her purchasing proxy—has a choice between 
two assembled products.  The first is hip replacement surgery with Dr. A at a 
large, well-known academic medical center.  Dr. A has a 90 percent success rate, 
offers a thirty-year warranty, and charges $30,000.  The second is the same hip 
replacement surgery with Dr. B at a small local hospital.  Dr. B has an 80 percent 
success rate and offers a fifteen-year warranty, but charges only $20,000.  Patients 
would struggle to determine whether the slightly higher rate of success and 
additional fifteen years on the warranty are worth $10,000 more.  And proxies 
like insurers or employers who aggregate such services into plans and networks 
may do no better.  There may be some easy choices.  Some people will not be able 
to afford the more expensive surgery, and will go with Dr. B.  If the surgeries were 
the same price, it might be easier to choose the one with a higher success rate but, 
even in that case, the patient would have to understand this data and, if she did, 
still might wonder if some aspect of quality were not captured in the numbers.  
Maybe one doctor’s success rate is lower because he is especially skilled and is 
referred the most challenging cases.  Such choices are considerably more 
complicated than the simple price comparisons that patients in the studies above 
did not embrace and would likely boggle most purchasers, even more 
sophisticated ones.  
*** 
The above discussion in Part II has illustrated how in the past several 
decades scholars and policymakers have embraced economic theory and market-
based solutions to attempt to solve some of health care’s most intractable and 
structural challenges by looking to forces of market competition and to 
consumers.  Yet, this embrace has been too full.  Market-based policies have not 
resulted in a utopia where smart consumers approach a plethora of options, reject 
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wasteful care, and send signals so that competition among industry players drives 
down prices.  Even more, attempts to create some semblance of this ideal by 
chipping away at market failures and boundedly-rational consumers have 
required intense regulatory scaffolding and constant refinement to little avail.  
The job of health law has become to bolster markets.  As illustrated above, this 
market bureaucracy comes with high costs, direct and indirect, and is not making 
people better off.  Quite the opposite. 
Some object by saying that the problem is not the markets, themselves, but 
the overregulation of markets that has caused the problem by impeding health 
competition.377  In fact, legal scholars, such as Charlie Silver and David Hyman, 
argue for a doubling down on market-based approaches that would displace 
regulation.378  These market loyalists argue that the problem is that we have not 
let markets operate freely enough or demanded enough of health care consumers.  
Hyman shared this view in testimony before the Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pension on reducing health care costs in June 2018,379 
suggesting it still holds purchase in policymaking. 
There are several problems with this reasoning.  First is that we have already 
seen the effects of unregulated markets.  They serve the wealthy and healthy and 
leave the rest uninsured.  In turn, providers have to scramble for payment and 
cherry pick patients.  Second, the evidence cited above makes clear that health 
care consumerism fundamentally does not work and, thus, demanding more of it 
makes little sense. 
Even more, a world of increasing choices is actively making people worse 
off.380  Although there are exceptions to the rule (likely disproportionately among 
academic readers of this Article), most people do not prefer to make decisions 
about their own health insurance or, in many cases, their medical care.381  People 
dread shopping for health insurance; 30 percent of respondents to one survey 
report they would rather prepare their taxes than shop for health insurance.382  In 
a book on choice by one legal expert, the very example he uses to illustrate people 
not wanting to have to make choices is when a doctor asked him if he wanted to 
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get an MRI or not.383  He wrote: “Sometime we want to be told what’s best.”384  
Health law experts Carl Schneider and Mark Hall quipped: “So, we are 
increasingly freed from paternalism, for we have proliferating choices about 
proliferating things, but we are increasingly prisoners of the need to learn enough 
to handle decisions that we make badly, that we would like to escape, and that 
divert us from things we would rather devote ourselves to.”385  The very existence 
of a market-based system is contrary to many people’s preferences.  Increasing 
retail health care or medical tourism will do nothing to address this fact. 
In a poignant memoir written as he was dying from lung cancer and 
published posthumously, Dr. Paul Kalanithi, a Stanford neurosurgeon, cedes 
decisionmaking to his doctor, a peer and colleague, as his body weakens during 
the course of cancer treatment.386  He still had the capacity to weigh prognoses 
and side effects and costs, but he did not want to do so any longer.387  He wanted a 
trusted expert to guide him, once he had made the initial decision to begin 
aggressive treatment to slow the advancement of his terminal lung cancer. 
We have over relied on policies that look to consumer choices and market 
forces to solve system-level failures, especially in light of mounting evidence of 
the limitations of these approaches in practice.  Many scholars and policymakers 
have gone so far in the direction of market-based health policy that they cannot 
find the brakes, even when evident that the road is a dead end. 
This Part’s comprehensive review of empirical evidence highlighted this fact 
to make the following case: If market-based approaches are no more efficient and 
are as bureaucratic as any other approach, it is time to end our reflexive reliance 
on them.  The law has normalized market-based approaches and deflects 
attention from alternatives.  If instead, we assessed different policy approaches 
based on what they produce, rather than on the hope of what they will produce, 
the dominance of market-based ideas in health care, and likely in other fields too, 
will recede and create space for alternatives.  Then, the hard work begins. 
III. COMPARING BUREAUCRACIES AND CONSIDERING CHOICE 
This final Part considers why market-based approaches proliferate despite 
mounting empirical proof of their failings.  It looks first briefly at the deep 
problems of politics and political economy, which have been examined in more 
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detail elsewhere.388  It then turns to a second, under-examined driver, contending 
that their durability lies also in the way these approaches have elevated the value 
of choice—a particular version of choice defined in individual, microeconomic 
terms.  Finally, it concludes by suggesting that this sanctification of choice has 
gone too far.  For health policy and regulation to advance demands seeking a 
more capacious understanding of when, and what, expressions of choice are 
meaningful and rejecting the privileging of choice when it is not. 
A. Understanding the Loyalty to Faltering Market-Based Policies 
1. Politics and Political Economy 
Economists readily admit that health care markets don’t work.  
Simultaneously, they—and others to whom that fact might not be so obvious—
continue to pour their efforts into testing and attempting to mend health care 
markets, at best making incremental improvements.  This Subpart considers 
why, looking at both the political economy of these policies and their 
rhetorical resonance. 
Consider the ACA exchanges as an example.  Before they were adopted as 
part of the ACA and before resources were devoted to building and bolstering a 
new marketplace, there was enough evidence on literacy, numeracy, and earlier 
experiments with managed competition to foreshadow that consumerism in a 
managed marketplace would fail.  If the end goal was simply to get more people 
insured, which the exchanges have in fact done adequately well, there were 
certainly simpler and less expensive options to do so. 
One explanation is that the average policymaker may genuinely have 
thought that competition among private plans in a new marketplace would work, 
unaware of the empirical evidence otherwise.  Others were laser focused on 
getting more people insured, and the exchanges may have seemed the only path 
forward politically. 
Since the 1970s, markets are a language that both Democrats and 
Republicans have increasingly become willing to speak.389  Market-based 
approaches, the product of a political movement beginning in the Reagan era, 
have come to be perceived as more neutral, scientific, or measurable than other 
approaches.  They focus on metrics.  We measure numbers of competing health 
plans and insured lives with managed competition.  With moral hazard, 
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economic experts measure the effects of different levels and types of cost-sharing 
on consumption.  With antitrust, economic experts scrutinize the market share a 
combined entity will have, using complex indices.  All this measuring and 
managing of numbers casts the project as an objective science.390 
Yet, this so-called objective science is far from neutral.  It obscures the 
morality of an end result defined by aggregation of individual decisions.  People 
with more purchasing power have more influence and people with more 
education, time, and resources navigate the system more successfully.  It 
surreptitiously lubricates a distribution of care that favors the wealthiest 
and educated. 
These models also allow policymakers to avoid making unpopular rationing 
decisions, while still claiming they have acted to solve spending problems.  If 
competition and consumerism cuts spending and reduces industry revenue, it 
happens a step removed from legislators.  If the exchanges had worked as 
Enthoven envisioned, providers eventually would have received lower 
reimbursements, and reliance on specialists slowly would have decreased.  But it 
would have been consumers and insurers, not elected officials, to blame. 
More likely, these solutions will not reduce spending and will affirmatively 
benefit influential constituents.391  The winners from market-based policies are 
the health care industries and members who have accreted political power over 
past decades and now exert it on the political process through high spending on 
lobbying.392  With the ACA exchanges, for example, insurers gain business, and 
hospitals and providers gain a larger share of insured patients, some with 
relatively well-paying private plans.393  The aggregation of years of reliance on 
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market-based approaches to control prices, to no avail, has helped to spur a 
massive health care industrial complex with layers of highly-salaried executives 
and consistently high profits.  Although this investment in health care has yielded 
benefits, including significant employment of health care workers, it is difficult to 
justify spending that does not result in demonstrable improvement to 
Americans’ health.394 
These polices, in turn, also have become a way to keep public spending from 
growing as health care costs balloon.  But they have done so by shifting spending 
from the public budget to individual household budgets.  As Enthoven initially 
envisioned, if competition does not drive down prices and insurance voucher 
values grow more slowly than costs, individuals will finance the increasing gap.395  
Most versions of policy based on Enthoven’s ideas are in part such a strategy to 
control public spending, by covertly moving shortfalls onto individuals, 
simultaneously transforming the project of insurance from one of social 
solidarity to individual responsibility.396 
Likewise, when employers adopt high deductible health plans, they leave the 
rationing and bargain hunting to their employees, even if the employees might 
not trim or shop wisely, or at all.  At the end of the day, the employer can control 
health benefit spending, and the employee either reduces medical care or spends 
more out of pocket on it.   
Enthoven explicitly envisioned that managed competition would 
produce—or preserve—a two-tiered system, where wealthier people topped off 
their vouchers to buy better plans.  Defending this aspect of his proposal, 
Enthoven wrote, “I believe it would be foolish to reject it on the grounds that it 
does not reach a hypothetical egalitarian ideal that has never been attained in any 
society and is surely not supported by the American people today.”397  While he 
might be right that many people think egalitarianism is un-American, managed 
competition—and other market-based approaches—obfuscates the choice of 
values like budgetary frugality over equality. 
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2. The Role of Choice 
This story of winners and losers is critical to the perpetuation of ill-fated 
market-based solutions.  Yet, it is not the whole story.  An underexamined, but 
perhaps as important, reason for their durability is that these policies align with a 
relatively recent American obsession with choice, since at least the 1970s, when a 
generation defined itself in protest to the draft and Vietnam War.  Early kernels 
in health care might be traced to tomes like Our Bodies Ourselves, published first 
as a course booklet in 1970 by a group of women called the Boston Women’s 
Health Book Collaborative, who were seeking to help women find self-
empowerment over their bodies.398  Choice takes legal root in cases like Griswold 
v. Connecticut in 1965 and Roe v. Wade in 1973, which recognized control 
through language prohibiting government intrusion over individual 
reproductive choices.399  Although this choice revolution does not spark from 
neoliberalism, it may have helped to fuel it, by centering on a particularized and 
individual version of choice. 
In health care, the sanctification of choice was an understandable response 
to many years when patients’ preferences came second.  For most of the twentieth 
century, doctors largely controlled medical care decisions.400  After the passage of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 and the concurrent growth of private insurance, 
spending grew, prompting the rise of more central planning and of managed care 
in the 1970s and 1980s, and insurers increasingly held the reins to control 
patients’ access to doctors and medical care.401  Since then, however, consumer 
choice has come to be something of a “sacred value,” or one that “a community 
treats as possessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, 
trade-offs, or indeed any mingling with secular values.”402  Simply put, choice 
always wins.  
 
398. See Our Story, OUR BODIES OURSELVES, https://www.ourbodiesourselves.org/our-story 
[https://perma.cc/3N49-HFC4].  Thank you to Tom Baker for highlighting this aspect of the 
choice movement. 
399. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (invalidating a law that prohibited the use 
of contraception as an unconstitutional “governmental intrusion”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 170 (1973) (right to abortion is “embraced within the personal liberty protected by the 
Due Process Clause”). 
400. STARR, supra note 1, at 27 (“Throughout the medical system, the profession was able by 
1920—and for the next half century—to establish organizational structures that preserved a 
distinct sphere of professional dominance and autonomy.”). 
401. Id. at 8 (“More recently, that system has begun to slip from their control, as power has moved 
away from the organized profession toward complexes of medical schools and hospitals, 
financing and regulatory agencies, health insurance companies, prepaid health plans, and 
health care chains, conglomerates, holding companies, and other corporations.”). 
402. Tetlock, supra note 14, at 320. 
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In this vein, informed consent gained steam, seeking to put medical 
decisions back in the hands of patients, for better or for worse.  Market-based 
policies grew up in parallel, elevating the value of choice and defining choice 
narrowly—in microeconomic terms of preferences and purchases.  An 
individual’s agency came to be measured by her buying power and self-interest. 
Even if laudable in concept, however, choice can obfuscate what a polity 
genuinely values when defined so narrowly.  For example, measuring what 
people value by how they act individually in a market can undermine tools that 
by their very purpose serve collective goals.  Health insurance aims to make 
health care spending a collective endeavor, spreading the costs of medical care 
among an insured population, regardless of any one person’s individual medical 
needs in a particular year.403  Although it might have been otherwise,404 the 
downfall of the ACA’s individual mandate that required most Americans to carry 
health insurance came in part because it sought to achieve a collective goal 
through individual choices and purchases.  It prompted Americans to think not 
about the goal of guaranteed and universal coverage but instead about their own 
bottom line—exactly how much their insurance policy cost and what they got in 
return.  Choice centered the policy discussion in the wrong ideological place. 
The political economy of health care is notoriously sticky, but the obsession 
with choice—and, in particular, the narrow market conception of choice—may 
be less so.  Americans in recent decades may have become enamored of the 
idea of choice and critical of big government, but views on such issues can 
likely change. 
There is evidence that these views are, in fact, not as strong as they are 
sometimes made out to be.  Studies show many conservative voters disliked 
Obamacare and exchanges not because they didn’t want government 
involvement in health care but rather because they wanted Medicaid instead of 
private insurance.405  The recent surge in popularity of the idea of single payer 
systems, even if rooted in an incomplete understanding of what such a policy 
would mean, signals an increasing openness to new regulatory approaches that 
are less focused on individualism. 
 
403. See Deborah Stone, Health Equity in a Trump Administration, 42 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 
995, 997 (2017). 
404. See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, 
and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED 7, 31 (2010). 
405. See Sarah Kliff, Why Obamacare Enrollees Voted for Trump, VOX (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:10 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2016/12/13/13848794/kentucky-obamacare-
trump [https://perma.cc/7HE2-72CR] (reporting that interviews with Trump supporters, 
enrolled through the exchanges, reveal a pattern of frustration that those on Medicaid are 
“getting even better, even cheaper benefits”). 
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B. Considering the Meaning of Choice Beyond Markets 
If health policy and law are to progress, it is imperative to examine the 
proper place of individual choice.  In many cases, individual choice is altogether 
the wrong organizing principle to animate health regulation.  In other cases—
way fewer than imagined—it may be meaningful.  And in many cases, even if the 
principle of choice is meaningful in concept, looking to individual market activity 
to measure what people value is flawed in practice.  Dismantling the ineffective 
market bureaucracy lies in untangling these spaces. 
1. Questioning the Sanctity of Choice 
In many cases, better regulatory responses, including to inefficiencies in the 
system, reveal themselves only through pushback on the modern sanctification of 
choice.406  When choice is illusory, unnavigable, or makes people miserable, it is 
not worth elevating.  Sometimes there is only one right option.  When one 
treatment option is far superior to another, enabling choice between the two is 
illogical, and arguably cruel.  If a particular treatment does not work, or when it is 
very expensive and does little good, having it as an option is a rouse.407 
Insurers, with public insurers in the lead, must begin to exclude such 
treatments from coverage, even if doing so provokes resistance.  Further, the 
FDA and other regulatory bodies should take a hard line and reject treatments 
and therapies without marginal value.408  Where to draw the line can be difficult, 
but even a conservative attempt would be progress.  Although this kind of 
regulatory hardline will undoubtedly garner backlash from some vocal interest 
 
406. Some scholars wholly reject the idea of choice in favor of justice, such as rejecting 
“reproductive choice” for “reproductive justice.”  See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Reproductive 
Justice, Not Just Rights, DISSENT (Fall 2015), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/ 
article/reproductive-justice-not-just-rights [https://perma.cc/8GU9-LSG7]. 
407. As one example, studies have exposed excessive overuse of Cardiac stents that is expensive 
and possibly harmful.  See, e.g., Aaron E. Carroll, Health Stents are Useless for Most Stable 
Patients.  They’re Still Widely Used, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/upshot/heart-stents-are-useless-for-most-stable-
patients-theyre-still-widely-used.html [https://perma.cc/Y4ER-VKF9]; see also ORG. ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV., TACKLING WASTEFUL SPENDING ON HEALTH (2017), https://read.oecd-
ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/tackling-wasteful-spending-on-
health_9789264266414-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/7NMP-T6U8#page5] (describing 
practices ranging from overdiagnosis and overtreatment to underuse of generic drugs). 
408. See, e.g., SILVER & HYMAN, supra note 13, at 120–21 (citing examples of wasteful care that 
Medicare reimburses, including colonoscopies for patients over age 75, prostate cancer 
screening for men over 75, and procedures for vertebral fractures that were shown to be both 
ineffective and risky and cost Medicare about $1 billion annually). 
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groups, it is nonetheless the sounder regulatory option in the end.409  It may be 
more justifiable in light of the failure of subtler efforts to get people to stop using 
such services.  
Likewise, if one insurance plan dominates another in all or most cases, it 
would be better simply to issue beneficiaries the better plan, rather than to create 
a false semblance of choice.  At the very least, employers should stop offering 
dominated plans or be penalized for doing so.  Medicare should work to cull out 
dominated Part D and Medicare Advantage plans and regulators should 
significantly narrow the proliferation of options in these spaces, which would 
make the project of periodically eliminating dominated plans much easier. 
Paternalism, even if unpopular, is preferable in these cases to creating 
complex regulatory structures that set people up to make poor choices.  The 
reality is that, in health care, market-based approaches are themselves moving in 
a paternalistic direction with the layering of increasingly directive decision aids 
and default rules.  This idea, coined “libertarian paternalism,” has been sold as a 
means to preserve choice.410  Yet, it struggles to maintain its libertarian 
dimension in health care, where decisionmaking challenges run deep, and 
softer nudges fall short. 
Decentering the discussion away from choice prompts consideration of 
alternatives that have been pushed aside to avoid political struggles or hard, 
normative debates.  If consumer choice among health plans will never rationalize 
overreliance on highly-paid specialists, then maybe it is time to reckon with this 
problem directly.  If consumers cannot—or will not—root through options to 
choose the cheapest provider and market competition has not checked prices 
sufficiently, then it may be time to deal directly with the outsized prices in the U.S. 
health care system.   
 
409. Such resistance surfaced in ACA debates when Congress created a new organization called 
the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) to consider comparative 
effectiveness of different treatments.  In response to initial backlash, PCORI’s power was 
limited, and Medicare cannot rely on comparative–cost effectiveness assessments for 
payment decisions, but it is still collecting potentially valuable data.  See ZEKE EMANUEL ET AL., 
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RE-EVALUATING THE PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH 
INSTITUTE (2016), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ 
25103643/PCORI-brief1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FE97-QFJQ].  Some of the backlash arises 
from groups who argue that research is not conducted evenhandedly and could 
disproportionately harm certain people, but instead of using such input to reject data-
based policymaking, it should motivate efforts to improve research quality. 
410. See, e.g., THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 5–6. 
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Fortunately, there is a roadmap with a variety of alternatives to address these 
kinds of systemic problems.411  Other OECD countries rely on a range of 
regulatory mechanisms to control prices and to ration.412  Even if some of these 
countries’ approaches work better than others, they all work better than the 
ineffective consumerist approaches currently prioritized in the United States.  
Most peer nations, for example, have some version of central price setting or 
ceiling to keep spending down, even those countries that are often celebrated as 
market success stories, such as Singapore, Switzerland, or China.413  These 
systems’ designs all include elements of choice, but none of them relies on 
consumerism for price control.414  Even some individual states have shown 
successful experimentation with price controls in the United States , suggesting 
its feasibility within the U.S. health care system.415  Maryland  has been centrally 
setting payment rates for hospitals for over forty years and updated its 
payment structure in 2018, estimating savings of as much as $1 billon over the 
next five years.416   
Likewise, peer countries offer various more thoughtful ways to conduct 
rationing.  The British system is perhaps the best known, where the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) explicitly makes decisions 
about what treatment will be reimbursed by the National Health Service based on 
cost-effectiveness and other social values, including factors like clinical need and 
innovation potential.417  Other countries like France and Germany have a less 
formal system, yet have developed centralized processes for identifying and not 
paying for unnecessary or low-value services.418 
 
411. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, OECD, PRICE SETTING AND PRICE REGULATION IN HEALTH 
CARE (2019), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/ed3c16ff-en.pdf?expires=1575 
553830&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=6A646FC3C924020558D08BB6FFCBD794 
[https://perma.cc/CLS6-TYDC]; see also discussion and sources cited supra note 277 on the 
point that other countries do not rely on consumerism to drive down prices, even if they 
include elements of choice in their systems. 
412. Id. at 3–4. 
413. See supra note 273. 
414. Id. 
415. See Frankford & Rosenbaum, supra note 335, at 11; Aaron Baum et al., Health Care Spending 
Slowed After Rhode Island Applied Affordability Standards to Commercial Insurers, 38 
HEALTH AFF. 237 (2019); Carmela Coyle, Maryland’s Progress on the Path to the Triple Aim, 
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/ 
hblog20151112.051749/full. 
416. See Coyle, supra note 415. 
417. See generally Peter Littlejohns et al., Social Values and Health Priority Setting in England: 
“Values” Based Decision Making, 26 J. HEALTH ORG. & MGMT. 363 (2012). 
418. See Katharina Kieslich, Social Values and Health Priority Setting in Germany, 26 J. HEALTH 
ORG. & MGMT. 374 (2012); see also Monika Steffen, Universalism, Responsiveness, 
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Finally, pushing back on the sanctity of choice would not only unlock 
consideration of better solutions that are not choice centric, it would also prevent 
further construction of ineffective market-based bureaucracy.  If prices were 
regulated centrally, for example, there would be no need for CMS and states to 
invest in a web of transparency laws to try to track and understand the variance in 
prices across the states.  Likewise, imagine if the ACA had created—or a future 
policy creates—a baseline health plan for all uninsured low- and middle-income 
Americans that is issued to anyone who qualifies.  It would eliminate the need for 
the entire market bureaucracy produced by the exchanges. 
Admittedly, any regulatory approach has its own complexities and its own 
bureaucratic needs.  Design of a baseline health plan would demand navigating 
the state-by-state nature of insurance and provider networks and contests over 
what benefits to include and how much to reimburse for care.  Yet, regulatory 
efforts could and should focus on these kinds of critical questions that might 
produce valuable results, rather than on technocratic tinkering to scaffold 
competitive structures that are not producing, and will never produce, the 
desired results. 
2. Reinvigorating Meaningful Choice 
Deemphasizing the supremacy of individual choice does not reduce all 
health regulation to paternalism.  In limited circumstances and on careful 
scrutiny, individual choice may indeed be valuable and thus should be honored 
and supported by regulation.  However, in the many cases when individual, 
especially market, choice is a poor proxy for what people value, it is imperative to 
develop better proxies.   
Fortunately, a wealth of collective engagement on issues of health care could 
inform policies that are more in line with shared priorities and popular will.  This 
Article merely scratches the surface of this topic to suggest the possibility of 
developing responsive policies without relying on individual choice.   
a. Individual Choice 
Choice in an individualized sense may be valuable in some, limited, ways, 
where it does genuinely enhance autonomy. Market based health policy has 
generated myriad layers of choice.  An individual must choose whether to have 
insurance and, if yes, then among health plan options.  She then must choose her 
 
Sustainability—Regulating the French Health Care System, 374 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 
404 (2016). 
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providers, including her doctor, hospital, imaging center, pharmacy, lab, physical 
therapist, and so on.  Then, she must choose what care to seek from each of these 
providers.  Yet, most people do not value, or want to make, most of these choices 
and do not navigate them well, as shown above. 
That said, some people in the United States deeply care about having a 
doctor they know and trust.  This particularly American attachment sparked 
resistance to managed care in the 1990s.  Deliberations and town hall meetings 
debating the ACA in 2010 likewise made clear that people do not want to lose 
access to their doctors.419 
Choosing a doctor differs from many choices the market bureaucracy has 
asked people to make.  It can be deeply personal.  For many, it is not about prices 
or finding an objectively best physician.  Rather, it may be about shared values or 
morals or about finding someone who will take the time to communicate in a way 
that makes sense.  For others, it is about convenience of location, scheduling, or 
office hours.  This is the type of decision that may be heterogenous and that 
people could more plausibly make in a way aligned with their own interests. 
Ironically, as health care choices proliferate in so many ways, choice of 
provider has diminished.420  Even though President Obama promised that people 
could keep their doctors, his promises proved empty for some people (and 
earned him PolitiFact’s lie of the year).421  Insurers cancelled existing individual 
plans to accommodate the development of new ACA exchange plans, cutting 
people off from their existing providers, and new plans had notoriously narrow 
provider networks.422  Medicaid and Medicare are both increasingly moving 
toward managed care, where provider networks are often more limited.423  If 
 
419. See DAVID BETTS ET AL., DELOITTE, WHAT MATTERS MOST TO THE HEALTH CARE CONSUMER 3 
(2016), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/life-sciences-
health-care/us-lshc-cx-survey-pov-provider-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/48QL-LZVE] 
(explaining that what consumers most want is “to be known and understood in order to get a 
personalized health care experience”). 
420. I thank Zach Liscow for helping highlight this irony. 
421. See Louis Jacobson, Barack Obama Says That What He Said Was You Could Keep Your Plan 
‘If It Hasn’t Changed Since the Law Passed’, POLITIFACT (Nov. 6, 2013, 11:35 AM), 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2013/nov/06/barack-obama/barack-
obama-says-what-hed-said-was-you-could-keep [https://perma.cc/RTL2-MZFN]. 
422. Id.  See also Jason Millman, This is Obama’s Explanation for Why You Might Not Get to Keep 
Your Doctor, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2014/03/14/this-is-obamas-explanation-for-why-you-might-not-get-to-keep-
your-doctor [https://perma.cc/GYP9-E4J3]. 
423. See GREG SCOTT ET AL., DELOITTE, HEALTH PLAN FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 2011–2016 2 
(2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/life-sciences-and-health-care/articles/ 
government-health-plan-financial-trends.html [https://perma.cc/N77L-MSQD] (noting 
significant increase in private insurer revenue from Medicare Advantage and Medicaid from 
2011–2016). 
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health care regulation honored those places when individual choice genuinely 
matters, it would  preserve the ability to find and keep doctors we like and trust. 
As another more contentious example, polling suggests that a majority of 
people—and a large majority of women—support reproductive choice.424  Yet, 
state legislatures continue to pass counter majoritarian legislation that 
dramatically limits reproductive choice.425 
b. Collective Choice 
Finally, in most cases, what people value most is more complicated than 
what is suggested by their market purchases.  Going forward, these two must be 
disaggregated.  This Subpart offers one last reflection, turning back to the reason 
we elevated choice in the first place.  At its core, a regulatory system that is 
designed to support market choices was supposed to enable us to use our 
resources on the things we most value, which is an admirable goal in concept.  
Yet, when what people care about cannot be expressed in what they buy, it is 
necessary to work to understand priorities in a more capacious way. 
It is common refrain that a lack of consensus is what led us to market-based 
policies in the first place, but such pronouncements are overstated.  Some clear 
threads of agreement weave broadly among the populace.  Most people value 
universal health care coverage.426  They want—and want others to have—access 
to health care without incurring financial insecurity.427 
Contentious moments especially reveal consensus, and, in this era of health 
policy turmoil, people are actively deliberating over values and priorities in public 
fora.  When Congress tried to repeal the ACA in the summer of 2017, people rose 
up against the roll back of the law and its coverage expansion.428  Similarly, public 
 
424. See Public Opinion on Abortion, Views on Abortion, 1995–2019, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 29, 
2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion [https://perma.cc/ 
S8JR-J997]. 
425. See, e.g., Lydia Saad, Alabama Bill at Odds with Public Consensus on Abortion, GALLUP BLOG 
(May 15, 2019), https://news.gallup.com/opinion/gallup/257627/alabama-bill-odds-public-
consensus-abortion.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2JD-HDFF]. 
426. Poll: Most Back Public Health Care Option, CBS NEWS (June 19, 2009, 4:50 PM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/poll-most-back-public-health-care-option, 
[https://perma.cc/JP3G-CZ2E] (finding that 64 percent of surveyed think the government 
should guarantee universal coverage and 57 percent would be willing to pay more taxes to 
ensure it). 
427. See id. (concluding that 50 percent were satisfied with their own costs but only 19 percent 
were satisfied with costs for the country as a whole). 
428. Perry Bacon Jr., Why the GOP Is So Hell-Bent on Passing an Unpopular Health Care Bill, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 15, 2017, 9:48 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-
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outrage percolates regarding exorbitant drug pricing and the bind in which it has 
put many American families, causing Americans to identify lowering drug prices 
as a top 2017 Congressional priority.429 
Health care is a ripe forum to reexamine how we understand Americans’ 
priorities.  We have turned to markets in part because of skepticism of 
democracy’s ability to fix entrenched problems at a moment of deep political 
dysfunction.430  In health care, problems of vested interests and political capture 
are especially acute.431 
Yet, even at this moment when democracy limps along, examples have 
emerged where democratic deliberation over health care priorities is vibrant, 
even if not resolved.  This final Part offers a few examples—themselves 
admittedly imperfect—of ways that people have collectively discovered or 
expressed what they most value in a health care system.  It does not imply these 
are the best or only examples but rather aims to illustrate the possibility that 
deliberative or democratic processes can productively shape health regulation. 
C. A Few Illustrations to Suggest a Path Forward 
Assuming consensus indeed exists that it is a social priority to identify and 
reduce spending on low-value care, there are many possible ways to do so.432  
 
gop-is-so-hell-bent-on-passing-an-unpopular-health-care-bill [https://perma.cc/W2KH-
A7DG]. 
429. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, REFORMING BIOPHARMACEUTICAL PRICING AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 2f (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CEA-Rx-
White-Paper-Final2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RMB-5RBQ]. 
430. More generally, political scientists have documented how policymaking has become less 
democratic, for reasons ranging from a bias in what policymakers hear to more complex 
policy feedback effects that discourage certain groups of people from active civic engagement.  
For an overview of both of these lines of study, see Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The 
Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship: Bridging Policy Studies and Mass 
Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55 (2004) (outlining systems theory in political science and the rise 
of research on policy feedback and its effects on mass political behavior); Joe Soss & Lawrence 
R. Jacobs, The Place of Inequality: Non-Participation in the American Polity, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 
95 (2009) (documenting the effects of rising economic inequality on political participation). 
431. Over the past twenty years, pharmaceutical companies have consistently topped industry 
spending on lobbying activity followed by insurance (#2), hospitals and nursing homes (#8), 
health professionals (#13), and health services/HMOs (#16).  Top Industries, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i 
[https://perma.cc/8432-FVW7].  Adding all of these categories, combined health care 
industry spending dwarfs that of all other industries. 
432. See, e.g., MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS, AND 
ECONOMICS OF RATIONING MECHANISMS (1997) (discussing the ethics and economics of 
different systems of rationing). 
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Some doubt the value of collective deliberation on rationing,433 which may be 
legitimate when thinking of rationing treatment-by-treatment.  Yet, deliberation 
over principles that can guide priorities and tradeoffs may be more productive.  A 
first step might be to define more broadly how voters, citizens, and patients 
define value.434 
1. Examining Shared Values  
Oregon attempted such deliberation in order to expand its Medicaid 
program in the early 1990s.435  Through a public, iterative process, it developed 
the Oregon List, a prioritized list of medical care for its Medicaid program in 
order to cover more people by covering fewer services.436  The state Health 
Services Commission held eleven public hearings, conducted 1000 random-
digit-dialed telephone surveys, and authorized a citizens’ advocacy group, 
Oregon Health Decisions, to hold forty-seven community forums, soliciting 
input on a questionnaire about the relative importance of certain health 
conditions or services and engaging in public discussion.437 
Based on public input, clinical data, and outcomes research, the state 
developed an algorithm to array medical conditions in rank order of priority.438  
Medicaid dollars would be allocated based on rankings, starting by paying for 
items at the top of the list and moving down the list as far as funds for a particular 
year would allow.439 
 
433. See, e.g., Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing Medical Care: Rhetoric and Reality in the 
Oregon Health Plan, 164 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1583 (2001). 
434. See Frank Pasquale, The Hidden Costs of Health Care Cost-Cutting: Toward a Postneoliberal 
Health-Reform Agenda, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 173 (2014) (“How much should our 
society spend on health care?  That is a deep and difficult, political and economic (and 
fundamentally politico-economic) question.  Yet it ought to be addressed before 
policymakers point to high health care spending in itself as a rationale for reducing the 
purchasing power of patients, reducing compensation of physicians, nurses, and other 
providers, or deterring investment in hospitals, drugs, and devices.”); cf. Richard H. Pildes & 
Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8 (1995) (“A special 
goal is to incorporate public judgments about risk so long as they are appropriately informed 
and reasonable, even when those judgments diverge from expert understandings. . . . [P]ublic 
judgments often reflect a distinctive kind of rationality, one that rejects some conventional 
forms of cost-benefit balancing.”). 
435. Oberlander et al., supra note 433, at 1584–85. 
436. Id.; see also Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New 
Accountability, 10 HEALTH AFF. 7 (1991). 
437. Fox & Leichter, supra note 436, at 20–21. 
438. Id. at 21–22. 
439. Id. 
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One of the insights in Oregon was that the public gave relative priority to 
preventive services and dental care, and services such as dental checkups were, in 
turn, ranked higher than the physician members would have placed them.440  
Further, the public and experts both rejected some of the ways that the algorithms 
prioritized low-cost yet nonessential services over high cost but potentially 
lifesaving ones, even if the former scored higher on a total dollar per outcome 
measure.441  For example, on the initial list, addressing thumb sucking 
(presumably not that expensive) ranked above hospitalization for a starving child 
(expensive).442  Such priorities were changed in a second list.443 
Even though the list was first rejected by the Bush Administration in a 
waiver application and later haphazardly revised to accommodate federal 
administrators’ demands and concerns of disability discrimination, and even 
though the list has not been used as anticipated as a rationing tool, the process to 
create it nevertheless illustrates the potential for understanding collective 
preferences, even on sensitive questions.  People assembled in community 
meetings and hashed out concerns and priorities, which directly informed 
state policymaking.444 
Even critics of the Oregon List recognize that the process of developing it 
built public support for raising taxes to fund expanded insurance for the poor, a 
valuable end in itself.445  The discussion thus created spending priorities that at 
least marginally better reflected community values and had community support. 
Deliberation over health care values has occurred in other fora—both 
experimental and organic.  Over the past two decades, federal agencies have 
asked how to get better public engagement on important health care matters.  On 
the question of how evidence should inform health care decisionmaking, the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality created a community forum under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to increase public deliberation.446  
The project relied on a range of tools, including James Fishkin’s Deliberative 
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Polling,447 designed to gauge and build consensus on complex issues in small-
group settings. 
For one part of the demonstration, investigators convened seventy-six 
deliberative groups for various durations of time with 907 sociodemographically 
diverse participants in four locations across the United States.448  They posed the 
following question to try to gauge values about the respective roles of patients and 
physicians in making medical decisions: “Should individual patients, their 
doctors, or both be able to make any health decisions no matter what the evidence 
of medical effectiveness shows, or should society ever specify some boundaries 
for these decisions?”449 
Research surfaced several important values, including that people found 
evidence of harm to communities or individuals as a more compelling reason to 
accept limits on choices than evidence of ineffectiveness of treatment.450  It also 
found that even though people resisted cookie cutter medical decisions, a 
majority thought that doctors should not be able to provide a medical treatment 
that will not work for a patient.451  Over the course of the discussion, the 
proportion of participants taking this position increased.452  Furthermore, 
participants voiced comfort with restrictions on ineffective treatments, including 
that insurance should not pay for them.453  Finally, deliberation increased 
knowledge of medical evidence and comparative effectiveness research.454  This 
type of deliberative process can provide input for shaping policies and may also 
help participants solidify their support for such policies. 
Another less discrete and more organic example where public deliberation 
is both shaping and revealing a dynamic understanding of larger values is on 
palliative and end-of-life care, which aim to make people more comfortable 
during illness and before death.  Again, productive engagement resulted from 
discussion one level removed from decisions on specific treatments and focused 
more conceptually on values like pain versus comfort, or longer versus more 
able life. 
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Conventional wisdom says that Americans have a taste for expensive 
lifesaving interventions.  Yet, efforts to engage with people on this question in 
more conceptual ways—and outside of life and death moments—have revealed 
otherwise.  Hospice care is a half century old,455 but active efforts to engage people 
in discussion on what is desirable and possible in the case of terminal illness or at 
the end of life have been slower to develop. 
One community that has been ahead of the curve is the Wisconsin city of La 
Crosse, where 96 percent of people who die have an advance directive in place.456  
The movement in La Crosse began in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Bud 
Hammes, an ethicist who worked in the Gunderson Health System, developed a 
template for providers to talk to their patients about end-of-life preferences as 
part of routine medical care.457  The program, which began with a successful small 
pilot run by nurses trained to have end-of-life conversations, later scaled, first in 
the Gunderson System, and into other communities as an independent 
organization.458  This effort, even though it began in a very individualized way, 
spurred collective community deliberation over the value of invasive and 
expensive life-prolonging interventions. 
In parallel, other organizations have aimed to start and shape conversations 
about dying.  One of the earliest such programs, Five Wishes, was started in 1996 
in Florida by a nonprofit called Aging with Dignity, with support from the Robert 
Woods Johnson Foundation.459  These types of programs attempted to normalize 
talking and thinking about death and to resist overmedicalization by using more 
generalized and plain language that asks people to consider, for example, who 
they want help with their care and how comfortable they want to be. 
What is most interesting about these examples is not the legal documents 
that they have generated, but rather how they show people and communities 
discussing what values could shape the way someone thinks about serious illness 
or death.  Does someone care most about survival or about being comfortable?  
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How does someone like to make important decisions, and with whom?  
Concurrently, clinical trials have shown the potential of palliative care and 
counseling to avoid unnecessary medical care and to improve outcomes and 
sometimes even prolong life.460  These efforts have both raised and revealed 
different ways a health care system—and the people in it—might approach death. 
Undoubtedly, people remember vividly when payment for end-of-life 
counseling was proposed as part of the ACA in 2009, and opponents of health 
care reform famously decried it as a move toward death panels; the payments 
were thus withdrawn from the health care reform package.461  Yet, only six years 
after the death panels outcry, CMS faced little opposition to the proposed rule to 
authorize Medicare reimbursements for advanced care planning discussions.462  
Indeed, comments on the proposed rule submitted by both individuals and 
health care organizations overwhelmingly supported the change in policy, once 
considered on its terms and not as a pawn in a larger battle.463  The percentage of 
larger hospitals with palliative care programs is now 90 percent, compared to 
only 15 percent of hospitals with over 50 beds in 1998.464 
This example suggests that, even on one of the most sensitive topics—
targeted for attack by overly vocal interest groups—people and communities can 
engage productively on discussion of tradeoffs between, for example, extending 
life and quality of life, if engaged in the right settings and at the right level of 
conceptual abstraction.  And these conversations can then begin to support 
policymaking that increases investments in palliative care, further weaving it into 
the fabric of medical practice.  Although not the primary goal, in the end, this 
kind of thoughtful consideration of how people want to deal with serious illness, 
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pain, and death could simultaneously spur policymaking that roots out wasteful, 
invasive end-of-life expenditures. 
2. Access, Ballot Initiatives, and Medicaid Expansion 
Finally, separating the discussion about what people most value from 
market mechanisms can reveal that people might care most about others, and the 
distribution of resources to others.  The fight over Medicaid expansion is 
revealing the depths of insight into a shared commitment to access that is being 
expressed though a more traditional democratic tool: ballot measures. 
The ACA intended to expand Medicaid access in all states to people earning 
up to 138 percent of the federal poverty level, but was thwarted in the courts.465  
The first major legal challenge to the ACA, NFIB v. Sebelius, in effect made this 
expansion optional, so states could keep their pre–ACA eligibility categories or 
expand and, in turn, receive federal matching funds for upwards of 90 percent of 
the spending on newly qualified enrollees.466  As of September 2018, thirty-six 
states and the District of Columbia had adopted the expansion.467   
What is remarkable is that in the fourteen opt out states, voters have begun 
to directly override their representatives’ decision with ballot initiatives.468  Maine 
was the first to pass a ballot initiative to expand Medicaid in November 2017.  
Voters in Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah followed in November 2018.  Ironically, and 
illustrating that implementing laws people value may be more challenging than 
gauging what they value, politicians, including former Republican Governor 
LePage in Maine and current legislators in Utah, have dug their heels in to resist 
implementing the referenda.469 
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A takeaway from these initiatives is that people deeply value access to 
medical care in their communities—especially for lower-income community 
members.  These initiatives passed because people who would not directly benefit 
personally from the expansion voted in its favor.  Health regulation should focus 
on gauging and realizing such expressions of shared commitments.  Bureaucracy 
is inevitable, but it should bolster a health care system that can fulfill, rather than 
frustrate, what people and communities genuinely care about. 
These examples will not—in and of themselves—transform the U.S. health 
care system, but they illustrate different ways to develop health system priorities 
that reflect shared commitments.  None of health care’s problems is easy.  But the 
hope that the market will simultaneously fix escalating, wasteful spending and 
also produce what people want has pushed aside working on alternatives that 
could more effectively achieve these two important and sometimes distinct goals.  
Relinquishing the false hope in markets can clear space for solutions that could 
genuinely improve the value of health care spending and make people healthier 
and more secure. 
CONCLUSION 
Market-based solutions preserve an aura of choice and autonomy and have 
garnered widespread appeal in recent decades.  They may be appropriate when 
there is no right answer; when heterogeneity of wants can genuinely be 
accommodated by the market; when people are reasonably good decisionmakers; 
and when the subject in question is not life or death.  Then, consumers may be the 
best arbiters.  But such moments are fewer than imagined, especially in the realm 
of health care. 
The growing body of evidence discussed in this Article shows that market-
based approaches have largely failed health law and suggests we can do better.  It 
is time to let go of the false hope that market-based solutions will solve U.S. health 
care woes. 
Eschewing market-based policymaking is a refusal to continue to create 
structures that do not work and that set people up to fail, knowing they will likely 
do so, and then labeling that failure as choice.  As Deborah Stone wisely 
cautioned, “[i]t is cynical to think that people will feel better about deprivation or 
bad outcomes as long as they believe they have had a hand in choosing their 
fate . . . . [C]onsumer choice offers citizens procedural comfort but less 
substantive help.”470  We must relinquish fleeting and shallow procedural 
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comfort for sounder answers.  In some cases, that might mean deprioritizing 
choice.  In other cases, once we divorce choice from markets, we can ask what the 
polity genuinely values and can work to overcome the barriers to realize such 
ends, whether those barriers are technical, political, or sociological. 
In the end, it is possible that the social and political price of taking on these 
harder conversations is too high.  Collective engagement on hard problems may 
seem naïve at a moment in time with extraordinarily high political divisiveness, a 
breakdown in representative government, and concentrated wealth and interests 
controlling policy.  Trying to gauge shared priorities in a deeper way will of 
course be contentious and divisive, particularly if it reveals that what some people 
want is discriminatory or rights threatening.  One possibility is that ineffective, 
bureaucratic market-based policies may be the price we pay to keep the peace. 
Yet, this Article has shown that this price is extremely high.  And, at the end 
of the day, these market-based policies, as battles over the ACA have most 
recently illustrated, have not been mollifying.  They have merely buried 
contentious issues to reemerge later. 
We must take on political challenges and uncomfortable conversations to 
make real progress on the most intractable health policy problems.  As long as we 
continue painstakingly to build health care’s market bureaucracy, we are too 
distracted and too tired to have these conversations.  This Article has argued that 
we must put down the technocratic tools and turn our collective efforts to 
building more productive intellectual foundations for the next era of health 
policy, law, and regulation. 
